People v. Hoffman

• Decision Date: 19 August 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. 191445
• Citation: 225 Mich.App. 103,570 N.W.2d 146
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claude Theodore HOFFMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 146

570 N.W.2d 146

225 Mich.App. 103

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claude Theodore HOFFMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 191445.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 3, 1997, at Detroit.

Decided Aug. 19, 1997, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication Nov. 6, 1997.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Michael D. Thomas, Prosecuting Attorney, and Janet M. Boes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for People.

State Appellate Defender by Charles J. Booker, Detroit, and Claude T. Hoffman, Carson City, in pro. per., for Defendant-Appellant on appeal.

Before TAYLOR, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and SAAD, JJ.

RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, Judge.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278, and kidnapping, M.C.L. § 750.349; M.S.A. § 28.581. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment. He appeals his convictions as of right. We affirm and hold, inter alia, that "other-acts evidence" tending to establish that defendant hated women was properly admitted at trial for the purpose of proving defendant's motive for his brutal and depraved actions.

I

Defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony from two women whom defendant had allegedly assaulted and battered and to whom he had expressed his general hatred toward women. We disagree. The decision whether to admit evidence is left to the discretion of the trial court. People v. Gibson, 219 Mich.App. 530, 532, 557 N.W.2d 141 (1996). This Court will find an abuse of discretion only when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for the ruling. People v. Taylor, 195 Mich.App. 57, 60, 489 N.W.2d 99 (1992).

In People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 74-75, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993), our Supreme Court held that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible under MRE 404(b) if such evidence is (1) offered for a proper purpose rather than to prove the defendant's character or propensity to commit the crime, (2) relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3) sufficiently probative to prevail under the balancing test of MRE 403. MRE 404(b) is consistent with an inclusionary, not exclusionary, theory of admissibility. ¹ VanderVliet, supra at 64-65 508 N.W.2d 114; People v. Sabin, 223 Mich.App. 530, 533, 566 N.W.2d 677 (1997). Establishing motive is among the purposes, for which prior-acts evidence is expressly, admissible. MRE 404(b), ² People v. Harris, 219 Mich.App. 184, 186, 555 N.W.2d 891 (1996).

No Michigan case defines the term "motive" as it appears in MRE 404(b). However, motive is defined by Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 5th ed.) as:

Cause or reason that moves the will and induces action. An inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge a criminal act. People v. Lewis, 275 N.Y. 33, 9 N.E.2d 765, 768 [1937].

In common usage intent and "motive" are not infrequently regarded as one and the same thing. In law there is a distinction between them. "Motive" is the moving power which impels to action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. "Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. People v. Weiss, 252 App.Div. 463, 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255 [1937].

See also State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 454 P.2d 945 (1969); Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.Crim.App., 1972); 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 133, p. 267. We agree with the above Black's Law Dictionary definition and hereby adopt it as our own.

In the present case, the victim, who had been living with defendant, testified that defendant often became agitated when speaking of his old girlfriends, describing them as evil "bitches." The victim further testified that, on one occasion when defendant became particularly vehement in expressing hostility against his former girlfriends, she became frightened and tried to flee. However, defendant caught her, knocked her down, and brutally beat her. Defendant then dragged the victim into his house, stripped her naked, tied her up, and threatened to burn her nipples off with hydrochloric acid, make her perform fellatio on his dog, torch her hair, inject bleach in her veins, and "kill [her] and chop [her] up and make [her] into stew."

In an effort to establish that defendant's actions were motivated by his misogyny (hatred of women), the prosecutor called two of defendant's former girlfriends, who testified that defendant had beaten and threatened them. One of the witnesses testified that defendant told her that "women are all sluts and bitches and deserve to die." The people argue that the testimony of the former girlfriends was other-acts evidence admissible for the purpose of proving defendant's motive. However, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing such evidence because its only relevance was to establish defendant's character or propensity towards violence.

The distinction between admissible evidence of motive and inadmissible evidence of character or propensity is often subtle. The following hypothetical may clarify the differentiation:

In midafternoon, on the outskirts of a rural Michigan village, an African-American man is savagely assaulted and battered by a white assailant. The assailant neither demands nor takes any money or property. The assailant is a total stranger to the victim. The defendant is later apprehended and charged with the attack. After the arrest, the prosecutor discovers that the defendant had been involved in several other violent episodes in the past, including bar fights, an assault on a police officer, and a violent confrontation with a former neighbor.

Absent a proper purpose (such as to prove a common plan, scheme, or other exception), this other-acts evidence would be inadmissible because its only relevance is to establish the defendant's violent character orpropensity towards violence. See, generally, 1 McCormick, Evidence (Practitioner Treatise Series, 4th ed.), §§ 188, 190, pp. 792-793, 797-812. However, if we were to add to this hypothetical the fact that all the defendant's prior victims were African-American and that defendant had previously expressed his hatred toward blacks, then the evidence of the defendant's prior assaults would be admissible to prove the defendant's motive for his conduct. By establishing that the defendant harbors a strong animus against people of the victim's race, the other-acts evidence goes beyond establishing a propensity toward violence and tends to show why the defendant perpetrated a seemingly random and inexplicable attack.

The distinction made in the above hypothetical is exemplified in New Jersey v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879 (App.Div., 1994), wherein the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that evidence of a defendant's bigotry was admissible to establish the defendant's motive for randomly attacking an elderly black man. In Crumb, the defendant was accused of striking an elderly black man in the back of the head, and then kicking and stomping on the fallen victim's face and chest. Id. at 313, 649 A.2d 879. Apparently, the victim was not robbed, because approximately $127 in cash was found in his wallet. Id. The testimony established that the defendant told a friend that he had beaten up "an old black bum ... just because he was there...." Id. at 314, 649 A.2d 879. In an attempt to prove that the defendant's racism motivated the attack, the prosecutor in Crumb sought to introduce some letters, verse, and drawings found in the defendant's apartment that contained phrases such as: "Die N..... Scum," "White is Right," "Nazi Pretty Boys," and "Kill them F...... N......" Id. at 315-316, 649 A.2d 879.

In overruling the trial court's ruling excluding the evidence at trial, the New Jersey Superior Court held that

some of the written material directly expresses defendant's hostility toward and hatred of black people and his concomitant desire to see them dead. This material is compellingly powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence. The material also tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation by swinging his cane at [the defendant]. [Id. at 317, 649 A.2d 879.]

The court also noted that, without the evidence of the defendant's bigotry, "a jury would not know the context of [the victim's] death and might be resistant to the idea that a young man purposely would inflict deadly harm on an elderly stranger without any apparent reason such as theft or substantial provocation." Id. at 318, 649 A.2d 879. The court added that "[t]he written material also corroborates the anticipated testimony of [two prosecution witnesses] regarding defendant's race-related statements to them." Id. at 319, 649 A.2d 879.

We agree with the analysis in Crumb and hereby adopt it as our own. After doing so, we hold that in the present case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence for the purpose of establishing defendant's motive. Similar to the evidence of racism in Crumb, evidence that defendant hates women and previously had acted on such hostility establishes more than character or propensity. Here, the other-acts evidence was relevant and material to defendant's motive for his unprovoked, cruel, and sexually demeaning attack on his victim. See also M.C.L. § 768.27; M.S.A. § 28.1050. Cf. People v. Fisher, 193 Mich.App. 284, 289-290, 483 N.W.2d 452 (1992) ("prior acts of marital violence were admissible to show defendant's motive"); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-374, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div., 1991) (the defendant's prior violent treatment of and threats...