People v. Haynes

• Decision Date: 17 May 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 144300
• Citation: 502 N.W.2d 758,199 Mich.App. 593
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kermit Eldridge HAYNES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 758

502 N.W.2d 758

199 Mich.App. 593

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kermit Eldridge HAYNES, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 144300.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 17, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided May 17, 1993, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication July 30, 1993.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., George E. Ward, Chief Asst. Prosecutor, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for people.

State Appellate Defender by Susan Meinberg Thomas, for the defendant on appeal.

Before DOCTOROFF, C.J., and MURPHY and CAVANAGH, JJ.

DOCTOROFF, Chief Judge.

Defendant pleaded guilty of first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, assault with intent to rob while armed, M.C.L. § 750.89; M.S.A. § 28.284, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; M.S.A. § 28.424(2). Following an extensive sentencing hearing pursuant to M.C.L. § 769.1(3); M.S.A. § 28.1072(3), the Recorder's Court concluded that defendant should be sentenced as a juvenile, instead of as an adult, and placed defendant with the Michigan Department of Social Services until age twenty-one. The prosecution appeals that ruling, claiming that the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant as a juvenile. We reverse and remand with instructions to sentence defendant as an adult.

Defendant's guilty plea arises out of the shooting death of Benjamin Gravel on his way home from the Bayview Yacht Club on February 8, 1990. Defendant and a group of young men spent the evening attempting to steal cars from people driving in Detroit by pointing a gun at the drivers and ordering them to stop. After one of the others made several unsuccessful attempts to steal a car, defendant acquired the gun in an effort to demonstrate the proper way to execute the crime. The group proceeded to Clairepointe Road in the City of Detroit, where they placed a tree in the road outside the yacht club. After a few cars successfully avoided the tree, Mr. Gravel came upon the obstruction in his Cadillac. Defendant's statement, entered into the record, indicated that he walked up to the car and shouted at Gravel to get out of the car. When Gravel did not stop, defendant fired a number of shots into the car as it drove off. Statements of other members of the group revealed that defendant made statements after the murder to the effect that had Gravel stopped the car, he wouldn't have "smoked his ass."

In reviewing a trial court's decision to sentence a defendant as an adult, this Court applies a bifurcated standard of review. People v. Passeno, 195 Mich.App. 91, 103, 489 N.W.2d 152 (1992). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while the ultimate sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. The Legislature has established the following guidelines that must be considered by a trial court in making its decision to sentence a defendant as a juvenile or an adult:

(a) The prior record and character of the juvenile, his or her physical and mental maturity, and his or her pattern of living.

(b) The seriousness and the circumstances of the offense.

(c) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of offenses which would lead to 1 of the following determinations:

(i) The juvenile is not amenable to treatment.

(ii) That despite the juvenile's potential for treatment, the nature of the juvenile's delinquent behavior is likely to disrupt the rehabilitation of other juveniles in the treatment program.

(d) Whether, despite the juvenile's potential for treatment, the nature of the juvenile's delinquent behavior is likely to render the juvenile dangerous to the public if released at the age of 21.

(e) Whether the juvenile is more likely to be rehabilitated by the services and facilities available in adult programs and procedures than in juvenile programs and procedures.

(f) What is in the best interests of the public welfare and the protection of the public security. [M.C.L. § 769.1(3); M.S.A. § 28.1072(3).]

The prosecution has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by sentencing the juvenile defendant as an adult. MCR 6.931(E)(2); People v. Lyons, 195 Mich.App. 248, 252, 489 N.W.2d 218 (1992). Contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, we believe that the prosecution presented a preponderance of evidence to justify imposition of an adult sentence.

With regard to the first factor, the trial court made the following findings in its opinion:

As to his pattern of living, the history of his home and family life which was put on the record, persuades the court that whatever his mode of living in the earlier years happen to be they were not of his making. If his latter pattern of living became that which society is unwilling to abide, to what extent the defendant is responsible as compared to the extent that those who should have been responsible but were not, are to blame, one can only speculate. So, it is difficult for the court to find that defendant's pattern of living is a factor which militates in favor of adult confinement for this defendant. The court finds as fact that [it] does not.

While we understand the court's finding that a contributing cause to defendant's past behavioral problems was the environment in which he was raised, we believe that the court erred in dismissing the prior criminal conduct and antisocial pattern of living of this defendant as the fault of his role models.

Defendant's criminal conduct began at an early stage in his life. Defendant was reported to have been in trouble with the authorities for fighting in seventh grade, was suspended from school on six separate occasions for activity ranging from loitering to assault and battery, and had a prior adjudication for attempted possession of cocaine. He was also charged with felonious assault and being a minor in possession of a firearm, but the charges were dismissed. In the context of the evaluations, defendant admitted to selling "crack" cocaine between the years 1987 and 1989, during which time he claimed to have earned between $500 and $600 a day in drug sales.

Defendant was placed in the Wayne County Youth Home between August 20 and 23, 1988. On October 27, 1988, a warrant was issued for defendant after he escaped from custody. Defendant was returned to the youth home in December 1989. During that time, defendant was disciplined on a number of occasions for negative and disruptive behavior and sexual assault. On February 8, 1990, defendant committed the instant offense. Since his placement in the youth home following the murder, defendant has been disciplined for refusing to follow directions, cursing, being disrespectful to the staff, fighting, gang activity, and truancy from school. Defendant was placed in isolation at least five times since the murder. Isolation is the most severe form of punishment exacted by the faculty of the youth home.

In view of this persistent antisocial behavior before and after the instant offense, we believe the trial court's finding that this factor did not weigh in favor of adult disposition constitutes clear error. The fact that defendant has had a difficult family background and obviously has not been exposed to positive role models does not excuse his past criminal and antisocial behavior. The language of M.C.L. § 769.1(3)(a); M.S.A. § 28.1072(3)(a) does not limit the consideration of a juvenile's prior record and pattern of living to those situations where the trial court concludes the defendant should be held personally accountable.

The next factor to be considered is the seriousness and the circumstances of the offense. M.C.L. § 769.1(3)(b); M.S.A. § 28.1072(3)(b). The trial court, in addressing this factor, merely stated that this was an offense of "ultimate gravity." However, merely characterizing the offense as one of "ultimate gravity" begs the question whether the circumstances surrounding the offense should be given more weight in deciding to sentence a defendant as an adult. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty of first-degree murder. He was not only a participant in the crime, but was the one who fired the fatal shots. We believe that the trial court erred in failing to articulate the circumstances surrounding this offense and the effect that those circumstances had on its ultimate sentencing decision.

The trial court must next determine whether the offense is part of a pattern of offenses leading to one of the following determinations:

(i) The juvenile is not amenable to treatment.

(ii) That despite the juvenile's potential for treatment, the nature of the juvenile's delinquent behavior is likely to disrupt the rehabilitation of other juveniles in the treatment program.

With regard to this factor, the court stated in its written opinion as follows:

The court does not find that the evidence established that the offense committed by the defendant is part of a repetitive pattern of offenses which would lead to a determination that he is not amenable to treatment; or, that owing to the nature of the delinquent behavior, the juvenile is likely to disrupt the rehabilitation of others in the treatment program.

A review of the statute and the court's findings makes it apparent that the trial court merely stated its conclusions on this issue in language nearly identical to the statute without having made the necessary supporting findings from the evidentiary record.

At the dispositional hearing, there were three witnesses who had evaluated defendant and made recommendations with respect to the ultimate disposition. Robert Lemanek, an intake worker for the Department of Social Services, recommended that defendant be placed in a juvenile facility. Dr. Karen Noelle Clark, a psychologist, completed an evaluation of defendant and reported...