People v. Hinshaw
| Decision Date | 22 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | KA 18–01077,1449 |
| Citation | 96 N.Y.S.3d 445,170 A.D.3d 1680 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert J. HINSHAW, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
170 A.D.3d 1680
96 N.Y.S.3d 445
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Robert J. HINSHAW, Defendant–Appellant.
1449
KA 18–01077
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Entered: March 22, 2019
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree ( Penal Law § 265.03[3] ) and unlawful possession of marihuana (§ 221.05). Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court properly refused to suppress physical evidence seized by the police after a traffic stop.
It is well settled that to conduct a traffic stop, police require either probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction has
been committed, or "reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime" ( Matter of Deveines v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 136 A.D.3d 1383, 1384, 25 N.Y.S.3d 760 [4th Dept. 2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 [2001] ). Here, a New York State Trooper properly stopped the vehicle defendant was driving based on his check of Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) computer records for the vehicle's license plate number, which revealed that the car had been impounded and thus should have been located in an impound lot (see People v. Boomer, 187 A.D.2d 659, 660–661, 590 N.Y.S.2d 898 [2d Dept. 1992], lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 882, 597 N.Y.S.2d 942, 613 N.E.2d 974 [1993] ; see generally People v. Bushey, 29 N.Y.3d 158, 160, 53 N.Y.S.3d 604, 75 N.E.3d 1165 [2017] ). The Trooper testified at the suppression hearing that, based on the DMV records, he believed that he was required to conduct an investigation—i.e., stop the vehicle—to determine whether the vehicle had registration problems, the license plates were suspended, the insurance was suspended, or if the vehicle was, in fact, stolen.
Our dissenting colleagues conclude that the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle because the Trooper disregarded cautionary language in the DMV impoundment record stating that it "should not be treated as a stolen vehicle hit[, and] [n]o further action should be taken based solely upon this impounded response." We conclude, however, that the Trooper's testimony that the cautionary language was "generic," inasmuch as it even "comes up with stolen vehicles," and that, based on his experience, he interpreted the impoundment record as requiring him to conduct a further investigation because the vehicle "should not be out on the road," establishes that the stop was not unreasonable. Rather, we conclude that the impoundment record, coupled with the Trooper's explanation of its import, provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. In disregarding the Trooper's explanation that the cautionary language was "generic," the dissent would obligate us to find unreasonable any stops where that same message appears, irrespective of the facts surrounding the stop. We reject such a categorical determination.
Furthermore, it is of no moment that the DMV impoundment record was
later determined to be erroneous, because " ‘[a] mistake of fact ... may be used to justify a [stop]’ " ( People v. Baker, 87 A.D.3d 1313, 1314, 930 N.Y.S.2d 167 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 857, 938 N.Y.S.2d 864, 962 N.E.2d 289 [2011] ; see People v. Smith, 1 A.D.3d 965, 965, 767 N.Y.S.2d 327 [4th Dept. 2003] ). When an officer makes a mistake of fact or law in conducting a traffic stop, "the relevant question ... is ...
whether his belief that a traffic violation [or crime] had occurred was objectively reasonable" ( People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 134, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015], rearg. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1191, 16 N.Y.S.3d 50, 37 N.E.3d 108 [2015] ; see also id. at 134 n 2, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 ). Here, the Trooper's actions in temporarily stopping the car to investigate further were objectively reasonable (see People v. Johnson, 178 A.D.2d 549, 550, 577 N.Y.S.2d 459 [2d Dept. 1991], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 920, 582 N.Y.S.2d 80, 590 N.E.2d 1208 [1992] ). Once the Trooper smelled burnt marihuana and saw what he believed to be marihuana in plain view, he had probable cause to search the vehicle and its occupants (see People v. Walker, 128 A.D.3d 1499, 1500, 8 N.Y.S.3d 826 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 936, 17 N.Y.S.3d 99, 38 N.E.3d 845 [2015] ).
All concur except Whalen, P.J., and Centra, J., who dissent and vote to reverse in accordance with the following memorandum:
We respectfully dissent. "[T]he stop of an automobile is a seizure implicating constitutional limitations" and is lawful only if the police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has been committed, or "when there exists at least a...
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