People v. Hines

• Decision Date: 21 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011NA018944.,2011NA018944.
• Citation: 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 51593,36 Misc.3d 1234,960 N.Y.S.2d 51
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Louis C. HINES, Defendant.
• Court: New York District Court

36 Misc.3d 1234

960 N.Y.S.2d 51

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 51593

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

v.Louis C. HINES, Defendant.

No. 2011NA018944.

District Court, Nassau County, New York, First District.

Aug. 21, 2012.

Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Nassau County, Mineola, for People.

Natasja V. Bellinger, Esq., West Islip, for Defendant.

HELEN VOUTSINAS, J.

The following papers have been considered by the Court on this motion: submitted June 4, 2012

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                ¦Papers                                          ¦Numbered¦
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                ¦Notice of Motion, Affirmation & Exhibits Annexed¦1–2     ¦
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                ¦Affirmation in Opposition                       ¦3       ¦
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                ¦Reply Affirmation                               ¦4       ¦
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Defendant moves this Court by omnibus motion and the same is decided as provided herein.

The defendant is presently charged with one count of violating PL § 220.03, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree. This charge was reduced from the original charge of violating PL § 220.06(5), Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree, by Short Form Reduction Order dated January 19, 2012.

Specifically, the People allege that on or about August 18, 2011, at approximately 1:30 am police conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which the captioned defendant was a backseat passenger. The arresting Officer observed a co-defendant, who was in the front passenger seat, move his right hand toward the floor of the vehicle. The Officer opened the door “for his safety” and recovered a clear, plastic bag “... containing a whitish rock like substance believed to be crack cocaine on the floor between the passenger seat and door”. The Officer believed the substance to be crack cocaine based upon his training and experience. This conclusion was confirmed by an NMS Labs report dated November 21, 2011.

The defendant now moves for suppression of any evidence based upon a lack of probable cause, suppression of statement and evidence or in the alternative, granting a Mapp, Huntley and Dunaway hearing. The defendant also requests Sandoval relief.The People oppose the motion except as noted herein.

In order to obtain a suppression hearing based upon a claim that a statement or other evidence was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest, the defense is required to make factual allegations demonstrating its entitlement to such a hearing (CPL § 710.60[1] ), except where evidence is sought to be suppressed pursuant to CPL § 710.20(3) [voluntariness of statements] or CPL § 710.20(6) [identification procedures].

Defense counsel moves for a probable cause/Dunaway hearing. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The People oppose the motion stating that the defendant has failed to comply with the requirements set forth in CPL § 710.60(1), in that the defendant failed to submit allegations sufficient to warrant the granting of a pretrial hearing pursuant to People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993). The People assert that the defendant's papers are insufficient to prompt a pre-trial hearing.

This Court finds that the defendant's “sworn allegations of fact”, supported by his attorneys affirmation, affirmed under the penalties of perjury, coupled with the People's own allegations, state sufficient grounds to warrant a probable cause hearing. The People state that the Officers approached the vehicle because “it was high crime area, late at night, where there had been recent burglaries”. The defendant states that he was a passenger in the back seat of a parked motor vehicle, which was approached by police officers. The defendant further states, that he did not engage in any illegal conduct nor did he possess any drugs. The police directed him to exit the vehicle, when his person and the vehicle was subsequently searched without his consent.

Courts have held that approaching a vehicle in a high crime area, without any other articulate reason does not constitute a sufficient basis for an officer to approach a vehicle and request information. See People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521 (2001); People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181(1992); People v. Miles, 82 AD3d 1010 (2nd Dept.2011) Furthermore, in People v. Seda, 198 A.D.2d 98 (1st Dept .1993), the Court held: “When one is simply standing lawfully in a place, engaging in no overt illegal activity it is difficult, and frequently impossible, to set forth, in detail, facts establishing the negative.” This Court finds that questions of fact exist which can only be resolved at a hearing.

A passenger of a car has standing to challenge the admissibility of any evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop. Brendlin v.. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) If the stop is lawful, the passenger has no standing to challenge the search of the car unless he has established standing through some presumption or some expectation of privacy. People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514 (1987). A passenger has standing to object to police conduct if the stopping or the removal of the defendant from the car were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, Millan, id. Accordingly, a Dunaway hearing is granted. However, the scope of this hearing is limited to whether the police were authorized to stop the vehicle and whether they were authorized to order the defendant out of the vehicle....