People v. Hill, 2

• Decision Date: 27 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 2,2
• Citation: 262 N.W.2d 641,402 Mich. 272
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Renard HILL, Defendant-Appellant. 402 Mich. 272, 262 N.W.2d 641
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 641

262 N.W.2d 641

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Renard HILL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2.

402 Mich. 272, 262 N.W.2d 641

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 27, 1978.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Atty., Research, Training & Appeals, Robert A. Reuther, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

State Appellate Defender Office by Barbara L. Betsey, Asst. Defender, Janice Faysal, Research Asst., Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

KAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278 on March 28, 1967 in Detroit Recorder's Court. His appeal to the Court of Appeals raised three issues: violation of the 180-day rule; the improper admission of certain testimony into evidence; and a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, 22 Mich.App. 91, 177 N.W.2d 220 (1970). We granted leave to appeal to decide whether or not there had been a violation of the 180-day rule and later granted the appellate defender's request to brief and argue three additional issues with respect to instructions given at defendant's trial. We remand for augmentation of record.

The Facts

On January 18, 1966 defendant was arraigned on the instant charge of assault with intent to commit murder. This charge arose out of an incident on January 17, 1966 in which a police officer was shot. On January 19, 1966 while defendant was in custody, a complaint was filed, a warrant issued, and defendant was arraigned on a second charge of robbery armed. On January 21, 1966 following the filing of a complaint and issuance of a warrant, defendant was arraigned on a third charge of first-degree murder. Disposition of these three distinct cases, each arising out of separate incidents, occurred as follows:

Robbery armed: On April 15, 1966 the defendant pled guilty to robbery unarmed and on April 19, 1966 he received a sentence of 5 to 15 years imprisonment, and was delivered to the Department of Corrections.

Murder, first degree: Following two pretrial hearings and one adjournment defendant was brought to trial on the murder charge on February 1, 1967, 12 months after his arraignment. On February 6, 1967 defendant was acquitted.

Assault with intent to commit murder: On February 27, 1967, over one year after arraignment and before trial commenced on the assault with intent to murder charge, defendant brought a motion to quash the information alleging violation of the 180-day rule. On February 28, 1967, the trial judge denied defendant's motion finding that since the delay resulted from the intervening murder trial, the prosecutor had brought defendant to trial on the instant charge in good-faith compliance with the 180-day rule, M.C.L.A. § 780.131; M.S.A. § 28.969(1). Following one adjournment on March 14, 1967, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of assault with intent to commit murder on March 28, 1967. On April 14, 1967, defendant was sentenced to 50 to 75 years imprisonment.

I. 180-Day Rule

Defendant contends that the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction under M.C.L.A. § 780.131 et seq.; M.S.A. § 28.969(1) et seq. when trial in the instant case commenced 343 days after defendant's delivery to the state prison on another unrelated conviction.

The act provides in pertinent part:

"Sec. 1. Whenever the department of corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a penal institution of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such warrant, indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of such inmate and a request for final disposition of such warrant, indictment, information or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail.

"Sec. 2. The department of corrections shall notify each prisoner of any request forwarded under the provisions of section 1 of this act.

"Sec. 3. In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."

This Court has addressed the issue of compliance with this statute in only two cases: People v. Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300, 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959), and People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963).

In Hendershot, supra, defendant was sentenced to a term in a state prison pursuant to his conviction for manslaughter. The prosecutor filed a detainer notifying the Department of Corrections of an outstanding warrant for carrying a concealed weapon. Almost seven years later, when defendant was about to be released, the Department of Corrections served notice upon the prosecuting attorney requesting that action be taken toward final disposition of the untried concealed weapons charge. The prosecutor prepared the case for trial but defendant's pretrial motions delayed the actual trial beyond 180 days from the date of receipt of notice by the prosecutor. This Court held that the prosecutor's good-faith action in promptly readying the case for trial satisfied the statutory requirement of bringing the case to trial within 180 days from receipt of notice. The trial court was not, therefore, divested of jurisdiction under M.C.L.A. § 780.133; M.S.A. § 28.969(3).

In Castelli, supra, this Court held that the 180-day period could not begin to run until a defendant was delivered to state prison authorities. Dictum in Castelli suggests that once defendant was delivered to state prison, the Department of Corrections would be charged with a duty to serve the prosecutor with notice to begin proceedings within 180 days.

"In this case the department of corrections never did notify the prosecuting attorney of Oakland county of defendant's imprisonment or request disposition of the information. However, inasmuch as defendant was not delivered to the department and to State prison until March 3, 1961, no duty could have reposed on the department to do so before that date. 180 days thereafter had not yet expired when, on August 25, 1961, the Oakland county prosecuting attorney commenced proceedings, under the Hendershot holding, by habeas corpus to bring defendant before the magistrate for examination. Jurisdiction to try defendant, accordingly, was not lost and he is not entitled to discharge on the ground just considered." 370 Mich. 153, 121 N.W.2d 441.

Therefore, while the defendant in Castelli was already in the custody of county authorities when a warrant charging an unrelated offense was issued, the 180 days did not commence until he was delivered to state prison authorities. This Court held that prosecution was timely under Hendershot.

We read M.C.L.A. § 780.131 et seq.; M.S.A. § 28.969(1) et seq. as an effort to secure to state prison inmates their constitutional right to a speedy trial.

We hold that the statutory period begins with the coincidence of either conditions 1 or 2 and condition 3:

1) The issuance of a warrant, indictment or complaint against a person incarcerated in a state prison or under detention in any local facility awaiting incarceration in any state prison;

2) The incarceration of a defendant in a state prison or the detention of such defendant in a local facility to await such incarceration when there is an untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint pending against such defendant; and

3) The prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is so incarcerated when the warrant, indictment, information or complaint is issued or the Department of Corrections knows or should know that a warrant, indictment, or complaint is pending against one sentenced to their custody.

We so hold because we are confident that the Legislature which drafted the 180-day rule did not intend to empower law-enforcement officials to defeat this statutory protection afforded to defendants by failing or refusing to serve formal notice. Our holding imposes a duty upon all law-enforcement officials to see that state prison inmates are brought to trial on outstanding warrants in good faith within 180 days.

We have held that defendant's trial need not be concluded within 180 days, but that the prosecution must take good faith action within that time to ready the case for trial. People v. Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300, 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959).

In the instant case, defendant was arraigned promptly after the warrant was issued, but the trial was delayed to allow the trial of another unrelated charge against the defendant. More than 180 days elapsed from the time of the charge and trial on it, but that does not...