People v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 01 October 1984
• Docket Number: Docket No. 67551
• Citation: 364 N.W.2d 635,421 Mich. 271
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry HAYES, Defendant-Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 635

364 N.W.2d 635

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry HAYES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 67551, Oct. Term, 1984.

Calendar No. 1.

421 Mich. 271, 364 N.W.2d 635

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 4, 1984.

Decided Dec. 28, 1984.

Released for Publication Feb. 1, 1985.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Fred R. Hunter, III, Pros. Atty., Leonard J. Malinowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys., Appellate Service, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Fred E. Bell, Ronald J. Bretz, Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

CAVANAGH, Justice.

I

Defendant Larry Hayes was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, and sentenced to life imprisonment for the killing of his common-law wife, Bobbie Kelly. On the basis of his failure to cooperate during psychiatric examinations, the trial court granted the prosecutor's pretrial motion to bar evidence relating to an insanity defense.

At the time of trial, M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(4) stated:

"The defendant shall fully cooperate in his examination by personnel of the center for forensic psychiatry and by any other independent examiners for the defense and prosecution. If he fails to cooperate, and that failure is established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant shall be barred from presenting testimony relating to his insanity at the trial of the case." ¹

We granted leave ² to determine the following issues: (1) whether application of the preclusion provision of M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(4) unconstitutionally infringed on defendant's right to present a defense, and (2) whether M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(4) is unconstitutionally vague. We answer no to both questions.

II

On November 12, 1978, two State Troopers were called to the defendant's trailer home. They were met outside by Bobbie Kelly's brother, who informed the troopers that his sister lay dead inside. Once inside, the troopers encountered the decedent's parents and the defendant. According to one of the troopers, defendant seemed relatively calm. However, defendant's speech was not always understandable, and he occasionally spoke to what he referred to as "spirits" who were "not in the room." When one of the troopers asked defendant what happened to Bobbie, defendant allegedly responded, "I did it, I think it was on Thursday." The policeman gave defendant his Miranda warnings, and arrested him. During the ride to the state police post, defendant instructed the troopers to tell the media that he killed Bobbie.

Prior to trial and upon stipulation, defendant was ordered committed to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry to determine whether he was competent to stand trial and the extent of his criminal responsibility due to the possibility of mental illness at the time of the alleged offense.

Defendant met with Center staff psychologist Dr. Harley Stock on February 7, 1979. Dr. Stock testified at the initial pretrial competency hearing that the defendant failed to cooperate during the examination. For example, defendant refused to fill out the forensic history questionnaire, and refused to sign the informed consent notification form. However, defendant did sign a form releasing his past medical records after he was informed that they would be needed for his insanity defense. Defendant also signed a document informing the jail about his physical complaints. In response to Dr. Stock's initial questioning, defendant related his past psychiatric history. However, defendant "got sick" and "clammed up" when asked about his actions leading up to the alleged crime. Defendant was allowed to lie down in the emergency treatment room until he calmed down. The interview resumed, and defendant gave his account of his actions on the day Bobbie died. Dr. Stock concluded that defendant was only providing as much information as defendant thought was in his best interests.

Defendant exhibited similar behavior at a second examination held on February 22, 1979. According to Dr. Stock's testimony and his formal report, defendant completely refused to interact with Dr. Stock at that time. Defendant would not give any socio-cultural history, and refused to undergo psychological testing.

The prosecution later moved to bar any testimony regarding defendant's possible insanity on the basis of his failure to cooperate at the prior examinations. M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(4). The trial court ordered one final examination at the Center.

Dr. Stock received the aid of a second staff psychologist at defendant's third examination. However, all efforts to initiate meaningful discussion proved fruitless. Dr. Stock concluded that defendant's behavior was wholly volitional, and that defendant was competent to stand trial. This conclusion was partly based on defendant's ability to differentiate between the legal forms that appeared to be in his best interests, and those that did not. However, Dr. Stock was initially unwilling to make a formal conclusion regarding defendant's criminal responsibility at the time of the offense, since he was unable to complete the clinical examination. When pressed for a conclusion, Dr. Stock recommended that the defendant be adjudicated criminally responsible for his actions. ³ However, at the final pretrial competency hearing held on May 29, 1979, Dr. Stock testified that he did not have all the information that he would like, and that his opinion might have been altered on the basis of further information.

The trial court found defendant competent to stand trial. It also granted the prosecution's motion, and barred defendant from offering evidence of insanity at trial.

Although defendant was not allowed to offer evidence of insanity, he testified at trial, and the trial court felt that the issue had been implicitly raised through the defendant's mannerisms and actions at trial. Accordingly, the jury was instructed on the distinction between legal sanity and mental illness. The jury was also instructed that they could return four possible verdicts: guilty, guilty but mentally ill, ⁴ not guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty.

The jury returned a guilty verdict, and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v. Hayes (Docket No. 47321, decided April 13, 1981).

III

Defendant argues that the preclusion sanction found in M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(4) violates his Sixth Amendment due process right to present a defense. U.S. Const., Ams. VI, XIV; Const.1963, art. 1, Secs. 17, 20. There is no question that a criminal defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to present a defense. Although not asserted by the defendant, Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 13 provides:

"A suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney."

"The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). (Emphasis supplied.)

We note that other attempts to address the constitutionality of similar preclusion sanctions, specifically those involving alibi notice statutes, have evaded direct review, and have been decided on nonconstitutional grounds. See People v. Merritt, 396 Mich. 67, 71, 76, 238 N.W.2d 31 (1976), and cases cited therein.

Although the right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process, it is not an absolute right. The accused must still comply with "established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Although Chambers involved the right to present a witness on one's own behalf, we believe that the above-quoted limitation is equally applicable to the instant statute. Furthermore, although M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(4) is specifically concerned with the determinations of competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility, it is clearly a statute designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ultimate verdict.

We are also persuaded by the argument that there is no constitutional right to assert an insanity defense. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 2156, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) (Marshall, J.: "Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms"); see also Note, The Fifth Amendment and compelled psychiatric examinations: implications of Estelle v. Smith, 50 Geo.Wash.L.R. 275, 291 (1982). The Legislature has created definitions of mental illness, M.C.L. Sec. 330.1400a; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(400a), and insanity, M.C.L. Sec. 768.21a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1044(1). Since these definitions were created by statute, the Legislature's limitations of the circumstances within which they apply do not necessarily raise questions of constitutional proportions. In M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(4); M.S.A. Sec. 20.1043(1)(4), it is clearly the Legislature's intent to give discretion to the trial court to determine whether the defense should be barred on the basis of a failure to cooperate.

Defendant initially urges us to adopt a flat proscription against...