People v. Hinshaw, No. 46

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WILSON, J.
• Citation: 132 N.Y.S.3d 90,35 N.Y.3d 427,156 N.E.3d 812
• Docket Number: No. 46
• Decision Date: 01 September 2020
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert HINSHAW, Appellant.

35 N.Y.3d 427
156 N.E.3d 812
132 N.Y.S.3d 90

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Robert HINSHAW, Appellant.

No. 46

Court of Appeals of New York.

September 1, 2020

OPINION OF THE COURT

WILSON, J.

35 N.Y.3d 429

Because the state trooper lacked an objectively reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or probable cause to stop Mr. Hinshaw's vehicle for a traffic infraction, we conclude the automobile stop was unlawful.

On the afternoon of November 8, 2014, a New York State Trooper stopped a vehicle on a street in Buffalo. The trooper had observed no traffic violations and saw that the inspection sticker was valid, both of the occupants were wearing their seatbelts, and "everything looked good." Nevertheless, the trooper ran a check of the car based on the front license plate. The inquiry produced a response that began with a direction to "CONFIRM RECORD WITH ORIGINATOR," listed as the Buffalo City Police Department. The response then instructed:

‘‘* *THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REPORTED AS AN IMPOUNDED VEHICLE –––– IT SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS A STOLEN VEHICLE HIT –––– NO FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BASED SOLELY UPON THIS IMPOUNDED RESPONSE* *’’

The trooper directed the driver to stop in order to "investigate further and find out what the problem [wa]s." The driver, Mr. Hinshaw, provided his license and registration to the trooper; both were in order. When the trooper asked about the impound notification, Mr. Hinshaw explained that the car had been stolen previously.¹ The trooper detected an odor of marijuana and observed a "roach" in the center console. He proceeded to search both the driver and the passenger of the vehicle and found additional marijuana on the floor of the passenger side

35 N.Y.3d 430

of the car and in Mr. Hinshaw's waistband. The trooper eventually found a loaded gun under the driver's seat.

By indictment, Mr. Hinshaw was charged with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon ( Penal Law § 265.03[3] ) and unlawful possession of less than an ounce of marijuana ( Penal Law § 221.05 ). He moved to suppress the marijuana, the gun, and his statements. At the suppression hearing, the trooper testified that he did not attempt to confirm the information with the originator; he treated the notice as indicating the car may have been stolen; and he had stopped the car based solely on the results of the license plate check. County Court denied suppression of the physical evidence but granted suppression of Mr. Hinshaw's inculpatory statements that preceded a Miranda warning. Thereafter, Mr. Hinshaw pled guilty to the entire indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the "impoundment report, coupled with the [t]rooper's explanation of its import, provided reasonable suspicion to stop

132 N.Y.S.3d 92

156 N.E.3d 814

the vehicle" ( People v. Hinshaw, 170 A.D.3d 1680, 1681, 96 N.Y.S.3d 445 [4th Dept. 2019] ). Two Justices dissented, contending that it was not objectively reasonable to believe that any crime had been committed on the basis of the license plate inquiry result ( id. at 1682–83, 96 N.Y.S.3d 445 [Whalen, P.J., and Centra, J., dissenting] ).

I.

Under the settled law of New York, an automobile stop "is a seizure implicating constitutional limitations" ( People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 752, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 [1995] ). Automobile stops are lawful only when "based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation" ( People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349–350, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 [2001] ); when based on a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime ( Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 752–753, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 ); or, "when conducted pursuant to ‘nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform’ highway traffic procedures" ( People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 563, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993, 373 N.E.2d 1218 [1978] ).

In People v. Robinson, we held that a traffic stop did not violate the New York State Constitution where a police officer had probable cause to believe that an automobile driver had committed a traffic violation – even though the officer's primary motivation to stop the vehicle may have been other than the traffic violation ( Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). We noted that although the language of the Fourth Amendment and of article I, Section 12 of our Constitution was "identical," that language

35 N.Y.3d 431

conferred only "similar" rights, explaining that this Court had not hesitated to expand the rights of New York citizens beyond those required by the Federal Constitution ( id. at 350, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). In that case, the defendant had asked us to "extend[ ][the] protections of our Constitution beyond those given by the Federal Constitution" to require more than probable cause when an officer had stopped a vehicle for pretextual reasons ( id. at 351, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). We declined to do so, rejecting the defendant's request to invalidate vehicle stops for pretextual reasons as long as "probable cause existed warranting a stop of the vehicle for a valid traffic infraction" ( id. at 349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). We emphasized that "[t]his Court has always evaluated the validity of a traffic stop based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation" and "confirm[ed] a standard that constrains police conduct – probable cause under the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its related regulations" ( id. at 350, 358, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ; see also People v. Bushey, 29 N.Y.3d 158, 164, 53 N.Y.S.3d 604, 75 N.E.3d 1165 [2017] [New York law forbids stops of vehicles, even those that appear "unusual ..., solely to examine the motorist's license and registration," but permits such stops if the officer "obtained probable cause to believe the vehicle was being operated with a suspended registration"] ).

In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, which "permits brief investigative stops ... when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’ " ( Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 [2014] ; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968] ), this Court has adopted greater protections than Terry and its federal progeny for pedestrian

132 N.Y.S.3d 93

156 N.E.3d 815

stops by the police (see People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] [creating a four-tiered framework for evaluating police-civilian encounters] ). Our De Bour test, in which "constitutional law and common law both played a part" ( People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 195, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 [1992] ), is more protective of the rights of individuals "to be free from aggressive governmental interference" ( De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 216, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ; cf. People v. Gates, 31 N.Y.3d 1028, 1030, 75 N.Y.S.3d 468, 99 N.E.3d 861 [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach ... The hyper-stringent rule of De Bour also serves as a barrier to legitimate, effective and minimally-intrusive law enforcement practices"] ). Thus, "[t]he continued vitality of De Bour ... is not contingent upon the interpretation that the Supreme Court gives the Fourth Amendment, because De Bour is largely based upon considerations of reasonableness

35 N.Y.3d 432

and sound State policy" ( Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 195, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 ). As relevant here, to curb potential discriminatory practices, New York also provides greater protections than does federal law for traffic infraction vehicle stops, as evidenced by our decision in Robinson (see Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 353, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). There, we emphasized that "[d]iscriminatory law enforcement has no place in our law" ( id. ). Correspondingly, suspicionless traffic stops – such as sobriety checkpoints – are allowed in New York only when conducted in a "uniform and nondiscriminatory manner" ( Matter of Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d 136, 145–146, 700 N.Y.S.2d 77, 722 N.E.2d 45 [1999] ).

Although De Bour – like Terry – was a case involving the forcible stop of a pedestrian, we noted there that "whether or not a particular search or seizure is to be considered reasonable requires a weighing of the government's interest against the encroachment involved with respect to an individual's right to privacy and personal security" ( De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 215, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ). A forcible stop of the occupants in a vehicle is equally intrusive whether done to enforce the laws against traffic infractions or the laws against crimes. The required "balancing of the interests involved" will differ, however, when the suspected illegality is a traffic violation or a crime, as reflected in the legislature's taxonomy....