People v. Henriquez-Ulintz
| Decision Date | 05 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20110032 |
| Citation | 172 N.Y.S.3d 827 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Helena HENRIQUEZ-ULINTZ, Defendant. |
| Court | New York County Court |
For the People: Rockland County Assistant District Attorney Renada N. Lewis
For the Defense: David D. Narain, Esq.
This matter was opened upon the Court's motion for an Adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. Further discussion of this action's procedural posture is set forth in a May 19, 2022 decision. People v. Henriquez-Ulintz , 75 Misc. 3d 1207(A), 2022 WL 1594844 [Just. Ct. 2022]. Relevant to the instant decision, the Defendant remains charged with Criminal trespass in the second degree ( N.Y PENAL LAW § 140.15 ), and Aggravated harassment in the second degree ( NY PENAL LAW § 240.30(1)(a) )1 .
On July 27, 2022, this Court inquired whether the People and the defense would consent to a sua sponte motion for an Adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, under NY CRIM PROC LAW § 170.55 ("ACD"), on all pending charges. The People promptly and expressly consented. Later that day, the defense responded with a request for leave to file a Clayton motion, under NY CRIM PROC LAW § 170.40 ("IFOJ"). After this Court granted the request, the defense's motion followed.
Therein, the defense prayed for an order "pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.40 to dismiss the Accusatory Instrument against [the Defendant], or an alternative relief, in that prosecuting this defendant could result in injustice." The motion also "requests that an order be entered granting such other further and different relief as to this court may seem just and proper."
At the threshold, the Court consolidates its own ACD motion, and the defense's IFOJ motion, for simultaneous decision. An ACD, is a disposition requiring consent from the prosecutor, the defense, and , the court. Smith-Hunter v. Harvey , 95 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 712 N.Y.S.2d 438, 734 N.E.2d 750 (2000). The defense's consent is rarely withheld. People v. Joseph P. , 106 Misc.2d 1075, 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 340 (Just. Ct. 1980). Indicia of consent to an ACD can be found where the defense presents facts supporting a contention that further prosecution might result in substantial injustice. People v. Wei Chen , 104 Misc.2d 1057, 430 N.Y.S.2d 469, 475-76 (White Plains City Ct. 1980).
The corresponding dismissal is not a favorable termination to the defendant. Id. Similarly, a favorable termination does not result, where a prosecution is dismissed IFOJ. Id. In this respect, ACD and IFOJ dispositions are alike. Yet, whereas the end results are similar, the manner in which these depositions are reached, and the surrounding timing, vary significantly. To this end, courts are not required to give any reasons for granting ACD's. Hennessy v. Gorman , 87 A.D.2d 29, 30, 450 N.Y.S.2d 638 (4th Dep't 1982), rev'd on other grounds , 58 N.Y.2d 806, 459 N.Y.S.2d 261, 445 N.E.2d 644 (1983).
Meanwhile, the Second Department has noted that courts have historically, only sparingly ordered IFOJ dismissals. People v. Clayton , 41 A.D.2d 204, 208, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2nd Dep't 1973). This is because IFOJ dismissals are only appropriate in the rare circumstances where the letter of the law should "be allowed to gracefully and charitably succumb to the spirit of justice." People v. Joseph P. , 106 Misc.2d 1075, 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (Just. Ct. 1980), quoting People v. Davis , 55 Misc. 2d 656, 659, 286 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967). Indeed, before an IFOJ dismissal can be granted, the court must examine and consider a litany of enumerated factors:
As evident by the foregoing, an ACD disposes of charges under a less structured, non-merits based adjudication, than the rarer, and loftier IFOJ dismissal. Powell v. Page , 8 Misc.3d 988, 800 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Co. 2005). Or, it might be said that furthering justice is a more arduous, than simply safeguarding justice's interest.
A court's decision to order an ACD, instead of an IFOJ dismissal, is not an uncommon occurrence. Indeed, family courts also order ACD's over IFOJ's. For instance, in Matter of Kenyon C. , 69 Misc. 3d 1210(A), 2020 WL 6373638 (Fam. Ct., Bronx County 2020), the respondent's motion to dismiss IFOJ was denied, but an ACD application was granted. There, the Kenyon C. Court could not find "compelling circumstances supporting the drastic remedy of dismissal of the petition in furtherance of justice" under the Family Court Act. Nevertheless, the Kenyon C. Court believed an ACD would serve the interest of justice.
Here, although the defense's IFOJ application marshals facts in furtherance of several of § 170.40 ’s enumerated factors, this Court reads the motion as indicia of the Defendant's consenting to an ACD, in satisfaction of Smith-Hunter v. Harvey , supra . This is because, as discussed below, "the defense [has] present[ed] facts supporting a contention that further prosecution might result in substantial injustice", in accordance with People v. Wei Chen , supra . Accordingly, this Court needn't examine or consider § 170.40 ’s factors, and simply order an ACD sans reasons, under Hennessy v. Gorman , supra .
Lest there be any doubt, the defense never opposed the Court's ACD motion. In fact, the defense prayed for "an alternative relief (emphasis added), in that prosecuting this defendant could result in injustice." In ordering and ACD the Court necessarily finds that ultimate dismissal of the accusatory instruments will further justice. This is exactly what the defense asks for, and this is "such other further and different relief as to this [C]ourt [ ] seem[s] just and proper." (See defense motion.) To be sure, in ordering an ACD, the Court is granting the precise ultimate relief and disposition the Defendant seeks. Plus, defendants only "rarely" withhold consent to an ACD. People v. Joseph P. , supra .
Therefore, the Court does not view the IFOJ application as a cross motion, in...
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