People v. Hatch

• Decision Date: 31 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. S074630.,S074630.
• Citation: 22 Cal.4th 260,991 P.2d 165,92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel William HATCH, Defendant and Respondent. In re Daniel William Hatch, on Habeas Corpus.

92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80

22 Cal.4th 260

991 P.2d 165

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel William HATCH, Defendant and Respondent.

In re Daniel William Hatch, on Habeas Corpus.

No. S074630.

Supreme Court of California.

January 31, 2000.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, George M. Palmer, Patrick D. Moran, Brent Riggs and Diana L. Summerhayes, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

John J. Reed, Tustin, and Eliseo D.W. Gauna, Van Nuys, for Defendant and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

The primary issue before us is whether the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy bar retrial after a dismissal under section 1385 of the Penal Code.¹ We conclude they do not under the facts of this case.

Factual And Procedural Background

Defendant Daniel William Hatch was originally charged by information with seven sex offenses: (1) two counts of forcible penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2); (2) two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c); counts 3 and 6); and (3) three counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 4, 5 and 7). All charges arose out of an incident that occurred on September 3, 1996. At the time of the incident, Hatch was almost 21 years old, and the alleged victim, Doratee L., was almost 16 years old.

At trial, Doratee L. testified that she met Hatch at a shopping mall in August 1996. Hatch gave her his phone number, and she subsequently called him three or four times. She met Hatch again on September 1 at the same mall where they first met. After talking a bit, Hatch and Doratee L. went to a park and engaged in some kissing and sexual foreplay. At this time, she told him she was a virgin and successfully rebuffed his sexual advances after telling him he was "going kind of fast."

Two days later, Doratee L. invited Hatch to come to her house around midnight. Although her family was home, she did not tell them he was coming over. When Hatch arrived that evening, Doratee L. met him outside. After talking briefly, Hatch and Doratee L. went to the carport and started kissing.

Doratee L. then testified that Hatch, without her consent, orally copulated her twice, placed his finger(s) in her vagina twice and had intercourse with her three times. Doratee L. further testified that Hatch used some physical force to commit these acts even though she cried continuously and frequently told Hatch it "hurt" and to "stop." She also stated that she attempted to push Hatch off and "scoot" away many times to no avail and even burned his hand with a cigarette. Finally, she claimed she did not scream because she was afraid Hatch would come after her or her family.

On the other hand, Doratee L. also testified that she smoked a cigarette with Hatch toward the end of the encounter without attempting to escape or get help, even though she stood several feet away from Hatch who was sitting down. She also conceded that Hatch never threatened her or her family, never hit her and never displayed any weapons.

The encounter ended when Doratee L.'s father came outside and called her name, and Hatch let go of her. Doratee L. then put on her shorts, grabbed her underwear and Hatch's pants and shorts and ran into the house. She did not, however, say anything to her father.

After running inside, Doratee L. went to the bathroom and cried. Soon after, her sister spoke to her. Although Doratee L. did not immediately tell her sister what happened because she was allegedly afraid of Hatch and felt embarrassed, she eventually told her sister about the alleged assault. Her sister contacted the police, and Doratee L. went to the hospital.

At the hospital, Jeanie Zandstra, a forensic nurse and sexual assault examiner, conducted an examination of Doratee L. Zandstra testified that the excessive tearing, abrasions and bleeding in the genital area suffered by Doratee L. indicated forcible sexual assault—and not consensual sex.

Doratee L. also spoke with Detective Katherine Watson at the hospital. At trial, Detective Watson largely corroborated Doratee L.'s testimony. Detective Watson further testified that she interviewed Hatch who claimed he had consensual sex with Doratee L. He alleged Doratee L. asked him to come over that evening to have sexual intercourse. He also told Detective Watson he repeatedly asked Doratee L. if she wanted to stop but she did not tell him to stop. Later in the interview, Hatch could not remember Doratee L.'s name and conceded that he may not have heard her protests and wished she would have screamed louder. He also claimed Doratee L. bled because she was a virgin and because his teeth may have cut her when he orally copulated her.

Officer John Lembi interviewed Hatch after Detective Watson. According to Officer Lembi, Hatch stated he "didn't pay attention" even if Doratee L. had told him to stop. Hatch also allegedly told Officer Lembi he had used methamphetamine the day before the incident.

Hatch did not testify but presented several character witnesses, including a former girlfriend who testified that he stopped when she rejected his sexual advances. Hatch also called Zandstra who had examined him on the same day as the alleged assault. She testified that his body showed no signs of a burn injury. Hatch also presented Deborah Kilgore, a registered nurse and qualified expert on sexual assault. Kilgore testified that Doratee L.'s injuries were not serious and were consistent with first-time consensual intercourse. Kilgore also observed that, according to Zandstra's examination notes, Doratee L. admitted the incident did not involve "weapons," "physical blows by hand or feet," "grabbing, grasping or holding," "physical restraints," "bites," "choking," "burns" or "threats of harm." In fact, Doratee L. identified no "method" used by Hatch to inflict her "injuries."

In rebuttal, Dr. Deborah Stewart, a professor of pediatrics and adolescent medicine and Medical Director of the Child Abuse Services Team of Orange County, testified as an expert witness. She claimed Doratee L.'s injuries were not consistent with first-time consensual intercourse. Rather, they indicated forcible sexual assault. At the close of testimony, Hatch stipulated to the omission of any instructions on lesser included or lesser related offenses. Hatch also did not move for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1.

After several days of deliberation, the jury deadlocked on all counts. On counts 1 through 3, a majority favored a not guilty verdict. On the remaining four counts, a majority favored a guilty verdict.² With the consent of the prosecutor and defense counsel, the trial court declared a mistrial.

At a hearing later that day, the trial court asked for comments from both sides. The prosecutor requested a retrial. Defense counsel countered that none of the jurors he spoke with believed Doratee L.'s "behavior was consistent with someone who was being pressured and forced into doing something against their will." When the court asked the prosecutor about additional evidence to be presented at a retrial, the prosecutor stated she would: (1) introduce evidence of heart attacks suffered by Doratee L. and her father allegedly caused by Hatch's actions; (2) introduce a tape recording of Detective Watson's interview with Hatch; and (3) call Dr. Stewart in the case-in-chief.

In response, the trial court remarked that the case was "well-tried" and that the jury was "smart" and arguably favored the prosecution. The court then ordered "the prosecution at an end" and "dismissed" the case "in the interest of justice" because "there is no reason to believe another jury would reach a verdict in this case one way or the other." According to the court, the minute order would reflect "that the court feels no reasonable jury would convict this defendant; that means twelve votes for guilty on any of the counts that were alleged against him in the information...." The actual minute order stated: "The court finds that no reasonable jury would convict the defendant of the charges alleged in the information based on the evidence presented in court." The court later clarified that it dismissed the case on its own motion pursuant to section 1385.

One day after the dismissal, the prosecutor refiled charges against Hatch pursuant to section 1387. In addition to the seven counts previously charged, the second information added nine new counts based on the same incident: (1) one count of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); (2) two counts of forcible penetration of a minor by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (h)); (3) two counts of forcible oral copulation of a minor (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)); and (4) four counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)).

After pleading not guilty, Hatch filed a petition for habeas corpus in superior court alleging that the second prosecution was barred on double jeopardy grounds. The petition was assigned to a different judge from the one who originally dismissed the charges. After reviewing the relevant pleadings and transcripts, the judge granted the petition because the language dismissing the original charges was similar to "the language in People v. Johnson [(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738]" indicating "there was not sufficient evidence to convict the defendant."

The prosecution appealed both the section 1385 dismissal and the order granting the habeas corpus petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on Hudson v. Louisiana (1981) 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (Hudson), and Mannes v. Gillespie (9th Cir.1992) 967 F.2d 1310 (Mannes), certiorari denied (1993) 506 U.S. 1048, 113 S.Ct. 964, 122 L.Ed.2d 121, the court held that the dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal for legal insufficiency of the evidence and barred retrial. The court also held that the dismissal was not appealable. We granted review to consider whether: (1) the trial court had authority under section 1385 to dismiss...