People v. Hernandez

• Citation: 2012 IL App (1st) 092841,359 Ill.Dec. 880,967 N.E.2d 910
• Decision Date: 23 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–09–2841.,1–09–2841.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Maria HERNANDEZ, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 092841
967 N.E.2d 910
359 Ill.Dec. 880

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Maria HERNANDEZ, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–09–2841.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Fifth Division.

March 23, 2012.

[967 N.E.2d 912]

Shannon M. Lynch, Oak Park, for Appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION
Presiding Justice EPSTEIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[359 Ill.Dec. 882]¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Maria Hernandez, was convicted of identity theft (720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a) (West 2008)). On August 21, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant to a two-year term of probation. Defendant now claims: (1) the State failed to prove that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the State failed to prove that she knew the social security number she used to purchase a vehicle belonged to another person; and (2) there was insufficient evidence that defendant was the same person who signed the credit application containing another person's social security number. For the reasons below, we vacate and remand.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On November 20, 2008, Maria Hernandez was indicted on one count of identity theft in violation of section 16G–15(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a) (West 2008)). Defendant waived her right to a jury trial. At the bench trial, the State produced four witnesses: Maria Nodarse, Ray Santiago, Detective Robert Ross, and Detective Jude Martinez.

¶ 4 Maria Nodarse testified regarding her social security number which we shall refer to as “Maria Nodarse's social security number.” Nodarse testified that the Internal Revenue Service contacted her in the summer of 2008 regarding a discrepancy. She obtained a copy of her credit report and contacted the Chicago police department. Nodarse testified that she had never been to a car dealership named “Sierra” nor had she ever purchased a Mitsubishi Eclipse. She had never met defendant and did not know anyone by the name of Maria Hernandez.

¶ 5 Ray Santiago, a salesman at Sierra Auto Group, testified that an individual named “Maria Hernandez” purchased a 200l Mitsubishi on September 2, 2006. Maria Hernandez also completed a credit application for Turner Acceptance Corporation. Santiago testified that the purpose of the credit application was to determine whether a person had sufficient credit to purchase a car. Maria Hernandez used two social security numbers, one of which was Maria Nodarse's social security number. Santiago testified that if questions arose when they checked the credit application, “they ask[ed] the customer if they use[d] another social security number” and Santiago had “seen times where somebody ha[d] two social security numbers.”

¶ 6 The credit application completed by Maria Hernandez consisted of two pages, which were duplicate copies of a standardized form. Both pages were signed by Maria Hernandez. The first page lists Maria Hernandez's driver's license number, date of birth (December 12, 1981), home address, employer (Marriott Hotel in Chicago), and occupation (housekeeping), but lists Maria Nodarse's social security number. The second page lists the second social security number and is otherwise incomplete.

[967 N.E.2d 913]

[359 Ill.Dec. 883]¶ 7 After Turner Acceptance Corporation approved Maria Hernandez's credit application containing Maria Nodarse's social security number, Sierra Auto Group generated a bill of sale for the Mitsubishi Eclipse. The bill of sale also contains Maria Nodarse's social security number, but lists Maria Hernandez as the purchaser. On September 2, 2006, Maria Hernandez signed this bill of sale contract and completed the purchase of the vehicle. Santiago testified that he did not remember if he saw Maria Hernandez drive away in the vehicle.

¶ 8 Detective Robert Ross testified that in 2008 he was assigned a case of identity theft with a victim named Maria Nodarse. Detective Ross received documentation from both Ms. Nodarse and Turner Acceptance Corporation. Based on that information, he determined a possible place of employment and contacted the Marriott Hotel. He then determined the name of a possible suspect, Maria Hernandez. He contacted Maria Hernandez's brother and left a message that he wanted to speak to her.

¶ 9 On October 29, 2008, Maria Hernandez met Detective Ross at Area 3 headquarters. Detective Ross identified defendant in court as the person he met with that day. Detective Ross testified that defendant spoke primarily Spanish and Detective Jude Martinez assisted with translation “to determine if Miss Hernandez had purchased a vehicle from Sierra Motors and did she provide the social security number of the victim.” After the interview, the detectives arrested defendant.

¶ 10 Detective Jude Martinez also identified defendant in court as the person whom he and Detective Ross had interviewed. Detective Martinez testified that defendant said she purchased a Mitsubishi vehicle from Sierra Auto Group using the social security number listed on the credit application and the purchase agreement ( i.e., Maria Nodarse's social security number). When Detective Martinez asked her how she obtained that social security number, defendant responded that she “made it up.” When Detective Martinez asked her about the second social security number listed on the credit application, she stated that she had obtained that number from her mother when she first entered the country and “she was not sure if that was a good social security number or not.”

¶ 11 After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed finding in which she argued the State did not prove that she knew she used another person's identity. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant elected not to testify and did not present any evidence on her behalf. The trial court found defendant guilty. The court subsequently denied defendant's posttrial motion to reconsider. After her conviction, defendant was sentenced to two years' probation. Defendant now appeals.

¶ 12 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13 In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court determines “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Montoya, 373 Ill.App.3d 78, 80, 311 Ill.Dec. 389, 868 N.E.2d 389 (2007) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction for identity theft). The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is the same as in a jury trial and is applied by the reviewing court regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v. Norris, 399 Ill.App.3d 525, 531, 341 Ill.Dec. 70, 929 N.E.2d 1149 (2010). “We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or [359 Ill.Dec. 884]

[967 N.E.2d 914]

unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.” People v. Zizzo, 301 Ill.App.3d 481, 486, 234 Ill.Dec. 685, 703 N.E.2d 546 (1998).

¶ 14 ANALYSIS ¶ 15 I. Whether the State Proved That Defendant Knowingly Used Personal Identifying Information of Another Person

¶ 16 Defendant first claims that the State failed to prove that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of identity theft, pursuant to section 16G–15(a)(1) of the Illinois Identity Theft Law (720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a)(1) (West 2008)), because the State failed to prove that she knowingly used the identity of another person. There are two aspects to defendant's first argument, however, as summarized in her request for relief:

“Appellant respectfully requests that this Court hold that the State is required under the statute to prove that the defendant knew she was using the identity of another person. The appellant further asks this Court to apply the facts of this case to that requirement and to find the defendant not guilty.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the instant case differs from the typical case involving the sufficiency of the evidence and calls for a different analysis. In the usual case, the only task for the reviewing court involves the second aspect of defendant's argument, i.e. applying the facts of the case to the statutory requirements to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The instant case necessarily involves a threshold determination of what elements the Illinois Identity Theft Law requires the State to prove, which calls for statutory interpretation. At the time of trial, the Illinois identity theft statute had not been interpreted by reviewing courts in terms of what elements the State was required to prove and defendant now asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the statute. She argues that “the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's argument that 720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a)(1) requires the State to prove that defendant knew the Social Security number actually belonged to another individual.”

¶ 17 Generally, when this court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, there have been either correct jury instructions on the elements of the offense or (in the case of a bench trial) no indication that the trial judge failed to consider the required elements of the offense. Here, however, there is an indication that the trial judge failed to consider the required elements of the offense. Defendant argues that “720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a)(1) requires the State to prove that defendant knew the Social Security number actually belonged to another individual.” More importantly, defendant also asserts on appeal that “the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's argument.”

¶ 18 Thus, although defendant's argument “may be characterized broadly as concerning the sufficiency of the evidence,” her “argument on this point has two facets.” Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 314, 324 (9th Cir.1957). We recognize that Wilson is...