People v. Hill

Decision Date02 October 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72--326,72--326
Citation302 N.E.2d 373,14 Ill.App.3d 20
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph B. HILL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Paul D. Giamanco, Hanagan, Dousman & Giamanco, Mount Vernon, for defendant-appellant.

Frank Bonan, State's Atty., McLeansboro, for plaintiff-appellee.

CREBS, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of the offense of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child in violation of section 11--5(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 11--5(a)(3)) after a jury trial in Hamilton County. He was sentenced to a term of one year at the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia. The case is here on direct appeal.

Appellant has urged five grounds for reversal. (1) That the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppres; (2) that the court erred in admitting evidence that defendant submitted to a polygraph test; (3) that defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) that the jury's verdict resulted from undue pressure; and (5) that defendant's sentence was excessive.

As regards the Motion to Suppress there is conflict in the testimony. Mr. Whitlock, the polygraph operator testified that the warnings were given before the polygraph examination. The Sheriff first corroborated this testimony but later changed his statement and testified that the Miranda warnings were given after the polygraph examination but before defendant's statement. Defendant did not directly deny receiving the warnings but a denial might be inferred from his testimony. If Mr. Whitlock's testimony is believed the motion was properly denied, and on the basis of the entire record the trial court could accept this testimony as true. We also note that there were two motions to suppress, one by defendant's first attorney which was denied after hearing by one judge, and the second by defendant's trial attorney which was denied after hearing by a different judge.

Appellant's second contention is that the trial judge improperly allowed evidence of a polygraph test into the trial. The fact that a polygraph test was given defendant was mentioned by the polygraph operator while being questioned by the State's Attorney. At this time there was no indication of the result of the test and appellant's counsel made no objection. While this mentioning of the fact that appellant had agreed to a polygraph test might be error, it is not enough to require reversal. Further mention of the polygraph was made by defendant while being questioned by his own counsel. Although it is clear that defense counsel was not seeking such an answer, some evidence of the possible result of the test came forward at this time. It has been held that evidence of a polygraph test elicited from the defendant when not required as a part of an answer to a question by the prosecutor will not be considered error. People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258, 184 N.E.2d 866, cert. denied 371 U.S. 964, 83 S.Ct. 546, 9 L.Ed.2d 511.

Appellant's third contention is that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the motion to suppress been granted this contention could require discussion. However, in view of the admitted inculpatory statements the evidence amply supports the guilty verdict of the jury.

Appellant next contends that the verdict of the jury resulted from coercion. The jury retired to consider their verdict at 2:40 P.M. and announced that they had reached a verdict at approximately 6:10 P.M. We find that this amount of time is reasonable. Also after the verdict was returned defense counsel requested that the court poll the jury. The eighth juror answered 'No. No. sir.' Defense counsel interjected: 'For the record, she said, 'No. sir. " The court then stated: 'The question again at this point: Is this your verdict? Yes or no? I couldn't hear your reply. Would you answer again. Is this your verdict, Chrystal E. Hale?' At this point she answered 'Yes, sir.' At the conclusion of the polling of the jury defense counsel stated: 'Could I ask that Mrs. Hale be asked again? There is a conflict. She said 'No' and then she said 'Yes'....

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20 cases
  • People v. Cabrera
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 16 Abril 1987
    ...conclusion is clearly unreasonable. People v. Herron (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 788, 792, 332 N.E.2d 623. See also People v. Hill (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 20, 302 N.E.2d 373; People v. Riddle (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 46, 6 Ill.Dec. 934, 363 N.E.2d 881; People v. Gardner (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 700, 352 ......
  • People v. Smith
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 19 Septiembre 1977
    ...believes that the juror has freely assented to the verdict." 30 Ill.App.3d 788, 791, 332 N.E.2d 623, 625. In People v. Hill (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 20, 22, 302 N.E.2d 373, the juror initially responded, "No. No, sir." Defense counsel repeated this answer. The court stated that he did not hear......
  • People v. Preston, s. 62547
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 5 Mayo 1978
    ...is given the opportunity to disavow the verdict. (See People v. Gardner (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 700, 352 N.E.2d 448; People v. Hill (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 20, 302 N.E.2d 373.) Ultimately, the question of whether a juror's response to a poll of the jury indicates a lack of voluntary assent to t......
  • People v. Maron
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Diciembre 2019
    ...facto . See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016) (no new law shall be considered to repeal a former law). Defendant also cites People v. Hill , 14 Ill. App. 3d 20, 23, 302 N.E.2d 373 (1973). In Hill , the trial court commented that the defendant could have been charged with a felony rather than a misdem......
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