People v. Harrison
Decision Date | 18 October 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 102859.,102859. |
Citation | 226 Ill.2d 427,877 N.E.2d 432 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Dwight HARRISON, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, Chicago (Michael Davidson, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Dwight Harrison was charged in the Cook County circuit court with two counts of first degree murder for the July 9, 1998, beating death of Theotrie Archie. He pleaded not guilty and raised the defense of insanity. Following a bench trial, he was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI).
After a hearing, he was found in need of inpatient mental-health services and committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services. He appealed, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress defendant's confession after the court found him insane at the time of the offense. He also contended the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court judgment was an acquittal for all purposes and that a reviewing court could not grant any substantive relief greater than the freedom from guilt established by the acquittal. 366 Ill.App.3d 210, 218, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315), and we now affirm the appellate court judgment.
Theotrie Archie was beaten to death in the hallway outside his Chicago apartment. Defendant was identified as the perpetrator by Noble Foggs, a former roommate of Archie, who saw defendant beating the victim. Chicago Police Detectives Thomas Benoit and Jean Romic found defendant at his sister's apartment. Defendant agreed to accompany them to the police station, where he was given a Miranda warning before he was interviewed. Initially, he denied any responsibility for Archie's murder and agreed to take a polygraph examination the following morning. Shortly after defendant entered the examination room, the polygraph examiner told detectives defendant wanted to talk to them. Following another Miranda warning, defendant confessed to the murder.
Assistant State's Attorney Robert Robertson then arrived, introduced himself, told defendant he was a prosecutor and not a defense lawyer, and again gave defendant a Miranda warning. Robertson allowed defendant to have a cigarette and use the washroom. Defendant then acknowledged to Robertson that he had been treated well and had no complaints about his treatment. Defendant also agreed to give a handwritten statement confessing to the murder. The statement was ultimately admitted as an exhibit at trial.
Defendant entered a not-guilty plea, and the trial court ordered behavioral examinations. Based on those examinations, the court found defendant fit to stand trial with medications. Defendant then filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress his confession.
At the suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from the detectives, Robertson, defendant's attorney, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Roni Selzberg, who was appointed by the court to evaluate defendant and render an opinion on his mental capacity. Dr. Selzberg was unable to offer an opinion on whether defendant intelligently waived his Miranda rights because she could not date her impressions back to the time of his arrest. The court granted defendant's motion to suppress, and the State appealed.
In an unpublished opinion, the appellate court reversed the suppression order, finding that defendant's confession was voluntary, based on the totality of the circumstances. People v. Harrison, 324 Ill. App.3d 1132, 282 Ill.Dec. 134, 805 N.E.2d 753 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court denied leave to appeal. People v. Harrison, 198 Ill.2d 600, 262 Ill.Dec. 622, 766 N.E.2d 242 (2002) (table).
On remand, defendant filed an "Amended Motion to Suppress Statements," again claiming defendant's confession was involuntary. In response, the State invoked collateral estoppel, prohibiting reopening the motion to suppress. Although the trial court granted defendant's motion to reopen the suppression motion, defense counsel later withdrew it. Defendant then waived a jury trial, and the cause was tried before the Cook County circuit court.
The State presented only four witnesses. Bobbie Archie, the victim's sister, identified her brother, described his physical stature, and stated that he appeared in good health when he left her apartment on the day of the murder. William Meador of the Chicago police department was the first officer to arrive at the murder scene. He testified he found the victim lying in the fifth-floor hallway, attended by paramedics. Meador was unable to find any eyewitnesses, but he spoke to an unnamed person in the building who identified the victim as Theotrie Archie, who lived in apartment 504.
The State then called Noble Foggs, who testified that he and the victim had been roommates. On the evening of the crime, Foggs and a friend, Shirley Graham, were in his apartment drinking beer and using crack cocaine while listening to music through headphones. When Foggs removed the headphones, he heard a "commotion" in the hallway and opened the door. He saw defendant, whom he recognized from the neighborhood, standing over the victim. Foggs testified that defendant "stomped" on Archie's throat a few times. Foggs said "don't kill him" and retreated inside his apartment fearing defendant might attack him because defendant was a "pretty big guy." Foggs feared for his life because he was smaller and high on crack cocaine. Foggs admitted to prior felony narcotics convictions and also admitted he did not immediately tell investigating police officers what he saw on the evening of the crime. He did not give the police his account of defendant's actions until he was later interviewed at the police station following a failed polygraph examination.
Transcripts of the suppression hearing testimony of Detectives Benoit and Romic, and Assistant State's Attorney Robertson were admitted by stipulation. Also admitted pursuant to stipulation was the handwritten statement of defendant, confessing to the murder.
Defendant's attorney made an oral motion for a directed finding and waived argument. The motion was denied, and the entire defense case, raising the issue of insanity, was then presented by stipulation. The State stipulated that Drs. Selzberg and Markos, psychiatrists who examined defendant, would testify consistently with their prior reports tendered to the court in 1999, stating that defendant was, at the time of the murder, suffering from schizophrenia and, as a result, unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his behavior with the requirements of law.
The State further stipulated to incorporate and adopt the proceedings at the various motion hearings as part of defendant's case-in-chief. In rebuttal, the State offered the stipulated testimony of Dr. Wahlstrom, who examined defendant in August 1999, and reported that, in his opinion, no mental-health professional could testify as to defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime because of defendant's inability to recall the actual date of the murder or his activities that day.
The trial court found that the State had proved first degree murder, but defendant had established by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense. The court entered a finding of NGRI and referred defendant to the Department of Human Services (Department) for evaluation.
Two Department psychiatrists evaluated defendant and concluded in their written reports that defendant was in need of inpatient mental-health services. At a hearing to determine whether defendant should be immediately released from custody, the parties stipulated to the admission of the reports. The court committed defendant to the custody of the Department until June 28, 2028, subject to statutory early release based on a finding that he is no longer in need of inpatient mental-health services. See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(d), (e) (West 2002).
Defendant appealed, challenging only the court's predicate finding that he committed first degree murder. He contended that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to reopen the suppression motion after the court found he was insane at the time of the offense and that the evidence, with his confession excluded from consideration, was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State requested that the appeal be dismissed as moot because the trial court's NGRI finding constituted an acquittal and the reviewing court could not grant any relief. The appellate court agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that "an NGRI verdict is, in all form and substance, an acquittal." 366 Ill.App.3d at 214, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152.
The appellate court further noted that even if it were to review defendant's claims on appeal, the record indicated they had no substantive merit. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). The court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court's insanity finding contradicted the appellate court's prior finding that his intellectual functioning was "low average to average," noting that defendant cited no authority and that the court had considered numerous relevant factors in making its determination. Thus, consideration of the statement was proper, and defendant failed to...
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