People v. Haywood
Decision Date | 06 March 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 128442,128442 |
Citation | 530 N.W.2d 497,209 Mich.App. 217 |
Parties | PEOPLE of The State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Neal HAYWOOD, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
John Sahli, Calhoun County Prosecutor, for the people.
State Appellate Defender by Ronald E. Steinberg, for defendant on appeal.
Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and TALBOT, * JJ.
Following a lengthy jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and was sentenced to forty to sixty years' imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm and hold, inter alia, that the trial courts may take judicial notice of the general acceptance of bloodstain interpretation evidence by the scientific community.
This case arises out of the beating death of defendant's girl friend. The victim's death occurred sometime in the early morning hours of June 19, 1989, in the apartment she shared with defendant. The police found the bloodied victim lying in a bathtub. An autopsy revealed that the victim had suffered multiple traumatic injuries consistent with a severe beating. The victim's internal injuries included a subdural hemorrhage surrounding the brain, five broken ribs, a perforation of the small intestine, and a large perforation of the rectum. The victim's primary cause of death was the loss of blood from the perforation of her rectum. The victim's injuries were consistent with being beaten with a bloody brush and broom handle found in the apartment.
At trial, the victim and defendant's downstairs neighbor, Norval Ingram, testified that he was home during the time of the victim's death. At approximately 12:35 a.m., he began to hear "unusual" noises in the upstairs apartment. Ingram was awakened by the sound of a heavy object hitting the floor. Following that noise, he heard the sound of running water and observed "dirty water" coming through his ceiling. Ingram then heard a "thud" and a "crashing" noise upstairs. The noise continued intermittently.
A short time later, Ingram went upstairs and knocked on defendant's apartment door. He heard a woman's voice ask if there "was someone at the door." The woman then called out defendant's name and stated that someone was at the door. From behind the apartment door, Ingram heard a man's voice he recognized as defendant's ask him "what [he] want[ed]." In response to Ingram's inquiry concerning the running water, the man told him to "take it up with the landlord." Ingram left and went downstairs to his apartment. Ingram continued to hear loud noises in the upstairs apartment until sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.
Detective Michael Van Stratton testified that he was dispatched to the victim and defendant's apartment at approximately 1:40 p.m. on June 19, 1989. While at the apartment, he observed bloodstains throughout the apartment. Over defendant's objection, Detective Van Stratton testified regarding his analysis of the bloodstains after being qualified as an expert witness in the field of bloodstain interpretation. On the basis of his analysis of the bloodstains, Van Stratton opined that the victim was beaten in several different locations, including the bedroom. Further, he concluded that someone had attempted to wipe up the blood in the apartment.
The prosecutor offered Detective Van Stratton's testimony to contradict defendant's original statement to the police. Defendant had stated that he had gone to sleep in the bedroom earlier in the evening after the victim had left for the evening. He told the police that he was awakened later that night when the victim returned. He stated that he did not discover the victim's injuries until he went into the bathroom and found her in the bathtub early the next morning. In his statement, he also denied attempting to wipe up the blood in the apartment.
On appeal, defendant raises a number of challenges regarding the admission of the bloodstain interpretation evidence presented by Detective Van Stratton. Defendant primarily argues that the prosecutor failed to sustain his burden of proving that bloodstain interpretation evidence has gained general acceptance by disinterested experts in the scientific community.
The Davis- Frye rule, adopted from People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955), and Frye v. United States, 54 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013 (1923), 1 limits the admissibility of novel scientific evidence by requiring the party offering the evidence to demonstrate that it has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. People v. Young (After Remand), 425 Mich. 470, 473, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986); People v. Adams, 195 Mich.App. 267, 269, 489 N.W.2d 192 (1992); People v. Gistover, 189 Mich.App. 44, 46, 472 N.W.2d 27 (1991). General scientific recognition may not be established without the testimony of disinterested and impartial experts whose livelihood is not intimately connected with the new technique. Young, supra at 479-480, 391 N.W.2d 270; People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 145, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 358, 376, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977). The Davis- Frye test is applied only to novel scientific techniques or principles. "A party need not show the general acceptance of an already established test." People v. Davis, 199 Mich.App. 502, 512, 503 N.W.2d 457 (1993). See also People v. Marsh, 177 Mich.App. 161, 164, 167, 441 N.W.2d 33 (1989).
The admissibility of expert testimony concerning the interpretation of "blood spatters" or "bloodstains" is an issue of first impression in Michigan. In Farris v. State, 670 P.2d 995, 997 (Okla.App.1983), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals described this evidence as follows:
The geometric Blood Stain Interpretation is a method used to reconstruct the scene of the crime. Blood stains are uniform in character and conform to the laws of inertia, contrifugal [sic] force and physics. Study of the blood pattern along with its size and shape helps determine the source of the blood and any movement that might have occurred after the bloodshed began, including subsequent violent attacks upon the victim.
Because bloodstain interpretation evidence is based upon generally accepted principles in the scientific community, a number of jurisdictions have upheld the admission of the testimony without the need for a Davis- Frye-type hearing. In People v. Clark, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1018, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 (1993), cert. den. --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2783, 129 L.Ed.2d 894 (1994), the California Supreme Court held that bloodstain interpretation testimony was admissible without proof that the evidence was generally accepted in the scientific community:
The testimony at issue here raises none of the concerns addressed by Kelly/ Frye. "The methods employed are not new to [science] or the law, and they carry no misleading aura of scientific infallibility." (People v. Stoll [49 Cal.3d 1136, 1157, 265 Cal.Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698 (1989) ] [psychological profile testimony], emphasis in the original.) In fact, the admissibility of "blood-spatter" or "blood dynamics" testimony in this state predates our [People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 (1976) ] decision. (People v. Carter, [48 Cal.2d 737, 750-751, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) ].) Moreover, neither the experiments conducted in connection with such analysis nor the principles underlying it produce an "aura of scientific infallibility." Rather, it is a matter of common knowledge, readily understood by the jury, that blood will be expelled from the human body if it is hit with sufficient force and that inferences can be drawn from the manner in which the expelled blood lands upon other objects. The Kelly/ frye rule is inapplicable.
Additionally, other jurisdictions have upheld the admission of bloodstain interpretation evidence by taking judicial notice of its reliability. In Lewis v. State, 737 S.W.2d 857, 860-861 (Tex.App.1987), the Texas Court of Appeals held that bloodstain interpretation testimony offered by a criminologist was admissible, partly on the basis of decisions of other jurisdictions:
Appellant complains that bloodstain analysis has never been offered in a Texas criminal trial, and observes that, at trial, the State failed to cite any cases approving the technique in other jurisdictions. Judicial recognition of a given technique is a factor in determining general acceptance. Jones, [v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex.App.1986).]
This Court may take judicial notice on its own motion of the judicial decisions of other states. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 202. Bloodstain analysis is considered a proper subject of expert testimony in several states. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn., 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed.2d 983 (1983); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296 (Me., 1981); People v. Erickson, 89 Ill.App.3d 56; 44 Ill.Dec. 138; 411 N.E.2d 44 (1980); People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957). Such testimony was also admitted in a recent Texas trial, although it is unapparent whether the evidence was challenged. Guerrero v State, 720 SW2d 233, 234 (Tex App--Austin 1986, pet. ref'd).
MacDonnell testified that he was aware of "many" other individuals who study in his field. Appellant notes that these other individuals were not named, and suggests that MacDonnell should not have been allowed to establish the general acceptance of his methods by his testimony alone. This rule might be valid in cases where the challenged technique uses untested methods, or where the reliability of the technique is seriously questioned, as is the case with lie detectors or "truth serum." However, MacDonnell's studies are based on general principles of physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics, and his methods use tools as widely...
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