People v. Hible

• Decision Date: 26 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4–13–1096.,4–13–1096.
• Citation: 53 N.E.3d 319,403 Ill.Dec. 265
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. William HIBLE, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

53 N.E.3d 319

403 Ill.Dec. 265

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.William HIBLE, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 4–13–1096.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

April 26, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Erica A. Nichols, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Springfield, for appellant.

Randall Brinegar, State's Attorney, Danville (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Allison Paige Brooks, all of

State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In August 2005, the State charged defendant, William Hible, with aggravated battery for an alleged battery on August 20, 2005. In June 2007, defendant pleaded guilty and the trial court sentenced him to two years in prison. In December 2011, defendant filed a section 2–1401 (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2010) ) petition claiming actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel. In January 2012, the trial court denied the petition sua sponte. The decision was appealed as premature, and the appellate court remanded with directions for further proceedings. People v. Hible, No. 4–12–0171, 2013 WL 3487170 (July 9, 2013) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ). In August 2008, defendant filed an addendum to his pro se petition. In October 2013, the trial court dismissed the petition for want of prosecution. This appeal followed.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 20, 2005, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12–4(a) (West 2004)). In June 2007, he entered a fully negotiated plea and the trial court sentenced defendant to two years in prison with credit for 121 days served. The trial court did not mention any fines when it sentenced defendant. The circuit clerk assessed several costs against defendant. The relevant costs include the following: (1) $50 for court costs (55 ILCS 5/5–1101(c) (West 2004)), (2) $2 for the “Anti–Crime Fund” (730 ILCS 5/5–6–3(b)(13) (West 2004)) (3) $4 for “Youth Diversion” (55 ILCS 5/5–1101(e) (West 2004)), and (4) $20 for the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Act) (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2004) ). In April 2008, defendant was released on parole and later discharged without incident.

¶ 4 In December 2011, defendant filed a writ of error coram nobis. Writs of error coram nobis were abolished in 1946. Pursuant to the statute, the trial court accepted the writ as a petition for relief from judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2010). In defendant's petition, he claimed he was actually innocent and his attorney had a conflict of interest by representing defendant and a codefendant in the same case, resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied defendant's petition sua sponte and found it to be untimely and without merit.

¶ 5 In February 2012, defendant appealed the trial court's decision. This court vacated and remanded, finding the trial court erroneously decided the case before it was ripe for adjudication. People v. Hible, 2013 IL App (4th) 120171–U, 2013 WL 3487170. On remand, the trial court dismissed defendant's petition for want of prosecution because defendant failed to serve the State and it was ripe for adjudication. This appeal followed.

¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 7 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's denial of his petition for section 2–1401 relief. Instead, defendant argues, and the State agrees, (1) fines were improperly imposed by the circuit clerk, and (2) defendant is entitled to presentence credit toward any new fines imposed on remand. The State requests a $50 fee for defending this appeal. We agree with the parties on the first two issues but decline to award the State its statutory fee for defending the appeal. Since the trial court will be recalculating and reimposing fines, we need not address the State's issue of overpayment or refund to defendant.

¶ 8 A. Fines Entered by the Circuit Clerk

¶ 9 As a preliminary matter, both parties challenge the entry of fines by the circuit clerk for the first time on appeal. Fines levied by the circuit clerk are void. People v. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56, 381 Ill.Dec. 550, 10 N.E.3d 959 ; see also People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 14, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437 (discussing improperly imposed fees as void).

¶ 10 The Illinois Supreme Court recently abolished the “void sentence rule” established in People v. Arna, 168 Ill.2d 107, 113, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995), which held any judgment failing to conform to a statutory requirement was void. People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 1, 398 Ill.Dec. 22, 43 N.E.3d 932. A sentence is only void if it is entered without personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 11 Castleberry does not change the outcome here. Fines imposed by the circuit clerk are still void. The Illinois Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the circuit courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. The clerk of court, under the same article, is explicitly referred to as a nonjudicial officer. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 18, 398 Ill.Dec. 22, 43 N.E.3d 932 ; Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 15, 396 Ill.Dec. 156, 39 N.E.3d 982 (quoting County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill.2d 186, 200, 107 Ill.Dec. 569, 507 N.E.2d 482, 486 (1987) ). The distinction between judicial and nonjudicial officers was described in Hall v. Marks, 34 Ill. 358, 363 (1864), as follows:

“It would be a perversion of language to call a clerk of a court a judicial officer. He is attached to the judicial department, but is only a ministerial officer of a court. * * * Every order or judgment he can lawfully enter[ ] is the judicial sentence of the court. He possesses no power or jurisdiction to render a judgment, but only to enter it under the express or implied order of the judge, in the exercise of judicial power. * * * The judgment * * * rendered by him * * * is, therefore, unauthorized and void. ” (Emphases added).

While the circuit court has original jurisdiction, jurisdiction for sentencing is limited to the judge. The circuit clerk is prohibited from entering judgment. Since Marks, courts have followed its prohibition on nonjudicial officers and other branches of government entering judgments. See, e.g., Bottom v. City of Edwardsville, 308 Ill. 68, 72–73, 139 N.E. 5, 7 (1923) (applying Marks to a void injunction issued by a master in chancery); People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson, 26 Ill.2d 268, 270–74, 186 N.E.2d 346, 347–49 (1962) (holding several tax laws unconstitutional that directed the court clerk to enter judgments); Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill.2d 6, 16, 178 Ill.Dec. 750, 605 N.E.2d 544, 550 (1992) (holding the rendering of judgment independent from the ministerial function of the court clerk's entry); Palumbo Bros., Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill.App.3d 756, 765, 228 Ill.Dec. 139, 688 N.E.2d 837, 843 (1997) (acknowledging unconstitutionality in permitting court clerks to enter judgments); Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 14, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437 (acknowledging a fee entered by the court clerk was without authority and therefore void).

¶ 12 Prior cases on fines and fees refer to the clerk's lack of jurisdiction, rather than the abolished void sentence rule in Castleberry. This court has held the clerk of court is a nonjudicial officer and has “ ‘no power to impose sentences or levy fines.’ ”

People v. Swank, 344 Ill.App.3d 738, 748, 279 Ill.Dec. 576, 800 N.E.2d 864, 871 (2003) (quoting People v. Scott, 152 Ill.App.3d 868, 873, 105 Ill.Dec. 916, 505 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1987) ); see also Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 14, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437 (fee entered by court clerk was without authority and therefore void); People v. Alghadi, 355 Ill.Dec. 730, 960 N.E.2d 612, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, ¶ 20 ; People v. Williams, 372 Ill.Dec. 424, 991 N.E.2d 914, 918, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 16 ; Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56, 381 Ill.Dec. 550, 10 N.E.3d 959. Fines imposed by the clerk of court are void. Each referenced fine entered by the clerk and not by the trial court is void.

¶ 13 Under a section 2–1401 petition, void judgments can be challenged beyond the two-year time limit. People v. Gosier, 205 Ill.2d 198, 206, 275 Ill.Dec. 493, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 1271 (2001) ; 735 ILCS 5/2–1401(c), (f) (West 2010). A void judgment is one entered without jurisdiction and can be challenged “ ‘at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally.’ ” Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 103, 267 Ill.Dec. 58, 776 N.E.2d 195, 201 (2002) (quoting Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858, 862 (1945) ). This court has jurisdiction to address this issue for the first time on appeal.

¶ 14 The determination of whether the circuit clerk imposed a fine against defendant is an issue of statutory construction and is reviewed de novo. People v. Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 92, 383 Ill.Dec. 831, 16 N.E.3d 13 (citing People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 355 Ill.Dec. 207, 959 N.E.2d 621 ). Fines and fees are two distinct charges. A fee is a charge designed to recoup the State's expenses, while a fine “ ‘is a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense.’ ” Id. ¶ 86, 383 Ill.Dec. 831, 16 N.E.3d 13 (quoting People v. Graves, 235 Ill.2d 244, 250, 335 Ill.Dec. 881, 919 N.E.2d 906, 909 (2009) ). The circuit clerk can levy fees on a defendant, but only the trial court can impose fines on a defendant. People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (4th) 121118, ¶ 18, 385 Ill.Dec. 367, 18 N.E.3d 912.

¶ 15 1. Court Fee

¶ 16 Both defendant and the State agree the $50 court fee is a fine. This court previously determined this issue in Smith. In Smith, this court held the $50 court finance fee (55 ILCS 5/5–1101(c) (West 2008)) was actually a fine and only the trial court could impose it. Smith, 2014 IL App (4th) 121118, ¶ 54, 385 Ill.Dec. 367, 18 N.E.3d 912. We...