People v. Heflin
Decision Date | 03 July 1990 |
Docket Number | Docket Nos. 79423,83994 |
Citation | 434 Mich. 482,456 N.W.2d 10 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. L.D. HEFLIN, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Celestine LANDRUM, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelly, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Van Buren County Pros. Attorney's Office by J. Michael James, Asst. Pros. Atty., Paw Paw, for the People in No. 79423.
State Appellate Defender Office by F. Michael Schuck, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for Heflin and Landrum.
Frank J. Kelly, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and JerroldSchrotenboer, Chief Appellate Atty., Jackson, for the People in No. 83994.
Majory B. Cohen, Mogill, Posner & Cohen, Detroit, for amicus curiae, Women Lawyers Ass'n of Michigan.
In these cases, consolidated for purposes of appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial courts erred in refusing to give jury instructions on common-law and statutory involuntary manslaughter 1 and self-defense. If we conclude that the trial courts erred, then we must also decide whether the errors were harmless.
In People v. Heflin, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the offense of statutory involuntary manslaughter even though it instructed the jury regarding voluntary manslaughter. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the trial court.
In People v. Landrum, we would hold that the trial court did not err in failing to give, sua sponte, an instruction regarding common-law involuntary manslaughter. We also would hold that the trial court's instruction to the jury adequately presented defendant's theory of self-defense. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the trial court.
On August 3, 1984, defendant shot and killed his son-in-law, Rory "Rich" Petersen. The prosecutor charged defendant with first-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). A jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549, and felony-firearm. Defendant received a prison term of nineteen to forty years for the second-degree murder conviction and the mandatory two-year prison term for the felony-firearm conviction.
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the fatal shooting, Wilma Heflin, defendant's wife, and Marcia Petersen, defendant's daughter and the deceased's wife, were canning food at the defendant's home. Rich Petersen, who had earlier dropped his wife and children off at defendant's home, drove into defendant's driveway to pick up Marcia and their two children, Tara and Joshua Richard. He never left his car. Marcia came outside and asked Rich to return in about an hour. Rich left immediately.
Defendant confronted Marcia about the incident and became enraged after Marcia confirmed his suspicion that Rich had just driven up his driveway. Apparently, defendant had warned Rich not to come onto defendant's property. Defendant and his wife asserted that the animosity they felt toward Rich was premised partially on their belief that Rich physically abused Tara and Joshua. 2
At the time of the confrontation between defendant and Marcia, defendant had noticed several bruises on Tara's face and threatened to beat Marcia if he ever saw the child's face bruised again. Marcia claims that defendant slapped her at that moment, causing her to lose her balance and fall; whereas, defendant claims that he accidentally knocked Marcia down when he reached over to pick up Tara. In either case, Marcia grabbed the children and ran home. Rich became angry after Marcia entered their home crying that defendant had hit her. Rich got into his car and drove towards defendant's house.
Defendant testified that he noticed Rich driving down his street at approximately forty to forty-five miles per hour, honking his horn. Defendant went into the house, retrieved a loaded 3 12-gauge shotgun from behind the front door, and reappeared in the front yard. Rich stopped the car in the street and yelled, at which point defendant testified he saw Rich reach over toward the passenger side of the car for what defendant thought was a gun. 4 Defendant shot and killed Rich. The evidence established that he fired all five rounds from the shotgun. However, defendant only remembers shooting the gun one time. Rich was shot twice, and died almost instantaneously.
At trial, defendant admitted shooting Rich, but argued that he acted in self-defense and for the safety of his daughter and granddaughter. He also stated that he felt fearful and angry when he saw Rich approaching his house. In addition, defendant's wife testified that Rich had threatened the Heflins on several prior occasions.
The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the charges of first- and second-degree murder, self-defense, and voluntary manslaughter, but he refused defendant's request to instruct the jury for the offenses of statutory involuntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, reckless use of a firearm, and arguably imperfect self-defense. 5 During deliberation, the jury requested that the judge reinstruct them with regard to first- and second-degree murder and manslaughter. The judge complied. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder and felony-firearm.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offense of statutory involuntary manslaughter. This Court granted leave to appeal in consolidation with People v. Landrum, limited to the issue whether the trial judge must instruct the jury regarding the offense of statutory involuntary manslaughter when it also instructs the jury regarding voluntary manslaughter. 6
A jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549, for the beating death of sixty-seven-year-old Henry Thomas on December 5, 1983. Defendant, an admitted prostitute, stated that she met Thomas at a local bar a week earlier and that he solicited her services then, but had no money. Defendant told Thomas to return when he had money. On December 5, Thomas returned to the bar and requested that the defendant accompany him to his residence. Defendant agreed after Thomas promised to pay her thirty dollars when they got to Thomas' house. On the way to defendant's home, they stopped off at a local liquor store to pick up some whiskey.
Defendant and Thomas drank the whiskey and danced for about an hour after they first arrived at Thomas' house. 7 Shortly thereafter, Thomas told defendant to take off her blouse. Defendant agreed to do so, but only after Thomas paid her the thirty dollars that they previously agreed upon. Thomas never responded. The two resumed dancing. Defendant stayed because she assumed that Thomas would eventually pay her the thirty dollars. After approximately an hour, Thomas said that he had the money and asked defendant to go into the bedroom. Defendant complied. On the way to the bedroom, Thomas pushed defendant towards the bedroom and stated that he had decided not to pay defendant, but that they would have sex anyway. Once again, defendant said that Thomas had to pay her before she would have sex with him. At this point, Thomas told defendant that she could either "fuck or fight." Defendant got undressed and into the bed. Defendant stated that she was not afraid Thomas would kill her. She continued to protest that Thomas should pay her. Thomas disrobed and began to climb on top of defendant when she hit him on the head with the telephone receiver. Thomas started bleeding profusely. Thomas grabbed defendant as she tried to get out of the bed, and the two fell to the floor. Defendant hit Thomas with the end table. She ran into the bathroom and closed the door.
Defendant stated that Thomas tried to force his way into the bathroom. Defendant moved away from the door, allowing it to swing open. Thomas' momentum carried him into the bathtub. Thomas pulled defendant into the bathtub and the two continued to fight. Defendant managed to get out of the bathtub. Thomas followed defendant and pushed her into the toilet, breaking the toilet seat. Defendant grabbed a bottle and beat Thomas with it several times. Next, defendant pushed Thomas back into the bathtub. Defendant grabbed the telephone receiver and continued to pummel Thomas every time he attempted to get out of the tub. Defendant stated that Thomas eventually gave up and appeared ready to fall asleep. As defendant got dressed, she heard defendant say, "[b]abe, are you still here?" Defendant replied, "[y]eah, I'm still here." Thomas repeated the question as defendant left the apartment.
Defendant went to a friend's house to clean Thomas' blood off herself and change her bloodstained clothes. She also testified that she attempted to call Thomas to make sure that he felt all right. Nobody answered. The police found Thomas dead in the bathroom and the bathroom virtually painted with his blood. Thomas had two broken ribs and a broken nose. Thomas had numerous cuts on his face and forehead, and several fractured teeth. He died due to an obstruction of his upper airway by blood and debris (his fractured teeth). Defendant, on the other hand, emerged from the fight relatively unscathed. The police arrested defendant the next day. She admitted killing Thomas, but claimed she did not intend to...
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