People v. Hartfield

• Decision Date: 21 April 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 126729
• Citation: 2022 IL 126729,202 N.E.3d 890,460 Ill.Dec. 870
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Kelvin T. HARTFIELD, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2022 IL 126729

202 N.E.3d 890

460 Ill.Dec. 870

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Kelvin T. HARTFIELD, Appellee.

Docket No. 126729

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed April 21, 2022.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Catherine K. Hart, Deputy Defender, and Amy J. Kemp, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant fired a gun at four police officers and was ultimately convicted of armed robbery ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2016)) and four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(3)). The appellate court vacated three of the four aggravated discharge convictions and remanded for resentencing but otherwise affirmed. 2020 IL App (4th) 170787, 447 Ill.Dec. 817, 175 N.E.3d 185.

¶ 2 The central issue in this case is whether a single shot in the direction of multiple peace officers can support multiple convictions of aggravated discharge. We also address defendant's request for cross-relief.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 There are three distinct legal issues before us. The appellate court sufficiently presented the facts in their entirety. Id. ¶¶ 10-36. We present only those relevant to our disposition.

¶ 5 Aggravated Discharge

¶ 6 Police suspected defendant of robbing a gas station. After locating defendant, four officers confronted him. Defendant ran. As he was running, he fired a gun in the direction of the officers. Officers returned fire. No officers were hit, but afterwards, they found what appeared to be bullet holes near where at least one of the officers had been standing. It is unclear how many shots defendant fired at the officers, but there is evidence that he fired more than one shot.

¶ 7 Speedy Trial

¶ 8 Defendant was arrested on July 27, 2016. The State sought, and was granted, six continuances so that it could obtain forensic analysis on fingerprint and DNA evidence.

¶ 9 On August 30, 2016, at the hearing on the State's first motion for continuance, defendant's case number was called. Defendant's counsel immediately objected in the following manner:

"Judge, he's in custody. Ready for trial. Please note my objection to the State's motion."

¶ 10 The Champaign County circuit court ultimately responded:

"We'll show the State's motion to continue. Objection. This is pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114-4, 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c). I'll note the objection. The objection's overruled. We'll continue these matters, September 27, 9:00, this courtroom."

¶ 11 The State and the circuit court then addressed the State's outstanding motion to collect standards from defendant. The State renewed that motion, and the court instructed the State to prepare an order.

¶ 12 Defendant ultimately went to trial on March 6, 2017.

¶ 13 Number of Discharges Prosecuted

¶ 14 Defendant was charged with armed robbery ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2016)) and four separate counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(3)). The charging instrument included four counts. They were identical save for the name of the officer at issue in each count:

"That on July 26, 2016, in Champaign County, Kelvin D Hartfield committed the offense of

AGGRAVATED DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM

Class X Felony SENTENCING RANGE 10 to 45 YEARS INCARCERATION

in that the said defendant knowingly discharged a firearm in the direction of [officer's name], a person he knew to be a peace officer and, at the time, [officer's name] was engaged in the execution of his official duties,

in violation of 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/24-1.2(a)(3)."

¶ 15 During closing arguments, the State recounted each officer's testimony that they had been fired upon by defendant. The State continued:

"Incidentally, sounds like, it seems like most logically, although obviously we don't, we can't know this, but it seems likely there were probably three shots fired by the Defendant. When the revolver's found, of course, there are three expended cartridges inside, three casings left with the bullets already fired, two still live rounds in there. That's consistent with essentially what the officers said. I don't want you to be troubled, I suggest to you you don't need to be troubled by the fact that we've got four officers who are charged with being victims of this offense and only three bullets possibly fired. Now, could the Defendant have reloaded later? Something like that could have happened. It's entirely possible that he shot more than three, but let's work just—let's give the benefit of the doubt, let's work with the proposition that maybe only three shots got fired. Does that mean there are only three counts? No. You could do five counts on one bullet, if you needed to.

The issue is not how many shots were fired, the issue is how many people got shot toward. If you got a bunch of people in a huddle hugging each other, you take one shot towards the huddle, you're shooting in the direction of all of those people. So it's not a matter of, did he pull the trigger three times, therefore there's three counts. It's an issue of how many people did he shoot at, and that's four. He shot at all four of those officers."

¶ 16 In its petition for leave to appeal to this court, the State acknowledged:

"The State charged defendant with four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. [Citation.] In doing so, the State relied on the number of officers at whom defendant fired and not the number of shots he fired. [Citation.] Similarly, during closing argument, the State took the position that regardless of the number of shots fired, four guilty verdicts were appropriate because defendant had fired in the direction of four police officers. [Citations.]"

¶ 17 Mid-Deliberation Jury Instruction

¶ 18 Prior to deliberations, the jury was instructed: "A person commits the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm when he knowing[ly] discharges a firearm in the direction of a person he knows to be a peace officer, while the officer is engaged in the execution of his official duties."

¶ 19 The following instruction was then repeated, in its entirety, four times—once for each officer:

"To sustain the charge of aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of [officer's name], the State must prove the following propositions. First proposition, that the Defendant knowingly discharged a firearm. Second proposition, that the Defendant discharged a firearm in the direction of [officer's name]. Third proposition, that the Defendant knew that [officer's name] was a peace officer. And fourth proposition, that the Defendant did so while the peace officer was engaged in the execution of his official duties.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant not guilty."

¶ 20 During deliberations, the jury sent the following note to the circuit court:

"Does suspect need to know there were 4 cops on the scene in the area where gun was fired [followed here by what appears to be a question mark, perhaps scribbled out] to be guilty of all four counts of [aggravated] discharge of firearm?

?

third Proposition: That the defendant knew that ______ was peace officer."

¶ 21 The circuit court and the State began discussing what the answer might be. The court at times treated the note as presenting a single question and at other times as presenting two questions. The State repeatedly referred to two "parts" that needed to be answered. The court tentatively concluded that the answer to the first question was "no," and in response, the State asked for the court to read the aggravated discharge jury instruction again. After doing so, the State agreed with the court's answer to the "first one." The State continued, however, by agreeing with the court's concern that the jury still had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each individual officer.

¶ 22 At this point, defense counsel interjected for the first time by saying: "Judge, please note my objection to any—I believe the appropriate response is, you've been instructed as to the law. Please note my objection to any—anything beyond that." The circuit court and the State then began to discuss the "second question." The court presented an answer, noting that under this proposed instruction, the jury "may determine that two of the officers weren't in the line of fire, one was, two were, or three were." The State ultimately agreed with the court's second answer by saying, "I think that seems fair." Defense counsel did not give any input or make any indication that this answer was unsatisfactory. The court then noted defense counsel's objection before stating that the decision had been made. The following response was then sent to the jury:

"Question #1

No

Question #2

You must determine based on the evidence which officer or officers, if any, may have been in the line of fire when the firearm was discharged."

¶ 23 The jury returned a guilty verdict on all five counts. In his posttrial motion, defendant wrote:

"The Court erred by giving further instructions to the jury during deliberations and while they had questions about the law as it related to Aggravated Discharge of a Firearm. The jury had been given all of the instructions required to render a verdict and did not need further clarification by the Court. The Court should have instructed the jury they were to follow the law as they had been previously instructed. Within minutes of giving further instructions to the jury, the jury returned guilty verdicts."

¶ 24 Sentencing and Appeal

¶ 25 After denying defendant's posttrial...