People v. Hill

• Docket Number: 2-20-0416
• Decision Date: 14 February 2022
• Citation: 2022 IL App (2d) 200416,220 N.E.3d 1100,468 Ill.Dec. 321
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles M. HILL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2022 IL App (2d) 200416

220 N.E.3d 1100

468 Ill.Dec. 321

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Charles M. HILL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-20-0416

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Filed February 14, 2022

Steven W. Becker, of Law Office of Steven W. Becker LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Jamie L. Mosser, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Diane L. Campbell, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE BRIDGESdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Charles M. Hill, was found guilty of the first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)(West 2002)) of a cab driver on July 16, 2003, when defendant was 17 years old.Defendant was initially sentenced to 48 years’ imprisonment, but he was later resentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment.Defendant appeals from the resentencing order, arguing that (1) the truth in sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied because it requires that juvenile defendants such as himself serve 100% of their sentences without the possibility of parole and (2)the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 40 years’ imprisonment in light of extensive mitigating evidence, including his expression of remorse and his rehabilitative potential.We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3Defendant was found guilty on September 15, 2006, and originally sentenced on January 17, 2007.Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed.People v. Hill , No. 2-07-0076, 383 Ill.App.3d 1150, 360 Ill.Dec. 141, 968 N.E.2d 220(2008)(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 4Defendant filed a postconviction petition(see725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.(West 2008)) on September 17, 2009, which the trial court summarily dismissed.We affirmed the summary dismissal on appeal.People v. Hill , No. 2-09-1157(2011)(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 5 On December 29, 2014, defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition.The trial court denied him leave, and this court affirmed.People v. Hill , No. 2-07-0076(2008)(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 6Defendant thereafter again sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition, this time through counsel.The trial court granted him leave to do so on June 2, 2017.Defendant filed his second petition that day, alleging that he received a de facto sentence of life imprisonment in violation of the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment and was therefore entitled to a new sentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407(2012), in which the mitigating factors of his youth could be considered.The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied, and then filed an answer.The parties later agreed to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of our supreme court's decision in People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763, which was decided on April 18, 2019.The State filed an amended answer conceding that, under Buffer , defendant was entitled to a resentencing hearing because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and met the qualifications outlined in Buffer .The trial court granted defendant's successive postconviction petition and scheduled a resentencing hearing.

¶ 7 The resentencing hearing took place on December 13, 2019.During the hearing, defense counsel raised the issue that the truth in sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendant.

¶ 8The trial court made its sentencing ruling on February 28, 2020; we summarize its findings.For the statutory factors in aggravation ( 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(West 2020) ), the trial court found that defendant had a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity at the time he committed the offense; that the sentence was necessary to deter others; and that he was on probation for another offense at the time of the murder.It found that none of the traditional statutory mitigating factors applied.SeeId.For the statutory factors regarding juveniles (id.§ 5-4.5-105(a)), the trial court found that defendant was under 18 at the time of the offense, seven days before his eighteenth birthday.There was no evidence that defendant suffered from any cognitive or developmental disabilities.Regarding the ability to consider the risks and consequences of his behavior, defendant was under 18 but was "very street smart" based on his experience in the criminal justice system.The trial court thought that defendant knew that he was going to kill somebody when he pulled the trigger, but it did not think that defendant considered the long-term consequence of him spending most of his life in prison.The factor encompassing defendant's family, home environment, and educational and social background was mitigating, as was his rehabilitation potential.

¶ 9The trial court continued, finding that the circumstances of the offense carried great weight because they were "inexcusable."Defendant and some other people took a cab ride with the plan to run away from the cab without paying the fare.Defendant chose to engage in the plan, armed with a fully loaded handgun, which he used to fire multiple rounds when the ride was over, and several of the rounds struck the cab driver.The driver was not armed or being aggressive, and defendant had no excuse for killing him.For the factor of his degree of participation and specific role in the offense, defendant was the one who brought the gun and committed the murder, so this factor weighed heavily against him.He also had a prior criminal history.Defendant was able to meaningfully participate in his defense.He was currently very remorseful, but, at the time of the offense and while out on bond, he thought he was going to get away with the crime, as evidenced by how he acted at the time of the guilty verdict and his committing new offenses while on bond.The trial court stated that, further, defendant fathered two children while on bond, which was not a responsible decision.The trial court also considered the victim impact statement from the victim's mother, which it gave great weight.

¶ 10The trial court stated that it was going to exercise its discretion and decline to impose the 25-year sentencing enhancement for the use of a firearm.It sentenced defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment and then stated, "Truth in sentencing does apply in this case, so I am specifically finding that this case—this sentence is to be served at a hundred percent."

¶ 11Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence on March 27, 2020, in which he included the argument that the truth in sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied.The trial court denied the motion on June 24, 2020.

¶ 12Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 13 II.ANALYSIS

¶ 14 A. Truth in Sentencing Statute

¶ 15Defendant first argues that the truth in sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile homicide defendants like him under Illinois's proportionate penalties clause because the statute mandates that defendants convicted of first degree murder serve 100% of their prison sentences without the possibility of parole (seeid.§ 3-6-3(a)(2)(i)).The proportionate penalties clause states, "All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.

¶ 16Defendant recognizes that this court recently rejected the same argument that defendant raises, in People v. Johnson , 2020 IL App (2d) 170646, 441 Ill.Dec. 50, 156 N.E.3d 50.There, the defendant argued that the truth in sentencing statute violated the proportionate penalties clause as well as the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ), both facially and as applied.Johnson , 2020 IL App (2d) 170646, ¶ 7, 441 Ill.Dec. 50, 156 N.E.3d 50.The defendant's "as applied" argument was premised on Miller , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, which held that it was a violation of the eighth amendment to sentence a juvenile defendant to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.Johnson , 2020 IL App (2d) 170646, ¶ 4, 441 Ill.Dec. 50, 156 N.E.3d 50.We stated that the court in People v. Pacheco , 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶ 58, 372 Ill.Dec. 406, 991 N.E.2d 896, had already addressed the defendant's argument, holding that the truth in sentencing statute was not unconstitutional in a situation where the juvenile defendant was convicted of first degree murder based on accountability and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.Johnson , 2020 IL App (2d) 170646, ¶ 12, 441 Ill.Dec. 50, 156 N.E.3d 50.We further stated that, because the defendant's eighth amendment claim based on Miller failed, so did his claim under the proportionate penalties clause, as the proportionate penalties clause was " ‘co-extensive with the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.’ "Id.¶ 16(quotingPeople v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106, 388 Ill.Dec. 834, 25 N.E.3d 526 ).

¶ 17Defendant argues that, contrary to our statement in Johnson , the proportionate penalties clause is not coextensive with the eighth amendment.Defendant cites People v. Clemons , 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40, 360 Ill.Dec. 293, 968 N.E.2d 1046, where our supreme court stated that the proportionate penalties clause was not synonymous with the eighth amendment.The court stated:

"Although a relationship may exist between the first clause of article I, section 11, and the eighth amendment, that relationship is not entirely clear.What is clear is that the limitation on penalties set forth in the second clause of article I, section 11, which focuses on the objective of rehabilitation, went beyond the framers’ understanding of the eighth amendment and is not synonymous with that

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