People v. Hines
| Decision Date | 08 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 17CA0143 |
| Citation | 491 P.3d 578 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip Bradley HINES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Nathaniel E. Deakins, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
¶ 1 Defendant, Phillip Bradley Hines, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of human trafficking for sexual servitude, pimping, and pandering, as well as his aggravated sentence.
¶ 2 Hines contends that the court erred by, among other things, failing to give a modified unanimity instruction on the human trafficking charge, which was required, he says, because the prosecution presented evidence of two discrete acts, either one of which could have constituted the offense of trafficking. Because we conclude that the human trafficking offense was charged and tried as a continuing course of conduct constituting a single transaction, we discern no instructional error. And because we discern no other errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
¶ 3 Hines and the victim met shortly after the victim moved to Colorado in 2010 or 2011. They were "a couple at first." But "almost immediately," the victim also began to work as a prostitute for Hines. She gave him the money she earned "because that's what [she was] supposed to do." The victim testified at trial that she was not allowed to keep any of the money and that she had to ask Hines for permission "for anything [she] got" because "he [was] the boss." She said Hines spent the money on drugs, alcohol, their hotel rooms, phones, and the victim's internet prostitution ads.
¶ 4 The victim testified that Hines soon became very abusive. He threatened her if she did not work. There "were quite a few incidents" where Hines dragged her around the room by her hair or hit her. The victim also testified that she and Hines did drugs together, but that he sometimes withheld drugs if she was not working.1
¶ 5 Another prostitute who knew the victim testified that the victim and Hines were just "a regular couple" at first. But then Hines started asking the victim about money or telling her to go "work the block or the track." She said that she saw the victim give Hines money after "dates," and that he spent it on drugs, hotel rooms, cigarettes, food, and other basic living expenses. She recalled Hines bragging "about how good of a ho [the victim] was." The other prostitute also testified that she "witnessed the aftermath" of Hines's violence toward the victim. On one occasion, she said that the victim came in her room and "[the victim's] face was really swollen," that Hines "shattered the whole side of [the victim's] face," and that she had to go into the victim's room to "help [the victim] clean up the blood off the wall."
¶ 6 During the summer or fall of 2014, the victim moved out of state because of Hines's violence toward her and because Hines had been arrested and incarcerated. But in December, after Hines was released to a halfway house, the victim contacted him again. He asked her to return to Colorado, telling her that he needed her help to pay for the halfway house, that he "love[d] [her]," and that "[t]hings w[ould] be different." She agreed because she "wanted to be around him" but also because she "[f]elt like [she] had no choice at the moment." Once back in Colorado, there was "no option [of her] not working."
¶ 7 Shortly after the victim's return, though, Hines became frustrated that she was not making enough money. So, Hines came up with a "solution" — the victim would work for another pimp, Durrell Bumphus, give Bumphus the money, and Bumphus would then give it to Hines. That plan was not successful, however, as Bumphus never gave Hines any money.
¶ 8 In January 2015, the victim was arrested in a prostitution sting and eventually implicated Hines during the investigation. Hines was charged with human trafficking for sexual servitude, pimping, and pandering. Hines's defense at trial was that he was the victim's boyfriend, not the victim's pimp, and he was unaware that she was a prostitute.
¶ 9 A jury convicted Hines on all charges. Because Hines was under confinement when he committed the offenses, the district court sentenced him in the aggravated range to a controlling term of twenty-four years.
¶ 10 On appeal, Hines contends that (1) the court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on a violation of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), §§ 16-14-101 to - 108, C.R.S. 2020; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his human trafficking conviction; (3) the court erred by admitting certain evidence; (4) the court erred by failing to give the jury a modified unanimity instruction; and (5) the court improperly sentenced him in the aggravated range.
¶ 11 On August 24, 2015, Hines, who was represented by counsel, pleaded not guilty. A month later, acting pro se and without notifying his lawyer, Hines filed a request for disposition of his case under the UMDDA. The UMDDA's 182-day deadline for bringing Hines to trial was March 21, 2016. See § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. 2020.
¶ 12 Trial was originally scheduled to begin on January 26, 2016. On January 19, defense counsel requested a continuance, Hines waived his speedy trial rights under section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2020,2 and the trial was rescheduled to April 19, 2016.
¶ 13 At a pretrial conference on April 11, the prosecutor requested a continuance based on the unavailability of the victim. Defense counsel asked that trial be reset within the speedy trial period, which was due to expire on July 19. The court granted the continuance request and reset the trial to May 24. At the end of the hearing, defense counsel referenced the UMDDA for the first time and told the court that he would "file a written motion regarding that particular issue" before the new trial date.
¶ 14 Hines, through counsel, then filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the UMDDA. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Hines had properly initiated the statutory process on September 21, 2015, but that the UMDDA deadline had been tolled for good cause, first when defense counsel requested a continuance in January 2016, and again when the prosecution requested a continuance in April 2016.
¶ 15 On appeal, Hines argues that the district court erred by finding good cause for the April 11, 2016, continuance.
¶ 16 Under the UMDDA, "[a]ny person who is in the custody of the department of corrections ... may request final disposition of any untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint pending against him in this state." § 16-14-102(1), C.R.S. 2020. The primary purpose of the UMDDA "is to provide a mechanism for prisoners to obtain speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subject of detainers." People v. Adolf , 2012 COA 60, ¶ 10, 296 P.3d 251. The statute requires that an incarcerated defendant be brought to trial within 182 days after the court and the prosecuting official receive his request for final disposition of charges, unless that period is expressly waived or extended for good cause or by stipulation. § 16-14-104(1), (2). If the defendant is not tried by the UMDDA deadline, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice. § 16-14-104(1).
¶ 17 We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the UMDDA, People v. Yakas , 2019 COA 117, ¶ 15, 461 P.3d 568, but we review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision to grant a continuance for good cause, see People v. Fleming , 900 P.2d 19, 23 (Colo. 1995).
¶ 18 To determine whether the district court correctly denied a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the UMDDA, we examine the following factors: (1) whether the defendant invoked the protections of the UMDDA; (2) if the defendant did invoke the statute's protections, whether he was brought to trial within the prescribed 182-day period; and (3) if he was not brought to trial within the prescribed period, whether that period was properly waived or extended. People v. Roberts , 2013 COA 50, ¶ 17, 321 P.3d 581.
¶ 19 Though the parties dispute whether Hines invoked the UMDDA and whether he was brought to trial by the deadline, we need not resolve those disputes, as the third factor is dispositive — whether the court abused its discretion in finding good cause to grant the prosecution's request for a continuance in April 2016, thereby extending the UMDDA deadline.
¶ 20 Hines says that while "[i]n a different case, good cause may exist to toll the limitations period so that the prosecution can locate and produce a material witness," good cause did not exist here because the prosecution did not exercise due diligence to secure the victim's presence for the April 2016 trial date.
¶ 21 The term "good cause" is "an amorphous term, difficult of precise delineation." Id. at ¶ 29. For that reason, whether the good cause standard has been satisfied depends on the facts of each case and is an inquiry left to the district court's discretion. Id. at ¶ 30. A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. See, e.g. , People v. Dominguez , 2019 COA 78, ¶ 13, 454 P.3d 364.
¶ 22 Because the UMDDA does not define "good cause," we look to principles derived from statutory speedy trial cases for guidance. See Roberts , ¶ 32 (); see also People v. Swazo , 199 Colo. 486, 489, 610 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1980) (...
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