People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 10 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 86-1956,86-1956
• Citation: 130 Ill.Dec. 648,537 N.E.2d 977,182 Ill. App. 3d 114
• Parties: , 130 Ill.Dec. 648 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 977

537 N.E.2d 977

182 Ill.App.3d 114, 130 Ill.Dec. 648

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-1956.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, First Division.

April 10, 1989.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, State of Illinois, (Thomas Long, Asst. Appellate Defender, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., County of Cook (Inge Fryklund, Catharine M. Forest, Eileen Rubin, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Eugene Harris, was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals from his conviction contending (1) the State improperly excluded blacks from the jury after defense counsel objected to the State's use of its peremptory challenges; and (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during cross-examination and closing argument that the defendant had coerced a witness into providing testimony.

At trial, Chicago police officer Nancy Stokilo testified that on June 28, 1984, while working as an undercover plain clothes officer, she telephoned Kenneth Steele, an individual from whom she had made five prior narcotics purchases. During this conversation, Stokilo arranged to meet Steele in a parking lot at 6:30 p.m. and to purchase two ounces of cocaine for $2,600. After speaking with her surveillance team, Stokilo arrived at the parking lot at 6:25 p.m. and waited for Steele to arrive. At 6:30 p.m. Steele walked into the parking lot, entered Stokilo's car and told her that the defendant, who he referred to as "his man Gene," would be there in a few minutes. Approximately twenty minutes later, Stokilo left her car and went into a grocery store where she told a member of her surveillance team that if the defendant did not show up shortly, Steele said that he would call him. Shortly after Stokilo returned to the car, Steele went across the street to call defendant from a pay telephone and told her to talk to the defendant. After this conversation, Stokilo and Steele proceeded to drive to Steele's house where Steele said defendant wanted to do the deal.

At approximately 8:30 p.m., after Stokilo and Steele had waited outside of Steele's house for approximately an hour, the defendant drove up. After introducing himself, the defendant told Stokilo to follow him to one of the apartment buildings he owned where they would complete the sale. Stokilo began to follow the defendant in her car until she realized that her surveillance team had been cut off by a passing train. Stokilo went back to the parking lot where she had originally met Steele. A few minutes later, the defendant walked up to Stokilo's car and told her that he had to get the cocaine from his brother and that he would be back in five minutes and she should have the money ready.

When defendant returned, Stokilo testified that he instructed Steele to get into the back seat in order that he could sit in the front seat passenger side. Defendant reached into the waist belt of his shorts and pulled out a clear plastic bag containing a white powder which he handed to Stokilo. Stokilo gave defendant $700 and told defendant that the remainder of the money was in the trunk. Stokilo went to the trunk to retrieve the money. The closing of the trunk was a prearranged signal to the surveillance team who arrived at the car as Stokilo reentered it. The officers arrested both the defendant and Steele.

Defendant testified that on June 28, 1984, he first saw Kenneth Steele at 2 p.m. when he went to Steele's home to buy $5 worth of marijuana. At that time he was introduced to Officer Stokilo who was in her automobile in front of the building. After Steele told defendant that he would not be able to purchase the marijuana until later that day, the defendant drove to a tavern where he remained until approximately 3:45 p.m. After that defendant stated he proceeded to another tavern. Between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. defendant testified that he left the tavern and saw Steele driving an automobile. Defendant told Steele that he still wanted the marijuana and Steele told him to follow him to a parking lot. Defendant stated that Steele introduced Officer Stokilo as his girl friend. Defendant stated that Steele got in the back seat of the car and he sat in the front seat and Steele handed Stokilo a brown bag from which she sniffed twice. Defendant asked Steele what was going on to which he responded "be cool." Officer Stokilo placed some money by defendant's legs. Steele grabbed the money, counted it, and asked for the remainder. As Stokilo went to the trunk to obtain the remainder of the money, defendant told Steele that he would see him later and opened the door and was leaving the vehicle when the police arrived and arrested him.

Kenneth Steele testified that he had known the defendant for a couple of years. He stated that on June 28, 1984, defendant came by his home at approximately 2 p.m. to purchase some marijuana. Steele told defendant he would have some marijuana later that day and the defendant left. At approximately 4 p.m. Steele stated that he was waiting in a parking lot with Stokilo when he saw defendant come out of a tavern. Steele waved the defendant over and told him that he had some business to take care of and that defendant should get back to him later concerning the marijuana. After a short period of time, Steele testified that he crossed the street and made a telephone call to his connection, Bernard Welch, and had Officer Stokilo talk to Welch. Bernard Welch was recently deceased at the time of trial. At approxi mately 6 p.m. Steele testified that he got into a car driven by Welch and Welch gave him two ounces of cocaine. Steele got out of the car and walked back to the parking lot. On his way he ran into defendant who was leaving a tavern. Steele suggested that the defendant join him in taking care of some business. Steele stated that when they arrived at the parking lot, he introduced Stokilo to defendant and then handed Stokilo the cocaine. Stokilo tested the cocaine and gave Steele seven one hundred dollar bills. Officer Stokilo went to the trunk to get the remainder of the money and, as she returned to the car, defendant stated he was ready to leave when the police officers appeared and arrested him.

I.

Defendant, a black man, first argues on appeal that this matter must be remanded for a hearing on whether the State improperly used its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. During voir dire defense counsel twice argued that the State was utilizing its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. After the State exercised its first series of peremptory challenges, defense counsel noted for the record that three of the four challenges were directed against black individuals. Further, after jury selection had been completed, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the fact that of the six peremptory challenges used by the State, three were directed against blacks. The trial judge stated that two members of the jury and one of the alternate jurors were black and denied the motion and did not require the State to give an explanation for its actions.

Prosecutors may not purposefully discriminate against a racial group in selecting a jury in a trial of a defendant belonging to that group. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a defendant must demonstrate that he is a member of a recognizable racial group and that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to remove members of his race from the jury panel. The defendant must show that the relevant facts and circumstances of the case raise an inference of discrimination. After this prima facie case is made, the State has the burden of putting forward a neutral explanation for its challenges. The trial court must then evaluate the State's explanation for the use of its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks and determine whether the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360; People v. Allen (1988), 168 Ill.App.3d 397, 118 Ill.Dec. 479, 521 N.E.2d 1172.

We agree with the defendant that the record in the case at bar could support a prima facie case of discrimination on the part of the State. The defendant is a black man, a member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor exercised three of his six peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. These factors suggest a prima facie case of discrimination requiring the State to provide a racially neutral explanation for the use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Although, in its brief on appeal and at oral argument in this matter, the State has presented racially neutral explanations for the use of its three peremptory challenges against blacks, under the guidelines of Batson, the neutral explanations are only relevant in a remand situation to the trial court where the State will be required to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination established by the defendant. The initial determination of whether a defendant has established a prima facie case is left to the trial judge who is in a superior position to determine...