People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 16 February 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 4-18-0522,4-18-0522
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALACHI DWAUN HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2021 IL App (4th) 180522-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALACHI DWAUN HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-18-0522

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

February 16, 2021

NOTICE

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County

No. 16CF1253

Honorable Scott D. Drazewski, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court conducted a proper Krankel inquiry into defendant's posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 2 In November 2016, defendant, Malachi Dwaun Harris, was charged in an eight-count indictment with two counts of aggravated possession of a stolen firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-3.9(a)(1) (West 2016)), a Class 1 felony; one count of attempt gunrunning (720 ILCS 5/24-3(A)(a) (West 2016)), a Class 2 felony; and five counts of possession of a stolen firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-3.8(a) (West 2016)), a Class 2 felony. After a bench trial in January 2018, defendant was found guilty of count I, aggravated possession of a stolen firearm, and counts IV-VII, possession of stolen firearms. The trial court found counts IV-VII merged into count I for purposes of entering a judgment of conviction. After a presentence investigation and report, defendant was sentenced to eight years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, along with two years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Defendant appeals.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was originally charged by information with one count of aggravated possession of a stolen firearm, a Class 1 felony; one count of attempt gunrunning, a Class 2 felony; and five counts of possession of a stolen firearm, Class 2 felonies, in November 2016. Several days later, indictments were returned for the same offenses, and in June 2017, the McLean County State's Attorney's Office initiated extradition proceedings to extradite defendant from his home state of Indiana.

¶ 5 Defendant was charged after being named by a codefendant, William McCoy, as one of three persons involved in the burglary of a sporting goods business in Springfield in November 2016. Entry into the business was made by driving a vehicle previously stolen in Indianapolis, Indiana, through the wall of the store and absconding with a number of firearms. The codefendant, who identified defendant at trial as one of two other persons involved, testified they left the store in another vehicle, a red Chevrolet Impala, driven by defendant, which was eventually stopped in McLean County after a police chase. McCoy was the only occupant arrested at the scene. The Impala, which was ultimately connected to defendant, was likewise from Indiana and found to contain some of the stolen firearms.

¶ 6 Defendant waived a jury and proceeded to a bench trial in January 2018, which was continued in progress to two days in March 2018. At the close of the State's case, the trial court granted defense counsel's motion for a directed finding on counts II and VIII. Defendant elected not to testify after being twice admonished and given time to discuss the matter with counsel. At the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed, and the court granted, defendant's motion for a directed finding as to count III. The court took the matter under advisement andruled two days later, finding defendant guilty of counts I and IV-VII. (the docket sheet incorrectly indicates counts V-VIII).

¶ 7 Defendant filed a "Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial" in April 2018, claiming (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in: (a) denying defendant's motion in limine prior to trial, (b) admitting certain identified exhibits over defendant's objections, (c) admitting expert testimony from two police witnesses regarding cell phone records and analysis, (d) admitting opinions regarding identified cell phone records and cell site location testimony, and (e) partially denying defendant's oral motion for a directed finding. Defendant's motion was denied.

¶ 8 The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years' imprisonment with two years of MSR and credit for pretrial detention. Defendant appeals.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to conduct an adequate preliminary Krankel inquiry into what he contends was a posttrial assertion he was denied his constitutional right to testify. See People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). Although defendant frames the issue as an inadequate Krankel, inquiry, the State argues the issue is, in reality, "whether the trial court insured that defendant's waiver was unequivocal." Further, the State contends this issue, having never been raised in the trial court, is now forfeited. Defendant's specific claim of error is with the sufficiency of the trial court's Krankel inquiry into defendant's waiver of his right to testify. For the reasons stated below, we limit our review to this issue alone.

¶ 11 Whether the trial court conducted a proper Krankel preliminary inquiry presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. If the trialcourt's inquiry was properly conducted and the court decided the merits of defendant's claim, we will reverse only if the trial court's actions constitute manifest error, or error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.

¶ 12 Defendant's brief accurately recited a portion of a lengthy and detailed colloquy between defendant and the trial court regarding defendant's right to testify, ultimately claiming "the record in this case does not establish that he unequivocally waived his right to testify." Defendant failed to mention this colloquy took place after an earlier admonition to defendant about his right to elect whether to testify or not. This admonition was preceded by comments by the court as follows:

"So in order to anticipate what options would be available to the defendant as to whether or not he wishes to present any evidence, first let me indicate to you, [defendant], that as it relates to any other witness, Mr. Lewis makes the determination on whether he wishes to call any such witness as part of your defense. That is not true, however, when it relates to whether you would elect or choose to testify as a witness in your case. Basically there are certain decisions that belong solely to an individual charged with a crime in a case, and that includes not only what plea to enter, whether to waive a jury trial, and then the next issue is whether to testify on your own behalf. So although I am not asking you for an election at this point in time, I do want to have a preliminary discussion with you to encourage you to have additional discussions with your attorney, Mr. Lewis, before the time wouldarise as early as this afternoon as to whether or not you would elect or chose to testify as a witness in your case." (Emphasis added.)

¶ 13 It was only after these preliminary remarks that the trial court then gave its admonishment:

"So you do have a right to testify, but you may elect not to testify. If you decide that you wish to testify then you will be giving up your constitutional rights against self-incrimination and you will subject yourself to cross-examination by the prosecuting attorney at the conclusion of your direct testimony. If you decide not to testify then your election will not be considered by the Court in any way in deciding upon its verdict. You should discuss your rights concerning testifying with your attorney, and although he has an obligation to give you legal advice on the subject, ultimately it is your decision to make as to whether to testify or not. So please take those matters into consideration and follow up with additional questions that you may have of Mr. Lewis before the time would arise later today as to whether you wish to testify or not." (Emphases added.)

¶ 14 The court then recessed for the lunch hour, allowing defendant substantial time for discussion with his attorney. Afterwards, once defense counsel indicated the defense was presenting no evidence, the trial court initiated a conversation with defendant, again omitted from defendant's brief:

"THE COURT: Mr. Lewis has indicated that it is hisintention not to call any witnesses as part of your defense. As a matter of trial strategy he makes the determination on whether or not he would wish to call either of the potential witnesses that had been disclosed earlier, Diana Pittman [spelled out by the court], or Diane Illucens, Killches [spelled out], hyphen, Riley [spelled]. However, that does not apply with respect to whether you wish to testify as a witness in your own case. Have you taken into consideration the matters that I asked you to consider between then and now as to whether or not you wish to testify, [defendant]?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me be more specific. You've considered whether or not you wish to testify as a witness in your case; is that correct?

DEFENDANT: Yeah, I don't want to testify.

THE COURT: You're going to have to speak up.

DEFENDANT: No, I don't want to testify.

THE COURT: We're working towards that. I need to ask you a few more questions to make sure that that is a knowing and voluntary decision on your part. You understand that ultimately it's your decision to make regardless of whatever recommendation Mr. Lewis may provide to you?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So this is a personal decision on your part;do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you have adequate opportunity in your own mind in order to discuss this issue with Mr. Lewis?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did he answer your questions for you?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Without telling me what his advice was, did he give

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