People v. Hister

Citation60 Ill.2d 567,328 N.E.2d 531
Decision Date19 May 1975
Docket NumberNo. 46911,46911
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Cleo HISTER, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and Jerome Charles Randolph's Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Winston & Strawn, Chicago (Ronald Butler, Thomas B. Donovan, and Robert G. Foster, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Cleo Hister, and Joe Newson were jointly indicted and tried for the murder of Richard Wilson, found guilty by a jury, and each sentenced to serve 16 to 30 years in the penitentiary. In a separate appeal, Nowson's conviction was reversed by the Appellate Court for the First District because the evidence failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Newson (1971), 133 Ill.App.2d 511, 273 N.E.2d 478.) On this appeal, a different division of that court reversed Hister's conviction for the same reason, one judge dissenting (20 Ill.App.3d 933, 314 N.E.2d 562), and we granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

The State contends that the evidence was not palpably contrary to the jury's verdict and that the appellate court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. It is also argued that the appellate court improperly placed substantial reliance on the previous opinion reversing Newson's conviction which had been based on an accountability theory supported wholly by circumstantial evidence while Hister's conviction was based on stronger, more direct evidence. We cannot agree, for, in our judgment, the appellate court opinion is clearly based on its independent analysis of the evidence against Hister which, although stronger than the evidence against Newson, is simply too confusing and contradictory to establish Hister's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The facts of this case have been accurately set forth by the appellate court and need not be repeated in any great detail. Rather, we deem it sufficient to summarize the evidence, emphasizing only those portions of the State's case contributing to our conclusion that the State failed to meet its burden of proof. At approximately 10 p.m. on the evening of April 28, 1968, a 15-year-old boy named Richard Wilson was shot in the head while riding a bicycle in the 300 block of West 65th Street in Chicago. He was taken to the hospital, where he died on April 30, as a result of the gunshot wound. Richard had spent most of the evening of April 28 with his 17-year-old nephew, eugene Adams, who was nicknamed 'Feenanny.' Adams admitted during the trial that, several weeks prior to the shooting, he and two friends had stolen a television set from an apartment he thought to be Newson's residence. The State utilized his testimony along with that of Johnny Wilson, gregory Lee, Jesse Parnell, Dale Lee and Tony Lewis in an attempt to establish that both Newson and Hister were seen in the immediate vicinity of the shooting shortly before it occurred; that one or both of them were armed and looking for 'Feenanny' and Richard concerning the stolen television; and that Hister had fired the shotgun blast that struck Richard in the head, and then fled with Newson and a third person in an automobile. Among the State's witnesses, only Jesse Parnell claimed to have observed the shooting of Richard; the others, including Adams, saw Hister or Newson, or both, in the area and heard shots, but did not actually see the shooting. Hister and Newson both presented alibi defenses, substantiated by relatives and girlfriends. Rebuttal and surrebuttal evidence was also presented, but is of little significance in light of the inadequacies of the State's case in chief.

Other than decedent's father and the physician who performed the autopsy on Richard, the State's witnesses were young people ranging in age from 11 to 17 who lived in the neighborhood where the shooting occurred. The confusion created by their testimony can be illustrated by several examples. Since Adams admitted stealing Newson's television, the evidence reveals a possible motive for Newson to shoot Adams, but it is not entirely clear why Hister would have shot Richard Wilson in light of Adams's testimony that Wilson did not participate in the theft of the television. Moreover, Hister and Newson claimed that they did not even know each other at the time of the shooting, and the State, although admittedly producing evidence that the two were seen together that evening, did not produce any evidence that the two were friends prior to the shooting. While we do not suggest that establishing a motive was essential to the State's case, these factors weaken the State's attempt to do so. Johnny Wilson, the victim's father, testified that shortly before the shooting, while driving in the neighborhood, he had seen Newson, carrying a package he believed to conceal a weapon, in the company of Warren Parker, whom Mr. Wilson had known for many years. But Parker, one of the State's rebuttal witnesses, stated on cross-examination that he had not been with Newson at that time.

According to the testimony of Gregory Lee and Tony Lewis, they were riding a bicycle together in the neighborhood during the evening of April 28, 1968, yet their separate accounts of the events that transpired are quite dissimilar. Lee...

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28 cases
  • U.S. ex rel. Jackson v. Page
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • July 31, 1997
    ...... of insufficient evidence only when "the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt." People v. Jackson, 256 Ill. App.3d 1101, 219 Ill.Dec. 666, 671 N.E.2d 833, slip op. at 7 (1st Dist.1994) [hereinafter "Slip op. at ____."] (citing People ... See id.; People v. Hister, 60 Ill.2d 567, 572, 328 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1975); People v. Lindsey, 73 Ill. App.3d 436, 447, 29 Ill.Dec. 721, 729-30, 392 N.E.2d 278, 286-87 (1st ......
  • People v. Mccarter
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 26, 2011
    ...the testimony were so numerous, confusing, and contradictory as to raise reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. See People v. Hister, 60 Ill.2d 567, 571, 328 N.E.2d 531 (1975) (the testimony of each of the two eyewitnesses were so remarkably different that it was “obvious that one or bo......
  • People v. Carvajal
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 26, 1993
    ...... Page 415 . [182 Ill.Dec. 112] defendant under circumstances allowing for a positive identification. (Fields, 135 Ill.2d at 40-41, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791.) Finally, questions of witness credibility and the weight to be given testimony are for the jury (People v. Hister (1975), 60 Ill.2d 567, 573, 328 N.E.2d 531), and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury where the evidence is merely conflicting. People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill.2d 296, 298-99, 347 N.E.2d 733. .         To be sure, the testimony in the present case is ......
  • People v. Loera
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 30, 1993
    ...... Page 1308 . [189 Ill.Dec. 259] L.Ed.2d 560, 573; People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 40, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791.) Moreover, the jury is the proper entity to consider witness credibility and the weight to be accorded various pieces of evidence. People v. Hister (1975), 60 Ill.2d 567, 573, 328 N.E.2d 531. .         As we noted in Carvajal, the testimony in this case contained conflicts regarding the number of shooters, what the shooters wore, the kind of guns they fired, and the locations from which they fired. However, we believe the following ......
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