People v. Hogan, Cr. 20943
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Writing for the Court | BIRD; BROUSSARD; KAUS; NEWMAN; RICHARDSON; MOSK |
Citation | 647 P.2d 93,31 Cal.3d 815,183 Cal.Rptr. 817 |
Parties | , 647 P.2d 93 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carl David HOGAN, Defendant and Appellant. In re Carl David HOGAN on Habeas Corpus. |
Decision Date | 01 July 1982 |
Docket Number | 21582,Cr. 20943 |
Page 817
v.
Carl David HOGAN, Defendant and Appellant.
In re Carl David HOGAN on Habeas Corpus.
In Bank.
Page 819
[31 Cal.3d 819] [647 P.2d 95] Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Mark E. Cutler, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, and Tom Lundy, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant and petitioner.
[31 Cal.3d 820] George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edmund D. McMurray, Ward A. Campbell, Jana L. Tuton, Michael J. Weinberger and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
BIRD, Chief Justice.
This is an automatic appeal from a judgment imposing a penalty of death. (See Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 1 A habeas corpus petition alleging newly discovered exculpatory evidence was also filed in this court.
I.
Carl David Hogan was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of Theresa Holland and the first degree murder of Jeremy Montoya, Theresa Holland's four-year-old son. (§§ 187, 189.) As a special circumstance it was alleged that appellant was personally present during the commission of the two murders, that he intended to cause the deaths and that he thereby committed more than one offense of murder. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(5).) This allegation was found to be true. Also, appellant was convicted of an assault with intent to commit murder upon Theresa Holland's infant son, Adam Holland. (Former § 217.) The jury fixed the penalty at death.
These offenses occurred during the afternoon of May 16, 1978, in the Hollands' home in Bakersfield. The victims were stabbed and bludgeoned with hammers and possibly other instruments.
The case against appellant rested on his presence at the scene of the homicides and other circumstantial evidence.
Appellant was discovered in the Holland residence by Dennis Holland, Theresa's husband, when Dennis returned home from work on May 16. Holland testified that as he entered the house, appellant tried to strike him with a sledge hammer. Testimony from the coroner indicated that the sledge hammer, which was covered in blood that matched [31 Cal.3d 821] the blood types of Theresa Holland and Jeremy Montoya, could have caused the wounds on the victims. When Holland yelled for neighbors to call the police and bring a gun, appellant went out the back of the house. Dennis re-entered the home and found his wife and stepson dead and his infant son injured.
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[647 P.2d 96] Appellant surrendered to the police several blocks from the Holland residence. He had blood stains on his trousers and boots. He also had a steak knife and a camera that were taken from the Holland residence, along with two $20 bills.
At trial, appellant maintained that he was innocent of the charges against him, that he had discovered the victims shortly before Dennis Holland returned home, and that he was overcome at the scene and was totally confused by it. Appellant testified that the bloodstains on his pants and shoes were acquired as he knelt near the victims. Although he admitted he had grabbed the sledge hammer when he heard sounds at the front door, appellant denied swinging the hammer at Dennis.
Expert psychological testimony was introduced which indicated that the killings were inconsistent with appellant's personality. Further, this testimony also supported his claim of psychological immobilization after his discovery of the victims. Several witnesses testified concerning appellant's whereabouts on the afternoon in question to corroborate his account of his activities on the day of the killings. 2
[31 Cal.3d 822] Appellant and Dennis Holland worked at Hopper's Machine Works in Bakersfield. They met when appellant, who had recently moved from Oklahoma and needed transportation to work, learned that Holland was interested in selling his motorcycle. Accompanied by his wife and her uncle, appellant went to the Holland home on the evening of May 6, 1978, and purchased the motorcycle for $550. Appellant gave Holland $300 in cash and agreed to pay the $250 balance in two equal installments when he received his paychecks on May 19th and June 5th. A bill of sale was prepared by Holland and each of them retained a copy.
Appellant knew very little about motorcycles, so Holland took appellant for a demonstration ride and instructed him in the type of motor oil to use. The name of the correct brand of oil was written on the bill of sale. During the course of the evening, Carolyn Hogan (appellant's wife) and Theresa Holland discovered that they attended the same church. Tentative plans were made for the Hogans to come to dinner.
Sometime between May 6th and May 15th, appellant stopped by the Hollands' house to obtain the can of motor oil that Dennis had told him to use. Dennis Holland was not at home, but appellant spoke to his wife for about 20 minutes. Theresa Holland told Dennis about appellant's visit and Dennis later saw appellant at work and told him which brand of oil to use.
Theresa wanted to use the proceeds from the sale of the motorcycle to finance adoption proceedings so that Dennis could
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[647 P.2d 97] adopt her son, Jeremy Montoya. Dennis wanted to use the money to buy a freezer for his truck in the hopes of establishing an ice cream business to supplement his income. The two argued, and according to Dennis' trial testimony, she pushed him and he shoved her back. Theresa then remarked, "Why don't you hit me?" and Dennis struck her on the shoulder. Finally, Dennis said, "Go ahead and do it if it means that much to you."However, on May 15th, the day before the homicides, Dennis told appellant that a deposit had been made on the freezer. Dennis asked appellant for the money he owed him so that the freezer could be picked up on Friday. Appellant assured Dennis that payment would be no problem.
On May 16, appellant left work at 10:30 a. m. because he had a 1:30 p. m. medical appointment. According to appellant, he had been experiencing[31 Cal.3d 823] troubles with his motorcycle and had had difficulty starting it that morning. On his way out, he saw Dennis Holland and they had a brief conversation. Holland noticed that the motorcycle was running roughly and told appellant he was using the wrong kind of oil. Appellant rode home, showered, and left about noon, wearing a light blue shirt and blue pants.
Two neighbors saw appellant walking toward the Hollands' house between 12 and 1 p. m. They testified that appellant looked dazed, numb, and was limping slightly. Other neighbors saw Jeremy Montoya and two young girls playing in front of the Holland house some time between 2 and 2:30. Another neighbor noticed at 3:30 that the Hollands' drapes were drawn, which was unusual when the Hollands were at home. The drapes had been open at 1:30.
Yet another neighbor spoke to her three-year-old son who had gone over to play with Jeremy at 3. In response to his mother's question, the child indicated that he had gone in the house and Theresa Holland had told him that Jeremy was asleep. At 3:15 or 3:20, that neighbor's other son, age 12, saw another man--not appellant--standing in front of the Holland house, several feet from the front door, with a "slurpy" in his hand.
Dennis Holland testified that he left work at 3:30 p. m., drove a coworker home, stopped briefly by the freezer store and an optometrist's office, and arrived home at approximately 4:10. He opened the front door, stepped inside, and out of the corner of his eye noticed appellant swinging the hammer toward him. He jumped back and the hammer missed him by inches. Holland testified that appellant tried to strike him with the hammer. Holland asked, "Why did you swing that thing at me?" Appellant responded, "What are you doing?" Holland said, "You must be crazy," to which appellant replied, "You must be crazy. I'm just doing some work in your house. Something in the back."
According to Holland, appellant, hammer still in hand, began to walk toward the kitchen near the back door as he talked. Holland stepped inside the house, but backed outside again when appellant started walking toward him. Holland called out to his wife and family, and appellant told him that everything was all right, that they were "asleep."
Holland testified he told appellant to put down the hammer, and then called to his neighbors to contact the police and to bring a gun. Two little[31 Cal.3d 824] girls who were being cared for by Theresa came out of Jeremy's room, where they normally napped. Holland called the girls to him and put them outside.
The two men struggled in the front doorway, with Holland briefly trapping appellant between the door and the screen. Holland went into the yard to arm himself with a skateboard so he could enter the house. Neighbor Ben Woods, who had heard Holland's cries for help, approached carrying a handgun. He tucked it into his waistband as he was halfway across the street. When Holland went back into the house, appellant was gone and the back door was wide open.
Appellant was seen climbing over a redwood fence, walking through several gates, stopping to pet a barking dog on the head,
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[647 P.2d 98] and walking down a nearby street. A police car approached, and appellant walked toward it. Without direction from the police, he put his hands on top of the vehicle. When the officers patted him down they found a small Instamatic camera in his right front pocket, a steak knife in his right rear pocket, some sunglasses, and his wallet, which contained two twice-folded $20 bills. The officers noted that appellant was perspiring heavily and that the front of his shirt was quite wet. They also observed that his shirt had been misbuttoned.In the meantime, Holland, followed by his neighbor Woods, entered the house....
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...(Mattox v. United States (1892) 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed.2d 917; see People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 848, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 (lead opn. of Bird, C.J.).) As Justice Marshall recently observed, the "precious right" of trial by jury "is denigrated when a ......
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People v. McWhorter, No. S068536.
...version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record.'" ([People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815,] 835[, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93].)' (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166[, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857].) `In order to intr......
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People v. Sassounian
...actually resulted." (People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050; People Page 901 v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 846, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93.) Under such circumstances it is settled that unless the presumption of prejudice is rebutted, the accused......
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People v. Cooper, No. S004687
...Cal.Rptr. 447.) Later cases have cited this language to find a presumption of prejudice in similar situations. (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 846, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 [a tape recording containing inadmissible portions that had been deleted was accidently given to the jury......
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People v. Burgener
...(Mattox v. United States (1892) 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed.2d 917; see People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 848, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 (lead opn. of Bird, C.J.).) As Justice Marshall recently observed, the "precious right" of trial by jury "is denigrated when a ......
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People v. McWhorter, No. S068536.
...version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record.'" ([People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815,] 835[, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93].)' (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166[, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857].) `In order to intr......
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People v. Sassounian
...actually resulted." (People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050; People Page 901 v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 846, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93.) Under such circumstances it is settled that unless the presumption of prejudice is rebutted, the accused......
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People v. Cooper, No. S004687
...Cal.Rptr. 447.) Later cases have cited this language to find a presumption of prejudice in similar situations. (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 846, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 [a tape recording containing inadmissible portions that had been deleted was accidently given to the jury......