People v. Hart
| Decision Date | 21 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-02-0740.,4-02-0740. |
| Citation | 281 Ill.Dec. 343,803 N.E.2d 964,345 Ill. App.3d 822 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric L. HART, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender (Court-appointed), Keleigh L. Biggins, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Eric L. Hart.
Scott Rueter, State's Attorney, Decatur, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, David E. Mannchen, Staff Attorney, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.
Defendant, Eric L. Hart, was charged with armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000)) and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1 (West 2000)). In January 2002, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and in May 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 20 and 3 years' imprisonment, with credit for 369 days' time served. Defendant appeals, arguing he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited testimony that he attempted to plea bargain and commented on that attempt in closing argument. We reverse and remand.
On May 20, 2001, a Clark Oil gas station in Decatur was robbed by a man wearing pantyhose on his head and carrying a .22caliber pistol. A worker at the gas station described the robber as a black male, mid to late twenties, about 5 feet 11 inches to 6 feet tall, 160 to 180 pounds, wearing either a black or blue "Starter" shirt with white or gold lettering across it, and blue jeans. Shortly thereafter, a police officer passed a vehicle containing a person matching the robber's description. The officer pursued the vehicle at speeds of up to 70 miles per hour. After the vehicle lost control and left the road, the suspect fled on foot. The suspect was apprehended and identified as defendant.
Michael Beck, former detective with the Decatur police department, testified at trial that he interviewed defendant. Beck first told defendant that he did not have to speak with him. Defendant spoke to Beck about a warrant on file that defendant thought had been taken care of. The following colloquy then took place:
Beck testified defendant then requested to make a phone call to his mother, which he was allowed to do. Defendant said that he wanted to pray with his mother. When defendant finished praying, he told Beck that he wanted to think about whether he wanted to make a statement. That concluded the interview.
Defendant testified at trial that he was on his way to his mother's house to take care of his dogs when a police car pulled up behind him, followed him for about a block, and turned on its lights. He drove on because he did not have a driver's license, a warrant was out for his arrest, and he wanted to park at a friend's house so that his car would not be towed. The police car hit him from the back and knocked him off the road. He was scared, so he jumped out of the car and ran.
During closing argument, defense counsel noted that defendant did not make an admission to Detective Beck, that the only thing defendant said was that he wanted to pray. The prosecutor subsequently argued:
Defendant did not object to the allegedly improper testimony and argument at trial, nor did he raise these issues in a posttrial motion. Under the plainerror rule, however, a reviewing court may consider a trial error that was not properly preserved (1) when the evidence is closely balanced, or (2) where the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the defendant has been denied a fair trial. People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 348-49, 250 Ill.Dec. 692, 739 N.E.2d 455, 477 (2000). The plain-error rule warrants our consideration of this allegation of error.
Supreme Court Rule 402(f) provides:
"If a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, * * * neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal proceeding." 177 Ill.2d R. 402(f).
"The characterization of a statement as plea related, and therefore inadmissible under Rule 402(f), must necessarily turn on the facts of each case." People v. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d 341, 351-52, 38 Ill. Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d 229, 235 (1980). A great variety of situations are possible. The defendant may explicitly ask about making a deal, or the defendant may explicitly state that he has unconditionally decided to cooperate in the general hope that it will do him some good. The defendant may not be explicit and may take different positions. The detective may refuse to talk to the defendant at all about a plea negotiation, or as in this case, the detective may state that he will advise the State's Attorney's office of defendant's cooperation. The defendant's response may be that he will not talk to the detective, or he may admit a few things, or he may make a full statement. The prosecutor may attempt to present the defendant's admissions to the jury, or as in this case, the prosecutor may simply tell the jury that defendant was interested in a plea negotiation. Many other variations are possible.
We should be careful about excluding an admission made by a defendant to a police investigator as an unsuccessful plea negotiation under Rule 402(f). Every guilty person who voluntarily speaks to a detective probably hopes to benefit from the conversation, either by convincing the detective that he did not commit the crime or by obtaining leniency for his cooperation. The police have an investigatory function that the courts and even the State's Attorney do not have. See 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure § 21.2(h), at 106-07 (2d ed.1999). We should not exclude a defendant's factual admissions to the police as a plea discussion, on the basis of a mere intention on the part of the accused to help himself by cooperating with the police. The accused must exhibit a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 353, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d at 235. That expectation must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 351, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d at 235.
This case, however, does not involve the exclusion of a defendant's factual admissions to the police. There were no admissions here. This case involves the prosecutor's suggestion to the jury that defendant offered to enter into plea negotiations and that offer was an indication of guilt. The State argues that defendant's statement "did not in any way indicate his willingness to enter a guilty plea in exchange for concessions from the State." That argument, however, is inconsistent with the argument the prosecutor made to the jury, that defendant wanted to know what kind of agreement he would get if he cooperated and "only guilty men want to know what they get if they cooperate." It is inconsistent to argue that defendant did not intend to pursue plea negotiations and at the same time argue that defendant's attempt to pursue plea negotiations indicated his guilt.
The use of technical objections in an attempt to establish that defendant's inquiries have not risen to the level of a "plea discussion" has been rejected by the supreme court. It is not a good objection that defendant was speaking to a police officer, who did not have the authority to negotiate a plea, so long as defendant could reasonably have assumed the officer was an appropriate party to whom he could convey his offer to bargain. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 352, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d at 235. It is not a good objection that defendant did not get into specifics, such as whether the charge would be reduced or whether the sentence would be limited to a certain number of years. "A statement made as an offer to enter negotiation is indistinguishable from a statement made at an advanced stage of the negotiation process in terms of its impact upon a jury." Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 352, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d at 235. What is important is that there be a clear indication of defendant's intent to pursue plea negotiations. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 352, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d at 235. Some decisions are willing to admit the very offer to make a deal. In People v. Ward, 192 Ill.App.3d 544, 549, 139 Ill.Dec. 564, 548 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (1989), the prosecutor argued to the jury that if defendant had not committed the offense, he would not have said, "`hey, let's make a deal.'" The Ward court refused to follow People v. Connolly, 186 Ill.App.3d 429, 436, 134 Ill.Dec. 338, 542 N.E.2d 517, 522 (1989), holding defendant's inquiry whether deals could be made in Madison County inadmissible. Ward determined there was no plea negotiation because the defendant was not...
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People v. Hart
...in closing argument. With one justice dissenting, the appellate court agreed, reversing defendant's convictions. 345 Ill.App.3d 822, 281 Ill.Dec. 343, 803 N.E.2d 964. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse the judgment of the appellate......
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