People v. Hartford Transp. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 January 1957
• Citation: 6 Misc.2d 562,165 N.Y.S.2d 418
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. HARTFORD TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Benjamin DE SANTIS. City Magistrate's Court of City of New York, Traffic Court, Borough of Manhattan
• Court: New York Magistrate Court

Page 418

165 N.Y.S.2d 418

6 Misc.2d 562

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. HARTFORD TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc.

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Benjamin DE SANTIS.

City Magistrate's Court of City of New York, Traffic Court Borough of Manhattan.

Jan. 2, 1957.

Patrick J. Falvey, New York City, for the people.

Edward F. Bowes, New York City, for defendants.

DAVID L. MALBIN, City Magistrate.

The defendants, both individual and corporate, are charged with a violation of Section 16-c(3) of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law, which reads as follows:

'It shall be unlawful to transport by motor vehicle over the highways within this state any dangerous article without conspicuously marking or placarding any motor vehicle engaged in such transportation on each side and on the rear thereof with the word 'dangerous' or the common or generic name of the substance transported or its principal hazard; provided, that the commissioner of motor vehicles may, by regulation issued after a public hearing, prescribe with respect to any specific dangerous article the minimum quantities below which no placard shall be required.'

The defendant, Hartford Transportation Co., Inc., is a motor carrier authorized to operate in interstate commerce under authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Defendant DeSantis is a driver employed by the Hartford Company to operate its tractors and trailers. The facts were stipulated by both parties and are briefly summarized as follows:

'Both the corporate and individual defendant admitted that on June 1, 1956, the individual defendant operated a tractor-trailer bearing New York Registration No. 383-784, while engaged in the course of his employment with the corporate defendant, which also owned the tractor-trailer; that the individual defendant operated the vehicle along the streets of the city of New York; that the vehicle's cargo was 22,750 pounds of sulphuric acid; that there were no placards bearing the legend 'Dangerous' or the legend 'Sulphuric Acid' affixed to any part of the vehicle.'

It was conceded that sulphuric acid is a corrosive liquid and thus a 'dangerous article' within the meaning of the statute, and that the weight of 22,750 pounds of corrosive liquid was sufficient to require placarding under a regulation of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles on November 19, 1951, fixing the maximum unplacarded load at 2,500 pounds.

Defendants contend that, despite the foregoing, unless it can be shown that they knowingly violated the section in point either in that they willfully violated the statute or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent such violation, they cannot be found guilty. The People contend that the mere failure to observe the statutory requirement that vehicles transporting dangerous articles bear appropriate placards constitutes a violation of the statute.

The defendants offered to prove that they set up a safety program of precaution specifically to insure proper placarding of dangerous cargo. They claim that a clerk in their employ, through inadvertence, started the chain of circumstances which resulted in the driver, DeSantis, Picking up this cargo in a sealed unmarked trailer and receiving with it a manifest bearing no indication that the cargo which he was about to transport was dangerous.

There is no argument but that the company's procedure, if properly and accurately followed, was such as to insure complete compliance with the statute. It is their claim that the establishment of such a procedure exonerates the corporation from criminal responsibility for the accidental oversight of the clerk-employee, and that the driver, DeSantis, being completely ignorant of the nature of his cargo cannot be held to criminal responsibility.

I must find both the individual and the corporate defendants guilty as charged within the exact language and purport of Section 16-c(3) of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law.

This legislation was enacted as a direct result of the Holland Tunnel fire in 1949, the express purpose being to prevent the hazard that arises from the undisclosed presence on public highways of dangerous articles.

In a case arising out of the fatal Holland Tunnel fire, the trucker...