People v. Hickman
| Decision Date | 23 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 76225,s. 76225 |
| Citation | 206 Ill.Dec. 94,163 Ill.2d 250,644 N.E.2d 1147 |
| Parties | , 206 Ill.Dec. 94 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Darrick HICKMAN, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Douglas HICKMAN, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Prince TURNER, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Sean WRIGHT, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Pedro MORENO, Appellee. to 76228 and 76751. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and David R. Akemann, State's Atty., Geneva (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen. and Arleen C. Anderson and Michael A. Hurst, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for the People.
Kevin T. Busch, Aurora, for appellees Darrick Hickman and Douglas Hickman.
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Paul Alexander Rogers, Asst. Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee Pedro Moreno.
Section 405.1(c) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides that a person convicted of criminal drug conspiracy may be sentenced "not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy." (720 ILCS 570/405.1(c) (West 1992).) We hold that this provision is not unconstitutionally vague and does not result in an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentencing scheme. We lastly interpret this provision consistent with this court's decision in People v. Moore (1978), 69 Ill.2d 520, 14 Ill.Dec. 470, 372 N.E.2d 666.
Defendants Darrick Hickman, Douglas Hickman, Prince Turner, and Sean Wright were ultimately charged in a four-count indictment in the circuit court of Kane County. Each of these defendants was charged with calculated criminal drug conspiracy (720 ILCS 570/405 (West 1992)), criminal drug conspiracy (720 ILCS 570/405.1 (West 1992)), attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 570/401 (West 1992)), and attempted possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 570/402 (West 1992)).
Defendant Pedro Moreno was charged in a three-count indictment in the same court. Moreno was charged with criminal drug conspiracy, attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and attempted possession of a controlled substance.
Each defendant asked the trial court to dismiss the criminal drug conspiracy charge and declare that the sentencing provision of the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court so ruled.
The State appeals directly to this court. (134 Ill.2d R. 603.) We consolidated these cases for review, and now reverse the trial court.
Section 405.1 of the Controlled Substances Act states in pertinent part:
" § 405.1. (a) Elements of the offense. A person commits criminal drug conspiracy when, with the intent that an offense set forth in Section 401, Section 402, or Section 407 of this Act be committed, he agrees with another to the commission of that offense. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit such an offense unless an act in furtherance of such agreement is alleged and proved to have been committed by him or by a co-conspirator.
* * * * * *
(c) Sentence. A person convicted of criminal drug conspiracy may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy." 720 ILCS 570/405.1 (West 1992).
The trial court found that subsection (c) of the criminal drug conspiracy statute does not provide for a minimum sentence. Rather, the subsection establishes only a maximum sentence, which cannot exceed the maximum sentence for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy. The trial court concluded that this absence of a minimum sentence renders subsection (c) unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void. U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
Due process requires that a statute must not be so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning or application. Also, the statute must provide sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and fact finders that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions. (People v. Fabing (1991), 143 Ill.2d 48, 53, 155 Ill.Dec. 816, 570 N.E.2d 329 ().) A sentencing provision may likewise be void for vagueness if it does not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. United States v. Batchelder (1979), 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L.Ed.2d 755, 764.
However, mathematical certainty in language is not required. (Fabing, 143 Ill.2d at 53, 155 Ill.Dec. 816, 570 N.E.2d 329.) A statute satisfies due process so long as: (1) the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law in accordance with the intent of the legislature. United States v. Petrillo (1947), 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L.Ed. 1877, 1883; People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517.
Further, a court presumes that a statute is constitutional. Accordingly, the party challenging the statute has the burden of clearly establishing its constitutional infirmity. A court will construe a statute as constitutional if it can reasonably be done. (Bales, 108 Ill.2d at 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517.) This principle applies also to a sentencing provision. United States v. Evans (1948), 333 U.S. 483, 486, 68 S.Ct. 634, 636, 92 L.Ed. 823, 826.
The trial court concluded that the absence of a minimum sentence renders subsection (c) of section 405.1 void for vagueness. The trial court believed that a minimum sentence was essential to any valid sentencing provision. ("If you create a new offense, you got to know what the minimum [sentence] is.") Referring to section 405.1(c), the trial court believed that a minimum sentence of zero constituted inadequate notice of the possible penalty, and provided inadequate guidance to a court in determining a minimum sentence.
We disagree. Addressing the requirement of fair notice, we conclude that subsection (c) provides fair warning of the possible penalty. It is established that "[i]ndividuals are entitled to fair notice of the criminal consequences of felonious activities--not necessarily letter perfect notice." United States v. Ferryman (1st Cir.1990), 897 F.2d 584, 590.
In the present case, subsection (c) of section 405.1 plainly and unambiguously notifies a person of common intelligence that if he or she is convicted of criminal drug conspiracy, that person could be imprisoned or fined or both, from zero (see People v. Moore (1978), 69 Ill.2d 520, 14 Ill.Dec. 470, 372 N.E.2d 666) up to the maximum sentence for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy. Of course, subsection (c) could have provided letter-perfect notice had it specified a minimum penalty. However, that is not a constitutional requirement. Due process requires only fair notice, which subsection (c) provides.
Addressing the fair-administration requirement, we conclude that subsection (c) provides sufficiently definite standards for trial courts to fairly administer the law. The plain language of subsection (c) does not create the multiple, conflicting penalties presented to the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Evans (1948), 333 U.S 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823. Rather, subsection (c) plainly and unambiguously establishes a sentencing range "simply between no penalty, at the one extreme, and, at the other, fine plus imprisonment up to the specified maxima" for the object of the conspiracy. (See Evans, 333 U.S. at 484, 68 S.Ct. at 635, 92 L.Ed. at 825.) Trial courts commonly determine sentences within statutorily defined ranges in the sound exercise of their discretion. (See People v. Lambrechts (1977), 69 Ill.2d 544, 559, 14 Ill.Dec. 445, 372 N.E.2d 641; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 153, 11 Ill.Dec. 274, 368 N.E.2d 882.) We hold that subsection (c) is not unconstitutionally vague.
Defendant Moreno concedes that section 405.1(c) of the Controlled Substances Act is not unconstitutionally vague. However, Moreno contends that subsection (c) violates due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11). Moreno argues that a person convicted of criminal drug conspiracy could receive under subsection (c) a sentence greater than if convicted of what he describes as the "more serious" offense of calculated criminal drug conspiracy, depending on the amount of drugs that is the subject of the conspiracy.
Initially, we note that Moreno and the State disagree whether this issue is waived for review. However, we need not address this waiver issue because we conclude that subsection (c) does not violate these constitutional guarantees. See People v. Wade (1989), 131 Ill.2d 370, 374-76, 137 Ill.Dec. 608, 546 N.E.2d 553.
Due process requires that the legislature reasonably design penalty provisions to remedy the particular evil which the legislature has selected for treatment under the statute in question. (People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill.2d 310, 319, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300.) The proportionate penalties clause in our constitution requires that the legislature, in defining crimes and their penalties, consider, inter alia, the seriousness of the offense. A sentencing scheme violates the proportionate penalties clause where conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety than other conduct is punished more harshly. People v. Johns (1992), 153 Ill.2d 436, 447, 180 Ill.Dec. 254, ...
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