People v. Harris

Decision Date25 July 2008
Docket NumberNo. 1-06-2557.,1-06-2557.
Citation892 N.E.2d 1147
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County (James Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz and Ashley A. Romito, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender of Cook County (Jessica Wynne Arizo, Assistant Appellate Defender, of counsel), Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Presiding Justice McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Eddie Harris appeals the trial judge's denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that he was denied his due process right to a fair hearing on his motion where the trial judge relied on her own recognition of events rather than the evidence before her, acted as an advocate for the State, made credibility determinations prior to the end of the testimony, prevented the defense from presenting evidence to support its claim, and relied on her own emotional reaction to the offense.

In October 2003, defendant and codefendant Duane Roach were charged with 16 counts of murder in connection with the repeated rape and beating death of Lori Roscetti on October 18, 1986. On December 16, 2004, defendant and codefendant Roach each agreed to plead guilty to one count of murder (count VI), i.e., murder executed during the course of a criminal sexual assault and committed in an exceptionally brutal and heinous manner, in exchange for a 75-year extended-term sentence, 3 years of mandatory supervised release (MSR), and the dismissal of the remaining charges. Defendant was represented by Assistant Public Defender (APD) LaFonzo Palmer at the plea hearing and codefendant Roach was represented by APD Tony Eben. The trial judge specifically asked defendant if that was his "understanding of the offer," to which defendant replied, "yes."

Prior to accepting defendant's plea, the trial judge admonished him that the murder counts carried a possible sentence of 20 to 40 years with a MSR term of 3 years. The judge also admonished him that he was eligible for an extended-term sentence, whereby he could be imprisoned for up to 80 years and serve 3 years of MSR. The judge further advised defendant that he could be found eligible for the death penalty or life imprisonment on some of the charges that had been filed against him.

The trial judge advised defendant that he had "the right to continue to plead not guilty and to require the State to prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" as well as the right to plead guilty. When asked if he understood that, defendant said, "yes." Defendant stated that he understood what a jury trial and bench trial were and that he had a right to a bench or jury trial, but wished to give up those rights. Defendant then signed a jury waiver, which the trial court accepted. The judge informed defendant that by pleading guilty, he was giving up the right to confront witnesses and to call witnesses in his defense as well as the right to testify in his own defense or remain silent. The trial judge then asked the following questions of defendant.

"THE COURT: To each of you, are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, Mr. Harris?

DEFENDANT HARRIS: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: Each of you have any threats, force or promises of any kind aside from the State's offer been directed against you in order to make you plead guilty, Mr. Harris?

DEFENDANT HARRIS: No."

The trial judge found that defendant understood the charges against him, the possible penalties that could be imposed, and that he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to murder under count VI.

The State offered the following factual basis.

Allen Radner would testify that in the early morning hours of October 18, 1986, at approximately 1 a.m., he walked Lori Roscetti to her car after studying late for medical school finals in the school library. David Sachs would testify that he was a railroad security officer and at approximately 4:40 a.m. on October 18, 1986, he discovered the "horribly beaten and still bleeding body" of Lori Roscetti lying next to her car on the railroad access lane located at approximately 1500 West 15th Place in Chicago.

Roscetti was pronounced dead at the scene. Joanne Richmon would testify that she was an assistant medical examiner in 1986 and she performed the autopsy on Roscetti. Roscetti was 23 years old at the time of her death and the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma. She would testify that "virtually every bone in [Roscetti's] face was shattered, including her sinuses, her hyaloid bone, her Adam's apple[,] that [Roscetti] had been brutally stomped on, and that the medical examiner also saw the bloody shoe prints on her torso." Additionally, "there were multiple fractures of her rib cage, her torso was also torn by multiple lacerations, revealing that a sharp pointed object had been repeatedly shoved through her skin."

DNA analysts would testify that they performed numerous tests from the rape kit swabs, Roscetti's clothing, and hairs found on her clothing and in the car. These analysts would testify that "the vaginal swab was positive for Eddie Harris' DNA; the rectal swab was positive for both Harris' and Roach's DNA; that [Roscetti's] coat had seven semen stains on it belonging to [codefendant Roach]. In addition, there were semen stains on her jacket from Roach, her jogging pants from defendant and Roach including a mixture from both, her shirt from Roach and a mixture from both, her left shoe from defendant and a mixture from both, and on her underwear from Roach." Another DNA analyst would testify that three pubic hairs were recovered from the crime scene and Roscetti's clothes, two were from Roach and one was from defendant. Additionally, a fingerprint examiner would testify that partial fingerprints from the interior door of Roscetti's car were a match to defendant's fingerprints.

A police detective would testify that in January 2002, he spoke with Bernard Roach, codefendant Roach's brother. Bernard revealed that he knew the identity of Roscetti's killers and then an investigation focused on defendant and codefendant Roach.

Bernard Roach would testify that in late 1986, he was walking with his brother, codefendant Roach, and defendant near the crime scene. There were many reward posters up seeking information on Roscetti's murder. As they were walking, codefendant Roach pointed to one of the posters and said to Bernard that they did that, "Me and Eddie did that, and she was a tough bitch to kill." Bernard would further testify that "nothing else was said and that he never thought it was true until he saw the DNA exclusions and two profiles that kept coming up."

Lieutenant Joseph Murphy would testify that defendant was arrested on February 4, 2002, and he gave oral admissions and both he and codefendant Roach gave separate reenactment videos. In the reenactment video, they said they were looking for cars to break into to get money to buy crack cocaine. They came upon Roscetti, who was parked behind her building, searching for something in her car. They came up behind her, jumped her and abducted her. They drove her car to the place where she was murdered.

The State would also introduce the videotaped confessions from both defendant and codefendant Roach. The videotaped confessions would show that they abducted Roscetti and forced her into the backseat. She was held down so she could not escape or cry out. She was crying, shaking and begging to be let go. They took her to an isolated railroad access lane. They took turns raping her. Afterward, she begged to be let go and said she would give her money to them. They beat her, her face was crushed with a concrete brick or rock and her neck was repeatedly slammed in the door.

APD Palmer stipulated to these fact and that the chain of custody was maintained for all exhibits and DNA testing. The trial judge found a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea and entered the judgment.

Before sentencing defendant to the agreed extended term of 75 years with a 3-year MSR term, the trial judge asked defendant if he wished to say anything. Defendant replied, "no." The State offered defendant's prior criminal background to the trial judge, which included two prior burglary convictions and a theft conviction. The judge then imposed the agreed sentence.

On January 14, 2005, defendant mailed a pro se "Motion for Reduction of Sentence," but it was not file-stamped by the clerk of the circuit court until March 22, 2005. Defendant alleged that APD Palmer told defendant "to plead guilty because [defendant's attorney] did not want to go to trial because [defendant's attorney] could not win." Defendant also said that APD Palmer told him that he "would only have to do 20 years before [he] was released."

On April 1, 2005, the trial judge placed defendant's case on her call. Since APD Palmer was unavailable, another public defender appeared. The judge noted that the motion was postmarked within 30 days of defendant's guilty plea and was timely. The judge reset defendant's case for later in order to give APD Palmer an opportunity to speak with defendant to see if defendant still wished to litigate the motion. On April 14, 2005, defendant sent a second pro se "Motion for Order Correcting Omission in Previous Order," in which defendant alleged that the mittimus failed to show that defendant was sentenced under the sentencing laws in effect in 1986 and therefore he "is entitled to serve 37.5 years."

On April 21, 2005, APD Palmer appeared before the trial judge to discuss defendant's pro se motions. APD Palmer indicated that he thought defendant was concerned with the anticipated parole date, which had shown as 100% of defendant's sentence, but defendant was entitled to receive day-for-day good-time credit....

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8 cases
  • People of The State of Ill. v. STRAWBRIDGE, 2-08-0701.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 9, 2010
    ...of the victim. A defendant has a fundamental right to an open-minded and unbiased trier of fact. People v. Harris, 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 560, 323 Ill.Dec. 155, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008). Generally, a person is not competent to sit as a juror if his or her state of mind is such that a party will ......
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    ...questions solicit[ed] evidence material to the State's case.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Harris, 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 561, 323 Ill.Dec. 155, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008) (quoting People v. Smith, 299 Ill.App.3d 1056, 1062, 234 Ill.Dec. 52, 702 N.E.2d 218 (1998) ).¶ 81 I believ......
  • People v. Haywood
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    • March 14, 2016
    ...This right to a fair hearing extends to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. People v. Harris, 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 560, 323 Ill.Dec. 155, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008).¶ 27 Defendant filed a motion to recuse pursuant to Rule 63(C)(1), which directs judges to voluntarily re......
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    ...judge does not "assume[ ] the role of prosecutor" in so doing. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Harris , 384 Ill. App. 3d 551, 561, 323 Ill.Dec. 155, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008). The court may pose any questions, in a fair and impartial manner, that help "elicit the truth" or "clari......
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21 books & journal articles
  • Repetitive questions
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Is It Admissible? Part I. Testimonial Evidence
    • May 1, 2022
    ...claim of a violation of the confrontation clause under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v. Harris , 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008). The trial court properly uses its discretion to restrict the scope of cross-examination to preclude repetitive or unduly harassing testimony......
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    ...claim of a violation of the confrontation clause under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v. Harris , 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008). The trial court properly uses its discretion to restrict the scope of cross-examination to preclude repetitive or unduly harassing testimony......
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    ...People v. Harold Oliver, 306 Ill.App.3d 59, 713 N.E.2d 727, 239 Ill.Dec. 196 (1999), §48.202 People v. Harris , 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008), §§1.400, 10.500 People v. Harris, 706 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y.A.D. 2000), §§6.800, 10.300, 10.500 People v. Hatfield, 18 P.2d 366, 129 C.A. 1......
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    ...claim of a violation of the confrontation clause under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v. Harris , 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 892 N.E.2d 1147 (2008). The trial court properly uses its discretion to restrict the scope of cross-examination to preclude repetitive or unduly harassing testimony......
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