People v. Haupt

• Decision Date: 18 May 1987
• Citation: 128 A.D.2d 172,515 N.Y.S.2d 537
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Herbert HAUPT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 537

515 N.Y.S.2d 537

128 A.D.2d 172

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Herbert HAUPT, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

May 18, 1987.

Joseph F. DeFelice, Ozone Park, for appellant.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Deborah Carlin Stevens, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and BRACKEN, BROWN and SULLIVAN, JJ.

BRACKEN, Justice.

The principal issue presented for our consideration on this appeal is whether the good-faith loss or destruction of evidence by law enforcement officials over a period of approximate 16 years, during which time the defendant was not competent to stand trial, served to deprive him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment, holding that, under the circumstances, there was no basis for dismissal of the indictment or the imposition of some lesser sanction upon the prosecution because of these losses.

In 1967, the defendant was indicted and charged with the crime of murder in the first degree (former Penal Law § 1044) arising out of the shooting of his neighbor, Anthony Licciardo, on February 6, 1967. In March 1967, the defendant, having been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, was found not competent to stand trial and was thereafter hospitalized continuously in various State institutions. In 1983, some 16 years later, he was found fit to proceed and was thereafter brought to trial.

At both his combined Mapp and Huntley hearings and the ensuing trial, it was established that considerable evidence with respect to the shooting was no longer in the possession of law enforcement authorities. The former detective who had been in charge of the investigation testified from memory as to a statement made to him by the defendant in which the defendant admitted the shooting. This statement had been recorded by the detective in his memo book, which he had thereafter discarded upon his retirement in 1969. So far as the detective was concerned, his contact with the case had terminated upon his retirement, and the case had thereafter been reassigned. However, he testified that the case stood out in his mind because it had been only the third non-vehicular homicide that he had investigated. The detective described the various police reports that would have been prepared in the course of a homicide investigation, but he had no knowledge, except with regard to a certain "DD 19" form which indicated that the defendant shot Licciardo, whether any other reports prepared in connection with the case had been destroyed by the Police Department.

The detective also testified that he had removed the defendant to the precinct from the crime scene and, at the precinct, an Assistant District Attorney had spoken with the defendant in the presence of a stenographer. The detective, however, had no idea what the defendant had said to the Assistant District Attorney. At the Mapp-Huntley hearing, the prosecutor disclosed that he had not been aware of any statement made by the defendant to any Assistant District Attorney until the detective so testified. It was thereafter stipulated at trial that a transcript of any conversation between the Assistant District Attorney and the defendant could not be located and, also, that after a thorough search of the records, no other police reports could be located either. It was further stipulated that the rifle used by the defendant in the shooting had been destroyed in 1972 by the Police Department's property clerk.

The defendant, who presented an insanity defense, contends on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that he was denied due process of law by virtue of the loss and destruction of evidence prior to his trial. He further claims that since the items in question can never be obtained or reconstructed, the indictment must be dismissed. Criminal Term denied the defendant's motion for dismissal and also refused to grant a hearing on that issue, stating, in part, that "through the passage of time I have no reason to believe that there would be anyone in the Police Department who could give any satisfactory explanation as to where the memos or reports might be".

We find that dismissal of the indictment was unwarranted under the facts and circumstances of this case. Any harm resulting from the loss of evidence over the 16-year period was negligible, and dismissal would be both disproportionately drastic and unnecessary in order to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The prosecution clearly has an obligation to disclose to the defense any evidence which is discoverable and which is in its possession (United States v. Bryant, C.A.D.C., 439 F.2d 642, 647; People v. Saddy, 84 A.D.2d 175, 178, 445 N.Y.S.2d 601). Indeed, the disclosure of all evidence which might lead the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused is required by due process; the test is to be applied liberally (United States v. Bryant, supra, at 648). A corollary of this duty to disclose is the obligation to preserve evidence until a request for disclosure is made, since any other rule would facilitate evasion of the disclosure requirements (People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516, 520, 478 N.Y.S.2d 834, 467 N.E.2d 498). Further, it is not for law enforcement authorities to decide what should be preserved and what should be destroyed (People v. Saddy, supra, 84 A.D.2d at 178, 445 N.Y.S.2d 601).

Thus, where discoverable evidence is lost, the People face the imposition of sanctions unless they sustain their heavy burden of establishing that...