People v. Hegedus, Docket No. 83601

Citation432 Mich. 598,443 N.W.2d 127
Decision Date03 July 1989
Docket NumberDocket No. 83601
Parties, 58 USLW 2064, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,623, 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1049, 1989 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 28,640 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick HEGEDUS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Div. by Michael J. Modelski, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Robert Ianni, Asst. Atty. Gen., in charge, Crim. Div. by Theodore S. Klimaszewski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kenneth M. McGill, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Robert Tanni and Th eodore S. Klimaszewski, Asst. Attys. Gen., Amicus Curial.

OPINION

BOYLE, Justice.

We consider in this case whether the criminal sanctions for certain violations of health and safety standards set forth in the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1 preclude the state from prosecuting the defendant for involuntary manslaughter. We hold that the statute does not preempt state action in this case, even though the victim's death occurred "in the workplace" and was allegedly caused by conduct that violated OSHA standards. Congress did not intend to preclude the enforcement by this state of its criminal laws simply because the alleged criminal activity occurred in the employment setting.

I Facts and Proceedings

The defendant, Patrick Hegedus, was charged with involuntary manslaughter, M.C.L. Sec. 750.321; M.S.A. Sec. 28.553, and conspiracy to violate the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, 2 M.C.L. Sec. 408.1035(5); M.S.A. Sec. 17.50(35)(5) and M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1)(a). The charges arose out of the January 18, 1985, death of William Hatherill, an employee of Jackson Enterprises, a company for which defendant Hegedus worked as a supervisor. Mr. Hatherill died of carbon monoxide intoxication while working in a company-owned van. The prosecution contends that the poor condition of the van's undercarriage and exhaust system allowed exhaust fumes to leak inside the van, causing Hatherill's death.

After a preliminary examination, the defendant was bound over on the charge of involuntary manslaughter. 3 Defendant's subsequent motion to quash the information on the manslaughter charge and reverse the binding over was granted by the circuit court, substantially on the basis that the defendant either had no duty to inspect the van or no duty or ability to take it out of service. The prosecution appealed as of right.

After receiving the parties' initial briefs, the Court of Appeals ordered supplemental briefs addressing the issue whether criminal prosecutions based on conditions in the workplace are preempted by either MIOSHA or OSHA. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court's quashing of the information, finding that criminal prosecution was preempted by OSHA. People v. Hegedus, 169 Mich.App. 62, 68, 425 N.W.2d 729 (1988) (Danhof, C.J., dissenting). This Court granted leave to appeal. People v. Hegedus, 431 Mich. 870 (1988). 4

II OSHA

OSHA's stated "purpose and policy" is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 651(b). To that end, the act gives the Secretary of Labor broad authority and responsibility to establish specific health and safety standards for "businesses affecting interstate commerce." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 651(b)(3). The act also imposes upon every employer a general duty to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 654(a)(1).

OSHA is primarily regulatory in nature, designed to prevent workplace deaths and injuries before they occur. Thus, its emphasis is on the promulgation of health and safety standards and enforcement and review procedures, rather than the assessment of penalties for injuries already suffered. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Whirlpool v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12, 100 S.Ct. 883, 890, 63 L.Ed.2d 154 (1980), "the legislation's remedial orientation is prophylactic in nature." 5

The act does contain, however, both civil and criminal penalties that can be assessed against employers who violate either specific, promulgated standards or the general-duty clause of Sec. 5(a)(1). For example, OSHA provides for civil penalties of up to $1000 for "serious" violations of either the general-duty clause or specific standards. 6 Up to $10,000 may be assessed for "willful" or repeated violations. 7

OSHA also provides for criminal sanctions under certain circumstances. Section 17(f) makes the unauthorized advance notification of an OSHA inspection a crime punishable by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Section 17(g) makes knowingly filing false statements with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) a crime punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or by imprisonment for up to six months, or both.

The relevant section in this case is Sec. 17(e), which provides criminal sanctions for a "willful" violation of a specific standard that results in the death of an employee. Section 17(e) states:

"Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and that violation caused death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both; except that if the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both." 8

The defendant contends that if he is subject to any criminal liability for his acts or omissions in causing the victim's death, it is under this section of OSHA, not under any state criminal law such as the manslaughter statute under which he was charged. M.C.L. Sec. 750.321; M.S.A. Sec. 28.553. The defendant argues that both the legislative history of OSHA and its comprehensive scope indicate that Congress intended to fully occupy the entire field of worker health and safety, and that to the extent that the state criminal sanctions sought to be applied in this case differ from or conflict with those found in OSHA, they are inapplicable as a result of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 9 III

OSHA Preemption
A

Generally, the existence of federal laws or regulations in a particular area can preempt state action in the same field where preemption is either express, implied, or the result of a conflict between state and federal law. 10 In each of these situations, the extent to which federal law actually preempts state authority is a question of congressional intent. " '[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.' " Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2216, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978). In addition, "[w]here, as here, the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States ... 'we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 [67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447] (1947)." Jones v. Rath Packing Co, 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).

B Express Preemption

The defendant does not argue that OSHA expressly preempts the application of state criminal laws to conduct in the workplace. 11 The Court of Appeals, however, apparently found such express preemption by virtue of Sec. 18 of the act. Section 18 provides in relevant part:

"(a) Assertion of State standards in absence of applicable Federal standards

"Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.

"(b) Submission of State plan for development and enforcement of State standards to preempt applicable Federal standards

"Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement."

The Court of Appeals properly interpreted this language to mean that a state may assert jurisdiction over an occupational safety and health issue "only if there is no federal standard in effect ... or the state has submitted its own enforcement plan to the United States Secretary of Labor for approval pursuant to [Sec. 18(b) ]." People v. Hegedus, supra, 169 Mich.App. at p. 67, 425 N.W.2d 729 (emphasis added). However, the Court of Appeals then improperly concluded that the prosecution of the defendant in this case in fact amounted to an assertion of jurisdiction over just such an issue.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that since OSHA does contain standards regulating the existence and allowable proportions of carbon monoxide in the workplace, the state may not exert jurisdiction over "this issue" except through an approved state plan. Id., p. 68, 425 N.W.2d 729. Observing that this case was not prosecuted under the state's approved plan (MIOSHA)...

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