People v. Hill

Decision Date31 July 1969
Citation303 N.Y.S.2d 265,60 Misc.2d 277
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Steven C. HILL, Defendant.
CourtNew York County Court

Frederick M. Hunt, Dist. Atty., County of Yates, for the people.

Paul V. Miller, Naples, for defendant-appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LYMAN H. SMITH, Judge.

Defendant-appellant has been convicted of Disorderly Conduct in violation of Subdivision 6 of Section 240.20 of the Penal Law, after a trial on June 5, 1969, before the Hon. Lyman Pierce, Acting Police Justice of the Village of Dundee, Yates County, New York, sitting without a jury.

On May 11, 1969, at about 3 A.M. in the Village of Dundee a single loud blast of an automobile horn attracted the attention of the Village Police Chief who, at that moment, was in the process of following in his patrol car a blue Ford automobile on one of the main thoroughfares of the Village, in an attempt to clock its speed. At the 'harsh' sound of the horn the officer broke off his chase of the Ford auto, executed a U-turn in the street and returned to a grocery parking lot where he had observed two parked vehicles and from which location he testified the sound of the horn had emanated.

The police chief, the People's only witness, identified the two parked vehicles as a Chevrolet and a Dodge, and also identified their several occupants, including the defendant-appellant as an occupant in the driver's seat of the Chevrolet. Upon direct examination and to the question, 'Are you sure from which vehicle the horn blast sounded?', the officer replied 'No, sir, I am not.'.

At the close of the People's case the defendant took the stand and testified he had heard an auto horn, but denied that he had sounded his horn. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the officer's information charged only that 'one of the vehicles blew their horn which caused a person in an apartment to look out and also a person who was working in a restaurant to look out of his window.'

Although the exact source was not established, the sound of the auto horn obviously triggered all that followed.

After stopping his patrol car, the officer asked the defendant-appellant, his passenger and the two young men occupying the Dodge automobile which one of them had sounded the horn. Each denied that any of them had done so. The officer then ordered all the young men to leave the parking lot and gave them 'five minutes to get out' or, in the alternative, stated that he would arrest them 'for disorderly conduct and loitering'.

Although the record is not clear as to the sequence of what happened next, it is clear a verbal exchange between these young men and the officer satisfied the officer that the appellant and the others had refused his command to disperse and that he should place all of them under arrest 'for loitering'.

Near the close of the trial the transcript reveals the following colloquy between the Court and the officer:

Q. How long was it after you told them to disperse before you actually arrested them?

A. I would say no more tan two minutes on Steve--two or three minutes on Steve.

Q. But you did tell them that you would give them five minutes?

A. I told Jim Schoonover this and was turning to Hill's car to tell Steve and Bob Coons.

At an earlier point in the trial the officer (upon cross examination) testified as follows:

Q. So you proceeded to arrest all four for one horn blowing incident. Correct?

A. Yes, sir.

There is no evidence in the trial minutes that a crowd gathered.

To constitute the offense charged (Disorderly Conduct) there must be evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant committed acts violative of the statute. (Sec. 240.20, Penal Law.)

Section 240.20 of the revised Penal Law provides in pertinent part as follows:

'A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:

6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse'

As indicated in the Practice Commentary (by Richard Denzer, Esq. and Peter McQuillan, Esq.) to this new section of the Penal Law ( § 240.20) the revision 'partially' replaced the former 'disorderly conduct' statute ( § 722, old Penal Law). However, it is worthy of note that the authors of the Practice Commentary state, 'Subdivision 6 (of § 240.20) substantially restates former Penal Law § 722(3).' McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law, p. 129.

While it might be argued that the appellant congregated with others and refused to comply with a lawful order to disperse (although the proof in this regard leaves much to be desired) the gravamen of the offense and the conduct which the statute proscribes must 'at least be such that a breach of the peace has become imminent or might reasonably by expected or intended to flow from such conduct.' (People v. Monnier, 280 N.Y. 77, 79, 19 N.E.2d 789, 790). There is no proof here that this defendant-appellant 'congregated', in the words of the statute, 'with intent' to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly created a risk thereof.

It is clear from the trial minutes that defend...

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12 cases
  • People v. Hanson
    • United States
    • New York District Court
    • September 11, 1998
    ......1 and 6. Clearly the defendant and the unarrested other were intent on a physical fight in a public place which would have ensued except for the action of the officer. Their conduct created an imminent risk of a breach of the peace, justifying arrest. People v. Hill, 60 Misc.2d 277, 303 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1969) People v. Perry, 265 N.Y. 362, 193 N.E. 175 (1934); People v. Montgomery, 17 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Chenango County Court 1940). Additionally the officer's order that the pair leave the area in separate directions was a lawful order to disperse, the deliberate ......
  • People v. Tuzzolino, 2009 NY Slip Op 31680(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 7/28/2009)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • July 28, 2009
    ......(People v Chesnick, 302 NY 58; People v. Griswald, supra at p. 41; People v Szepansky,25 Misc 2d 239.) Perhaps more importantly, it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to breach the peace. (People v Hill,60 Misc 2d 277.).         Therefore, the statute of disorderly conduct may not be molded to fit the facts, and to warrant conviction, the facts must fit the disorderly conduct statute under which the defendant has been charged. (People v. Griswald, supra; People v Hill, supra.). ......
  • State v. Anonymous (1976-9)
    • United States
    • Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut
    • January 1, 1976
    ......95] When the police arrived, on officer, on information furnished by the complainant, concluded that the defendants were bothering people and ordered them to leave. The defendants stated they had a right to be there selling papers and refused to leave. 1 They also engaged in political ...Hill, 60 Misc.2d 277, 303 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268.         In the present cases, there has been no showing that a disruption was imminent. In fact, the ......
  • People v. Pettigrew
    • United States
    • New York District Court
    • February 2, 1972
    ......508 (1927) . Peo. v. Smith, 19 N.Y.2d 212, 278 N.Y.S.2d 832, 225 N.E.2d 531 (1967) . Peo. v. Monnier, 280 N.Y. 77, 19 N.E.2d 789 (1939) . Peo. v. McCauliff, 267 N.Y. 581, 196 N.E. 590 (1935) . Peo. v. Reid, 180 Misc. 289, 40 N.Y.S.2d 793 (County Ct. Madison Co. 1943) . Peo. v. Hill, 60 Misc.2d 277, 303 N.Y.S.2d 265 (County Ct. Yates Co. 1969) . Peo. v. Chesnick, 302 N.Y. 58, 96 N.E.2d 87 (1950) .         The court will now consider each of these cases individually and distinguish them factually from the case at bar. .         The holding in the Phillips ......
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