People v. Henderson

Decision Date19 November 1963
Docket NumberCr. 7263
Citation386 P.2d 677,60 Cal.2d 482,35 Cal.Rptr. 77
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 386 P.2d 677 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Kaye HENDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Benjamin Dreyfus, San Francisco, under appointment by Supreme Court, and Garry, Dreyfus & McTernan, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and Albert W. Harris, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TRAYNOR, Justice.

A jury found defendant guilty of murder of the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen.Code, § 1239(b).) In a previous trial for the same offense defendant waived trial by jury and pleaded guilty to murder, which the court found to be of the first degree. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On defendant's appeal the District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial pursuant to a stipulation of defendant and counsel for the respective parties on the ground that defendant was improperly allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty after the court had ordered defendant's counsel discharged on defendant's motion. (Pen.Code, § 1018; People v. Ballentine, 39 Cal.2d 193, 196, 246 P.2d 35.)

Defendant admitted in open court that he killed the deceased, Mrs. Joyce Lovett, in a motel in Pinole, and that he inflicted the lacerations and contusions found on her body. Defendant had previously been casually acquainted with the deceased and met her in a bar in San Jose on the evening of July 10, 1961. They had a few drinks and the deceased agreed to accompany defendant on a trip to Lake Tahoe. They left the bar about closing time and drove to a motel in El Cerrito where defendant registered them as Mr. and Mrs. R. Henderson. The following day they went to two or three bars in El Cerrito and San Pablo where each of them drank several beers. In the afternoon they started toward Sacramento but were forced to stop in Pinole because defendant's automobile was overheated. They ate and had several more beers in Pinole. Defendant inquired at a bar about motel accommodations. A customer drove them to a motel on the edge of town where defendant again registered them as Mr. and Mrs. Henderson. They arrived at the motel about four o'clock in the afternoon. About half an hour later defendant killed and mutilated the deceased. At ten o'clock that evening a motel employee gave defendant a ride downtown, and defendant drove his automobile back to the motel. Later that night he put the deceased's body in his car and after driving around for several hours put the body along the highway. Defendant then drove to his apartment in Santa Clara where he stayed the remainder of the night. The following day he confessed the killing to his half-sister and showed her the deceased's rings. After seeing a lawyer in San Jose, he agreed to turn himself in and at about 8:00 P.M. surrendered to the Alameda County Sheriff.

The day after the killing Dr. McNie performed an autopsy on the body of the deceased. He testified that death was caused by asphyxiation from strangulation associated with multiple blunt injuries. Dr. McNie found multiple contusions on deceased's head, neck, shoulders, arms, and legs. He found multiple small abrasions on the left breast, multiple scratches measuring up to two inches in length on the skin of the lower abdomen, a three-eighths inch by one-quarter inch puncture of the skin over the pubis, and multiple wedge-shaped lacerations Based on the condition of the body, the People requested and the trial court gave instructions defining murder of the first degree when committed by means of torture and when committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate mayhem. The evidence of defendant's possession of the deceased's rings, which the physical evidence suggested had been removed before death, and his possession of the deceased's purse, support the instruction regarding a killing in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. The circumstances of the killing and the existence of fresh scratches on defendant's face when he was arrested support the instruction that the deceased may have been killed during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate rape.

[386 P.2d 679] of the skin and mucosa of the perineum radiating outward from the rectum and vagina, the largest of which was two by one inches extending from the vagina across the urethra to the clitoris. There was a three-quarter inch laceration of the rectovaginal septum. There were six to eight lacerations in the rectal area and the rectum was dilated to two and one-half inches in diameter and contained deceased's wadded panties. It was Dr. McNie's opinion, based on the finding of hemorrhage into the tissues underlying the injuries, that, except for the perineal area, the injuries had been inflicted before death. Dr. McNic was not asked whether in his opinion the injuries to the perineal area occurred before or after death. He testified, however, that there were areas of hemorrhage into the underlying supporting tissues of the [60 Cal.2d 486] rectum and vagina and into the mucosa at the edges of the lacerations. There was no evidence of sperm in the vaginal tract. A blood test disclosed .19 per cent alcohol in the deceased's bloodstream at the time of death.

The foregoing evidence, together with evidence tending to rebut defendant's defense of lack of malicious intent and premeditation, was the basis for the People's theory that the killing was murder of the first degree because it was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. In this regard, the man who drove defendant and the deceased from the bar in Pinole to the motel testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated at that time. The manager of the motel testified that when defendant registered 'he had been drinking but he wasn't inebriated.' Both of these witnesses were also of the opinion that the deceased was not intoxicated, although the blood test disclosed that her bloodstream contained .19 per cent alcohol. To negative lack of criminal intent the People also offered the testimony of Mrs. Pauline Perez that a month before the killing defendant had committed a sexual attack upon her under circumstances similar to those surrounding the homicide.

Mrs. Perez testified that she met defendant in the same bar in San Jose in which he later met the deceased and agreed to have defendant take her home. She testified that defendant did not take her home and that when she attempted to get out of his car, he struck her and threatened to kill her if she tried it again. When they stopped, defendant drew a knife and attempted to rape her and forced her to commit an unnatural act and to submit to the commission of a similar act by him. She testified that defendant then inserted a sap into her vagina and bit her arms, legs, breasts, and stomach. He threatened to kill her so that she could not report the incident to the police, but relented when she begged for her life. When defendant allowed her to leave the car, he kept her underclothes and purse. Mrs. Perez was taken to a hospital and the police were notified. Photographs of Mrs. Perez's injuries were introduced by the People to explain and corroborate her testimony. Defendant admitted on the stand that he performed the acts testified to by Mrs. Perez, but denied that he had a knife or that he threatened to kill her. He also denied that he threatened to kill her because she had informed on him.

Defendant does mot contend that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction In support of his defense of intoxication, defendant testified that he drank 13 to 15 beers at various bars on the day of the killing and that he was drunk when he and the deceased arrived at the motel. He testified that after checking into the motel the deceased took a shower and as she was drying herself he walked into the bathroom, picked her up and carried her into the bedroom. He 'laid her down on the bed, and then * * * started to make love to her and then this strange thing come' that he described as 'like watching * * * yourself do something and yet unable to intercede or to stop whatever is happening. * * * (Y)ou seem to be paralyzed and I could see everything was going on and, to put it bluntly, just like a dream.' Defendant testified that he strangled the deceased with his hands but that before killing her he did not hit or cut her or do any other violence to her body. He testified that after he had killed her he 'work' or 'came out' and realized what he had done. He carried her body into the shower and attempted to revive her with cold water. 'And then I says, 'If she's as said as she appears, who will believe me?' So that's when I got the crazy notion and did what the other I did.' Defendant testified that he went into the bathroom where the body was lying in a corner of the shower stall and cut the deceased's body with a beer can opener. Defendant then 'passed out' on the bed. When he awoke, he dressed the body and left it leaning against the wall in the bathroom. About midnight he carried the body to his car and disposed of it along the highway.

[386 P.2d 680] of first degree murder under any or all of the theories advanced by the People. His defense is that he had no intent to harm the deceased and that he had no control over his actions because of his intoxication and mental illness not amounting to legal insanity. He testified that the mutilation of the deceased occurred after he had killed her by strangulation. He could not recall when or how he received the scratches on his face and denied that he attempted to rape the deceased or to force her to engage in any unnatural act. He testified that he took the rings from her finger after he had put the body along the highway, but he did not know why he had taken them. He did not explain his possession of the...

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306 cases
  • People v. Serrato, Cr. 16519
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • July 25, 1973
    ...not been acquitted, they are at least protected against more severe punishment under the rule established in People v. Henderson (1963), 60 Cal.2d 482, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677; and followed in People v. Ali (1967), 66 Cal.2d 277, 57 Cal.Rptr. 348, 424 P.2d 932; People v. Hood (1969), ......
  • People v. Ray
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • July 27, 1967
    ...because it conflicts with the right to show diminished capacity on the guilt phase of the trial. (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 491--494, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677.) The court's observation was not an instruction, but merely a question addressed to one juror, not all of the ......
  • People v. Curcio
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • February 3, 1967
    ...has been considered in a number of cases. The practice has not been held to be unconstitutional. In People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 495, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 84, 386 P.2d 677, 684, the court made this 'Although evidence of prior offenses carries with it the risk that its probative value may......
  • The People v. Hightower
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • January 28, 2000
    ...years longer than the sentence imposed in 1993. Defendant's opening brief challenged this sentence under the rule of People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497. As recently summarized by us, that rule states that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction "may not upon reconvi......
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2 books & journal articles
  • A Constitutional Right to an Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 8-02, December 1984
    • Invalid date
    ...sentence was illegal), overruled, People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 659 P.2d 1144, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1983); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 495-97, 386 P.2d 677, 685, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1963) (pre-Pearce decision based on double jeopardy, Cal. Const, art. I, § 13) (superseded b......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • March 30, 2022
    ...is that the total aggregate amount of the monetary sentence can be no greater than that originally imposed. People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 sets forth the general rule that after appeal, a defendant may not receive a greater sentence on the charges he was first tried on. The Suprem......

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