People v. Hauschild, 102468.

Citation871 N.E.2d 1,226 Ill.2d 63
Decision Date07 June 2007
Docket NumberNo. 102468.,102468.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Joseph HAUSCHILD, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, John A. Barsanti, State's Attorney, St. Charles (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick and Garson Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Following a jury trial in the Kane County circuit court, defendant, Joseph Hauschild, was convicted of, inter alia, home invasion, armed robbery and attempted first degree murder. Defendant appealed and the appellate court originally reversed his convictions for armed robbery and home invasion, substituted a conviction for simple robbery and remanded for resentencing. Following a grant of the State's petition for rehearing, the appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded for resentencing on the armed robbery and attempted murder convictions. 364 Ill.App.3d 202, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On August 14, 2001, defendant and codefendant, Ethan Warden, broke into a residence occupied by Thomas Wright and his family. Defendant and Warden were each armed with a handgun. The two men entered the master bedroom, awakened Wright and his wife, and demanded a safe. Wright struggled with one of the defendants, and both defendants fired their weapons. Two shots hit Wright, causing life-threatening wounds to his chest and abdomen, as well as serious wounds to his right arm and left leg. The defendant and Warden then fled the scene carrying a lockbox.

On September 14, 2001, defendant was indicted for attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)); armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2000)); home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2000)); home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(5) (West 2000)); aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)); and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(d) (West 2000)). Following a jury trial, in which an accountability instruction was given, defendant was found guilty of attempted murder, armed robbery and home invasion. The verdict form for home invasion required the jury to make a specific factual finding regarding a single offense of home invasion, and the jury indicated that defendant was guilty in that he "personally discharged a firearm during the offense." See 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(4) (West 2000). On May 28, 2003, the trial court merged the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction into the attempted murder conviction and sentenced defendant to 35 years' imprisonment for home invasion, 18 years' imprisonment for attempted murder, and 12 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, each to be served consecutively, as well as a 2-year concurrent term of imprisonment for criminal damage to property, for a cumulative sentence of 65 years' imprisonment. While the sentence for home invasion included a 20-year enhancement based on the jury's finding that defendant discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(4), (c) (West 2000)), the trial court refused to enhance defendant's sentences for armed robbery while armed with a firearm and attempted murder, finding that the penalties for those offenses violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11) under the holdings of this court in People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), and People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), respectively.

In an opinion filed on October 5, 2005, the appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions for criminal damage to property and attempted murder, but based on a cross-comparison analysis, determined that the penalties imposed for the home invasion and armed robbery offenses violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11), and that the penalties were not severable from the substantive offenses. Thus, the court reversed defendant's convictions of those two offenses and vacated the sentences imposed thereon. However, at defendant's request, the court supplanted his conviction of armed robbery with a conviction of simple robbery and remanded the cause for resentencing. One day later, October 6, 2005, this court filed its decision in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), abandoning cross-comparison analysis in proportionate penalties clause cases. The State therefore filed a petition for rehearing in this case, based on Sharpe. The appellate court granted the petition, withdrew its October 5, 2005, opinion, and filed a new opinion in which it affirmed defendant's convictions for home invasion, attempted murder, armed robbery, and criminal damage to property, but vacated his sentences for armed robbery and attempted murder and remanded for resentencing on those convictions. 364 Ill. App.3d 202, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74.

In its opinion after rehearing, the appellate court agreed with both the State and defendant that he was actually charged with, and convicted of, armed robbery pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of the armed robbery statute (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)), as opposed to subsection (a)(4) (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2000)), as stated in the indictment. 364 Ill.App.3d at 211, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74. The panel also held that: (1) the penalty for armed robbery was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the penalty for armed violence based on the identical-elements test (364 Ill.App.3d at 213-17, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74); and (2) in light of Sharpe, defendant's sentences for armed robbery and attempted murder, which the trial court had refused to enhance as violative of the proportionate penalties clause, should be vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the statutorily mandated enhancements (364 Ill.App.3d at 223-25, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74). Additionally, the appellate court affirmed defendant's 35-year sentence for home invasion, finding it was not excessive. 364 Ill. App.3d at 220-22, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74. Finally, the panel rejected defendant's claim, made for the first time in his answer to the State's petition for rehearing, that consecutive sentences were not required for each of his home invasion, attempted murder and armed robbery convictions, and instructed the trial court, on remand, to order the sentences for each of the three offenses to run consecutively. 364 Ill.App.3d at 225, 227-29, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74.

ANALYSIS

On appeal to this court, defendant raises the following three issues: (1) whether his conviction for armed robbery must be reduced to a conviction for simple robbery, because the penalty for that offense is disproportionate to the penalty for an offense involving identical elements, i.e., armed violence based on robbery; (2) whether his existing sentences for armed robbery and attempted murder were authorized by the law in effect at the time of sentencing such that those sentences are not void and no new sentencing hearing is required; and (3) whether his 65-year aggregate consecutive sentence is excessive and unfairly harsh when compared to the 12-year sentence imposed on his codefendant, who was allowed to plead guilty to reduced charges in exchange for his testimony against defendant. We choose to address defendant's second contention first.

Effective January 1, 2000, our legislature enacted Public Act 91-404, the stated purpose of which is "to deter the use of firearms in the commission of a felony offense." Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000)). To accomplish this purpose, the legislature increased the penalties for certain felonies, including attempted murder and armed robbery, when the offender possesses or uses a firearm during the commission of the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1), 18-2 (West 2000). These additional penalties are commonly referred to as the "15/20/25-to-life" sentencing provisions. 364 Ill.App.3d at 209, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74; People v. Guevara, 216 Ill.2d 533, 536, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). Defendant contends that the appellate court erred in vacating his sentences for armed robbery while armed with a firearm and attempted murder as void and remanding for resentencing, where the trial court had properly refused to enhance those offenses under People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 264 Ill. Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), and People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 272 Ill. Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), which were binding precedent at the time of defendant's sentencing. Whether a judgment is void is a question of law which we review de novo. See People v. Rodriguez, 355 Ill.App.3d 290, 293-94, 291 Ill.Dec. 214, 823 N.E.2d 224 (2005); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill.2d 371, 378-79, 292 Ill.Dec. 893, 827 N.E.2d 422 (2005).

Initially we note that, as defendant admits, his answer to the State's rehearing petition did not challenge the State's claim that these sentences were void; rather, he was proceeding "on the assumption that the sentences were void, in the context of discussing whether the appropriate remedy was to remand for a new sentencing hearing or simply to add the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
254 cases
  • People v. Medrano, 1–10–2440.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 13, 2014
    ...withdraw his guilty plea. Whether [10 N.E.3d 251]a sentence is void is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d 63, 72, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007).¶ 16 Issue of Timeliness of Review ¶ 17 Preliminarily, we address the State's contention that Medr......
  • People v. Kotlinski, 2–10–1251.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 21, 2011
    ...511] [959 N.E.2d 1244] People v. Hauschild, 364 Ill.App.3d 202, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74 (2006), rev'd in part on other grounds, 226 Ill.2d 63, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007), in which the defendant shot a homeowner's dog during a home invasion. The appellate court held that i......
  • People v. Guyton, 1–11–0450.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 15, 2014
    ...factors. Furthermore, defendant's sentences fell within the statutory range and are therefore presumptively proper. People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d 63, 90, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007) ; see 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1) (West 2006); 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2006); 720 ILCS 5/8–4(a)(1)(......
  • People v. Luciano
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 14, 2013
    ...trial court may consider all permissible sentences and is not limited to the sentence of life without parole. See People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d 63, 88–89, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007) (proper remedy when a sentencing provision is held to be unconstitutional is to allow resentenci......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT