People v. Hart

• Decision Date: 15 December 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 68991
• Citation: 341 N.W.2d 864,129 Mich.App. 669
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leon HART, a/k/a Butch, Defendant-Appellant. 129 Mich.App. 669, 341 N.W.2d 864
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 864

341 N.W.2d 864

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leon HART, a/k/a Butch, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 68991.

129 Mich.App. 669, 341 N.W.2d 864

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 9, 1983.

Decided Oct. 11, 1983.

Released for Publication Dec. 15, 1983.

[129 MICHAPP 671] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Robert L. Kaczmarek, Pros. Atty., and Annette M. Gray, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by John Nussbaumer, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and R.B. BURNS and ALLEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On June 28, 1982, defendant was arraigned in circuit court and defendant entered a [129 MICHAPP 672] plea of guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. On the same date, the prosecutor filed a Notice of Intent to File Supplemental Information for Prosecution as an Habitual Criminal. Defendant pled guilty to Count II of the information, preparation to burn real property, M.C.L. Sec. 750.77; M.S.A. Sec. 28.272, in return for the dismissal of Count I, felonious assault, M.C.L. Sec. 750.82; M.S.A. Sec. 28.277, as well as in return for not being prosecuted as an habitual offender. Thereafter sentenced to a prison term of 1 1/2 to 4 years on November 4, 1982, defendant appeals as of right.

Defendant has raised nine issues on appeal, which we have consolidated into the seven issues addressed below. While none of defendant's issues require reversal, we will briefly discuss them seriatim.

Defendant's first issue is the claim that he is entitled to reversal of his conviction and remand for further proceedings because his guilty plea was illusory and involuntary. Specifically, defendant claims that (1) the prosecutor filed a Notice of Intent to File Supplemental Information for Prosecution as a Habitual Criminal rather than actually filing a supplemental information, and (2) the notice of intent to file habitual offender charges was insufficient because it did not inform him of "the nature of the accusation against him" and because it did not give him notice "of the possible consequences of conviction on the underlying charge".

Defendant's claims lack merit for the following reasons: (1) The prosecutor would not have been precluded from filing a supplemental information had plea negotiations failed. People v. Shelton, 412 Mich. 565, 569, 315 N.W.2d 537 (1982). (2) Defendant was properly put on notice of the possibility of [129 MICHAPP 673] habitual offender supplementation from the outset of the case. See People v. Nathaniel Johnson, 113 Mich.App. 414, 421-422, 317 N.W.2d 645 (1982). (3) Defendant received the benefit of dismissal of Count I and of the nonfiling and nonpursuit of an habitual offender information knowing full-well that he had three prior felony convictions and that he therefore could have been charged in a supplemental information as a second, third, or fourth felony habitual offender. People v. Peete, 102 Mich.App. 34, 38-39, 301 N.W.2d 53 (1980). (4) We find defendant's plea was manifestly voluntary, Peete, supra, p. 38, 301 N.W.2d 53. (5) Since no supplemental information was filed there was no formal requirement that defendant be informed of the habitual offender accusation against him or its "possible consequences". Unlike an information, a notice of intent is not formally required to inform a defendant of the "accusation" or consequences thereof.

Defendant's second claim is that his "right to speedy disposition" was violated by the fact he was sentenced on November 4, 1982, approximately four months after his June 28, 1982, guilty plea. Specifically, defendant argues he was prejudiced by the delay because he was deprived of two 90-day reductions granted to all state prison inmates pursuant to the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, M.C.L. Sec. 800.71 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1437(1) et seq. Having reviewed the record, we find that defendant, when he was in the trial court, never made an objection to sentencing or a motion to vacate sentence based upon the specific grounds he now presents. This has resulted both in the nonpreservation of this issue for appeal and in the lack of a record for review. See Trail Clinic, P.C. v. Bloch, 114 Mich.App. 700, 713, 319 N.W.2d 638 (1982); People v. Mack, 112 Mich.App. 605, 613, 317 [129 MICHAPP 674] N.W.2d 190 (1981). However, were we to consider this issue we would hold it is without merit for the reasons stated in the prosecution's brief.

Defendant's third claim is that his presentence report was not updated and that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant without obtaining a new, updated presentence report. We have examined this allegation of error and find it to be without merit. We find there was an updated presentence report in this case. A September 30, 1982, presentence report was specifically prepared for the instant crime. It is replete with information concerning the instant crime and defendant. Moreover, a November 3, 1982, supplemental presentence report added even more current, updated information to the already current September report. Accordingly, we find no reversible error. See People v. Triplett, 407 Mich. 510, 287 N.W.2d 165 (1980); People v. Anderson, 107 Mich.App. 62, 64-65, 308 N.W.2d 662 (1981); People v. Books, 95 Mich.App. 500, 504-506, 291 N.W.2d 94 (1980).

Defendant's fourth claim is that, if defendant's conviction is reversed, this Court should not allow the people to reinstate both the original charges against defendant or charge defendant as an habitual offender. Since we are not reversing defendant's conviction, this issue is not ripe for a decision by this Court. We do not give "advisory" opinions. See People v. Turner, 123 Mich.App. 600, 332 N.W.2d 626 (1983).

We have examined defendant's sentencing claims which comprise the fifth issue herein and find defendant's claims to be rendered moot by this Court's order dated September 12, 1983, denying the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification.

Defendant's sixth claim is that the trial court [129 MICHAPP 675] erred when it failed to advise defendant that if he was charged as an habitual offender, his sentence could be increased, GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(c). We disagree. There is no reversible error inherent in the trial court's failure to comply with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(c) because defendant was not charged as an habitual offender and his sentence was not enhanced due to habitual offender status....