People v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 06 June 1985
• Citation: 699 P.2d 1259,38 Cal.3d 780,214 Cal.Rptr. 652
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 699 P.2d 1259 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Westley HAYES, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 22185.

Page 652

214 Cal.Rptr. 652

38 Cal.3d 780, 699 P.2d 1259

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Westley HAYES, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 22185.

Supreme Court of California.

June 6, 1985.

Dennis A. Fischer, Fischer & Hill, Santa Monica, for defendant and appellant.

William R. Weisman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

This is an automatic appeal (Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b)) from a judgment of death under the 1978 death penalty law (id., § 190.1 et seq.). We affirm the judgment as to guilt but set aside the special circumstance findings under compulsion of Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, and People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826. The Attorney General concedes this is the proper disposition.

The facts necessary to decide this appeal are undisputed. Defendant put on no defense at the guilt phase.

On July 5, 1980, defendant came up to the servicing window of Tom's Jr. hamburger stand on West Florence in Los Angeles. He drew a revolver and ordered the men working behind the counter not to move. When one of those men turned, defendant shot him once; the man, Ramond Vasquez, fell to the floor. Defendant climbed in through the window and another employee, Jorge Castro, jumped on him and grabbed the hand in which defendant held the gun. In the ensuing struggle the weapon discharged, wounding Castro in the leg. Defendant and a confederate then ordered Castro to open the cash register, seized some money, and fled. Vasquez died from his wound.

Nine days later defendant entered the Golden State Market on 84th near Main Street in Los Angeles, where Leonard Fong and his wife Susan were working. The precise movements of the parties thereafter are not absolutely clear from the testimony. ¹ It appears that defendant came up to the cash register and ordered Mrs. Fong to put the money in a bag. Instead she ducked behind the counter, and defendant shot her. Mr. Fong then went towards the same place, and defendant shot him. He also shot and wounded Yuk Chun Wong when she approached. Defendant and two confederates then took money from the register and fled. The wounds of Mr. and Mrs. Fong were fatal.

Defendant was arrested two days after the shootings at the Golden State Market and confessed both to those crimes and the crimes committed at the hamburger stand. The confession was tape recorded and played to the jury. During the interrogation the police asked defendant several times why he had fired his gun at the people he was robbing. He replied that they had each made sudden moves "real fast," and he believed they were reaching under the counter for a weapon. When asked if he meant to kill his victims, he expressly denied having any such intent. Under further questioning he offered two additional explanations for firing his gun: i.e., "I was just trying to wound them so I could get away," and "All I did was just try to scare them ...."

Defendant was charged with three counts of murder; as to each count it was charged as a special circumstance that the murder occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)) and that he committed the two other murders charged (id., subd. (a)(3)). He was also charged with four counts of robbery and one count of attempting to murder Yuk Chun Wong. At the close of the prosecution's case, defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the latter count was granted. (Id., § 1118.1.) The jury found him guilty as charged on the remaining counts and at the penalty phase returned a verdict of death on two of the murder counts. On the third murder count the jury was unable to agree on penalty, and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that crime.

Defendant makes only one claim of error in the guilt phase. Prior to trial he moved to suppress his confession on Miranda grounds. (Evid.Code, § 402.) At the hearing Officer Bunch testified that he gave defendant the required Miranda warnings, and defendant waived his rights and agreed to talk. Defense counsel did not dispute those facts, but argued only that after admitting his guilt defendant in effect invoked his right to cut off further questioning; the questioning nevertheless continued, and the officer elicited additional details of the crimes. ²

Defense counsel asked Officer Bunch why he did not stop the interrogation when defendant said, "Do I gotta still tell you after I admit it?" The officer explained that as of that point in the questioning it was unclear to him exactly what defendant was "admitting," and he wanted to be sure defendant was speaking of the same crimes as the police. Officer Bunch took defendant's quoted remark to mean simply that although he was willing to confess to these crimes he was reluctant to go into their details. The trial judge then listened to the tapes twice, and found "there is no basis for this court to suppress that confession, and that will be the order."

Defendant now reiterates his claim of a violation of his right to cut off questioning. That right has been recognized since the Miranda decision itself: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.... Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked." (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625.) Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances: "A desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety of ways," and the words used by the suspect "must be construed in context." (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 515, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927.)

We are cited to no case directly in point. Of the decisions relied on by defendant, only one is similar enough to deserve discussion. ^{3 3} In People v. Marshall (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 129, 115 Cal.Rptr. 821, a minor was arrested and interrogated about the murder of his stepfather. He was duly advised of and waived his Miranda rights. He first denied being present at the killing, saying that he left the house when his stepfather began drinking and did not see him again until the funeral. Apparently disbelieving this story, the interrogating officer said that "we've talked to a lot of people ... and we know the truth.... [T]here's an awful lot that you left out. So do you want to go back over the parts you left out?" The minor twice replied, "No." When asked why, he said, "I just don't want to." (Id. at p. 132, 115 Cal.Rptr. 821.) The officer nevertheless persisted with the interrogation, and the minor finally confessed that he did return to the house and killed his stepfather because he was beating the minor's mother.

The Court of Appeal held (id. at p. 133, 115 Cal.Rptr. 821) that on these facts "there is no need to engage in speculation" as to the meaning or effect of the minor's words: whatever the reason for his unwillingness to "go back over the parts [he] left out," his express and repeated refusal to do so was a clear invocation of his right to stop the questioning. (Id. at p. 134, 115 Cal.Rptr. 821.) As the court rhetorically asked, "Is there more defendant must say to invoke his privilege to remain silent than 'no' when asked to explain or clarify or continue the conversation?" (Ibid.)

The present case differs from Marshall in two significant respects. First, the response of defendant here was not an express and repeated refusal to continue talking to the officers; rather he asked the single, ambiguous question whether he had to go into the details after having confessed to the fact of the shootings. Second, at the time of Marshall's refusal to talk he had not confessed to any criminal activity, but had given instead an innocent explanation of his connection with the events; here, by contrast, even before defendant asked the foregoing question he had already confessed that he "did it all" and had shot a man during a holdup.

More similar to the case at bar is In re Joe R., supra, 27 Cal.3d 496, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927. There a minor suspected of committing a robbery-murder was questioned after waiving his Miranda rights. At first he gave an exculpatory version of his involvement in the events; when the interrogating officer accused him of lying and produced inculpatory evidence found at his house, the minor said, "That's all I got to say" or "That's all I want to tell you." (Id. at p. 513, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927.) The officer nevertheless continued the interrogation and the minor confessed to the robbery. The trial court found that in making the quoted remark the minor was not trying to stop the questioning but was simply reaffirming his prior story. On appeal, this court rejected the minor's contention that he had been denied his right to withdraw his Miranda waiver; viewing the remark in context, we held it was not unreasonable for the trial court to adopt the prosecution's view of the meaning of that remark, and thus to find no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at p. 516, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927.)

Here, too, the trial court could reasonably have endorsed the inference drawn by the interrogating officer--i.e., that taken in context defendant's remark meant that although he was willing to confess to the crimes he was uncomfortable about going into their details. Such reluctance is an understandable reaction to a confession of multiple robbery-murder, and does not rise to the level of an implied assertion of the defendant's constitutional right...