People v. Hassen, Supreme Court Case No. 13SC356

• Docket Nº: Supreme Court Case No. 13SC356
• Citation: 351 P.3d 418, 2015 CO 49
• Case Date: June 29, 2015
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

351 P.3d 418
2015 CO 49

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner
v.
Omer Kelil HASSEN, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 13SC356

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 29, 2015

Attorneys for Petitioner: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Michael C. Mattis, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

Opinion

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 At the trial of Respondent Omer Kelil Hassen, the trial court completely closed the courtroom during the testimony of two undercover officers. We granted certiorari to consider whether this closure constituted structural error.¹ We hold that the closure violated Hassen's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. In so doing, we reject the People's argument that the closure was so trivial that it did not implicate Hassen's Sixth Amendment right. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

351 P.3d 420

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 The People charged Hassen with possession of a schedule II controlled substance—second offense; possession with intent to distribute a schedule II controlled substance—second offense; and three habitual counts. On the second day of trial, the People intended to call Officer S.P. Before doing so, the prosecutor requested that the trial court close the courtroom because spectators might recognize Officer S.P., who was working undercover at the time. The trial court granted the request over Hassen's objection, and it evicted the entire public from the courtroom, including members of Hassen's family. Hassen then requested a limiting instruction, and the trial court informed the jury that it should not view Officer S.P. differently from any other witness.

¶ 3 Later that morning, the prosecution made the same request for a second undercover witness, Officer E.W. The trial court again closed the courtroom entirely (Hassen renewed his objection), and it issued a limiting instruction. The jury ultimately acquitted Hassen of distribution but found him guilty of possession.

¶ 4 Hassen appealed, arguing that the closure of the courtroom violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the closure failed to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court's four-part test in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). People v. Hassen, 2013 COA 16M, ¶ 12, ––– P.3d ––––, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 25, 2013). Because the court of appeals also concluded that “the exclusion of the public was more than a momentary and fleeting occurrence,” it remanded Hassen's case for a new trial. Id. at ¶ 23. We granted certiorari.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 5 A trial court's decision to close the courtroom presents a mixed question of law and fact. See United States v. Al–Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1994). In reviewing such questions, “we accept the trial court's findings of fact absent an abuse of discretion, but we review the court's legal conclusions de novo.” Pena–Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31, ¶ 8, 350 P.3d 287.

III. Analysis

¶ 6 To resolve whether the trial court's closure violated Hassen's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, we first examine both the right itself and the Supreme Court's analysis of the right in Waller. We then conclude that the trial court failed to comply with Waller and that this failure constituted structural error, requiring a new trial. In so doing, we reject the People's argument that the closure was so trivial that it did not implicate Hassen's Sixth Amendment right.

A. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial

¶ 7 Both the United States and the Colorado Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV ; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. When the trial court erroneously deprives the defendant of his public trial right, the error is structural in nature. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 10, 288 P.3d 116, 119 ; accord United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). Structural errors “are not amenable to either a harmless error or a plain error analysis because such errors affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, and are not errors in the trial process itself.” Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148, 126 S.Ct. 2557. Therefore, “[t]hey require automatic reversal without individualized analysis of how the error impairs the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. Flockhart, 2013 CO 42, ¶ 17, 304 P.3d 227, 232.²

¶ 8 Although the public trial right is enshrined in the Constitution—and although erroneous deprivation of the right constitutes structural error—the right itself is not absolute. See

351 P.3d 421

Waller, 467 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210. It may yield to competing interests, including “the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” Id. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that “[s]uch circumstances will be rare” and that “the balance of interests must be struck with special care.” Id.

¶ 9 In Waller, the Court articulated four requirements that a trial court must meet in order to validly close the courtroom. First, “the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced.” Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Second, “the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest.” Id. Third, “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding.” Id. Finally, the trial court “must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Id. Regarding the third element, the Court has since reiterated that “[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.” Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (per curiam) (emphasis added).

¶ 10 With this framework in mind, we now consider whether the trial court's total closure of the courtroom violated Hassen's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

B. The Closure Violated Hassen's Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial

¶ 11 It is undisputed that the trial court did not formally apply Waller. The People argue, however, that this was a mere oversight; they suggest that even though the trial court did not mechanically apply Waller pro forma, the closure itself substantively satisfied the Waller requirements. We disagree. The record clearly establishes that the closure here failed to comply not only with the letter of Waller, but also with its spirit.

¶ 12 The People contend that protecting the identities of the undercover officers constituted “an overriding interest” in accordance with Waller's first element. That is a matter of debate. See ...