People v. Hill

• Decision Date: 31 March 1966
• Citation: People v. Hill, 17 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.Y.S.2d 422, 216 N.E.2d 588 (N.Y. 1966)
• Parties: , 216 N.E.2d 588 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Warren HILL, Defendant, and Lorenzo Catanzaro, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 422

269 N.Y.S.2d 422

17 N.Y.2d 185, 216 N.E.2d 588

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Warren HILL, Defendant, and Lorenzo Catanzaro, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 31, 1966.

Gilbert S. Rosenthal and Harold O. N. Frankel, New York City, for appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Alan F. Leibowitz and H. Richard Uviller, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

This is the first appeal to come back to this court following its remand for a Huntley hearing. (See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 176.)

In 1964, following our affirmance of the defendant's conviction and sentence of death for felony murder (13 N.Y.2d 842, 242 N.Y.S.2d 358, 192 N.E.2d 232, rearg. den. 13 N.Y.2d 988, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 193 N.E.2d 898), the Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment and remanded the case 'for further proceedings not inconsistent with (its) opinion * * * in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908.' (Catanzaro v. New York, 378 U.S. 573, 84 S.Ct. 1931.) In compliance with that mandate, we 'WITHHELD' DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL AND 'remitted' the case to the trial court for a hearing on the voluntariness of the defendant's inculpatory statements (15 N.Y.2d 722, 256 N.Y.S.2d 933, 205 N.E.2d 199).

The trial judge has ruled that the statements were voluntary and, from that determination, the defendant properly appeals directly to this court as of right in view of the fact that his original sentence, though later commuted to life imprisonment, was of death. (Code Crim.Proc. § 517, subd. 1; see People v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 173, 212 N.Y.S.2d 401, 173 N.E.2d 227.)

Catanzaro was indicted with three others for the holdup killing of a United Parcel truckdriver on May 17, 1961, on 53rd Street near Second Avenue in New York City. As a result of thorough police investigation, the defendant was discovered to be staying in a certain hotel and detectives went there to apprehend him. The defendant having gone out, the detectives awaited his return; two of them were let into the room by the hotel clerk, while a third remained in the lobby. The defendant arrived at about one o'clock in the morning, carrying a package under his left arm. Spotted by the officer in the lobby, he was followed upstairs and accosted in front of the door to his room. The door opened and one of the detectives inside the room, observing the defendant 'reaching for the package' under his arm, dashed from the room and grabbed him. During the ensuing struggle, in which considerable force was required to subdue the defendant, the package was torn open to reveal a loaded gun. One of the officers yelled, 'I have the gun. I have the murder weapon.' The defendant reacted to this by blurting out, 'No, no, I was only driving the car. I didn't do it. I didn't do it. The kid did it'. In a further effort to exculpate himself, the defendant also stated that the murder weapon was 'a .22' and that it was 'the kid' who had used it. The defendant was told that, if he did not co-operate, he would probably 'be stuck with this whole thing'; they 'will throw the book at you * * * (and) see that you get life or the chair'. He thereupon disclosed the names of his partners in crime and declared that the gun used to effect the killing had been thrown into the East River. Some time later, he gave a full statement, incriminating himself, to an assistant district attorney.

Although Catanzaro had not taken the stand at his trial, he did testify at the Huntley hearing. It was his claim that the police beat him and threatened his life both at the time of his arrest and during subsequent questioning at the station house. He had confessed to the assistant district attorney only because he 'thought any second (one of the police officers) was going to kill (him) right in the room there.' The trial judge, however, found the defendant's statements to be 'voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt' and further held that the defendant had, contrary to his testimony, never requested to see or consult with an attorney.

As the law now stands, the failure to advise the defendant upon his arrest of his right to counsel or of his right to remain silent does not invalidate his inculpatory statements, and the People are free to introduce them at the trial (see People v. Dusablon, 16 N.Y.2d 9, 19, 261 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41; People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 232--233, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928, 205 N.E.2d 852, 854) if voluntariness is established 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' (See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 78, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 843, 204 N.E.2d 179, 183, supra.)

The proof is more than sufficient to support the finding below that the defendant's admissions, both those uttered spontaneously when he was being subdued and taken into custody and those made at the police precinct, were voluntary and not the product of force or fear. In effecting the arrest, the police were privileged to use necessary force (Penal Law, § 246, subd. 1 (Consol.Laws, c. 40); Code Crim.Proc. § 174; see People v. Denker, 225 App.Div. 517, 234 N.Y.S. 32), particularly when they had reason to believe that the defendant had participated in a killing and was probably armed. The evidence supports the conclusion that they used no more force in the brief struggle than was necessary to subdue him and there is no record that he suffered any injuries.

Although the issue is one of first impression in this State, courts of other jurisdictions have held that the use of reasonable force in subduing a defendant or in effecting his arrest does not impair the voluntariness of a statement made by him during his subjection or render such statement inadmissible. (See, e.g., People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16, 30--31, 279 P.2d 744, cert. den. 349 U.S. 936, 75 S.Ct. 788, 99 L.Ed. 1265; Anderson v. State, 133 Wis. 601, 114 N.W. 112.) Confessions which are involuntary are inadmissible 'not because (they) are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law' and violate procedural standards of due process. (Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540--541, 81 S.Ct. 735, 739, 5 L.Ed.2d 760; see Spano v. People of State of New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320--321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265; Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242; Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801).

In the case before us, no impermissible methods were used nor was there any violation of due process....