People v. Hoiland

• Decision Date: 29 December 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 19819
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William HOILAND et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 523

99 Cal.Rptr. 523

22 Cal.App.3d 530

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William HOILAND et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 19819.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 29, 1971.

Hearing Denied Feb. 23, 1972.

Richard Solomon, Santa Barbara, and John R. Cosgrove, Menlo Park, for defendants and appellants.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan V. Hager, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Late in the afternoon of February 25, 1970, a riot erupted in the community of Isla Vista adjacent to the campus of the University of California at Santa Barbara. The unruly mob, numbering several hundred persons, among other things threw rocks at the windows and doors of certain business.

One of these business establishments was the Isla Vista branch of the Bank of America. During the afternoon attempts were made to enter the bank. These attempts included the breaking down of a plywood panel which covered the doors. A small fire was set just inside the door causing minor charring of the framing.

Later in the evening a large moveable garbage canister, known as a 'dumpster' The fire in the dumpster was extinguished and it was removed. Shortly thereafter a large crowd entered the bank through a rear door and proceeded to destroy records, tip over furniture and set small fires.

was pushed into the street in front of the bank and its contents were set afire. The dumpter was then pushed through the front door of the bank where it came to rest immediately inside the doorway. Once inside the bank it flamed intensely for a short while causing charring and smoke damage to the structure.

Some hours later, as a result of an additional arson, the bank was totally destroyed.

On June 3, 1970, the Grand Jury of Santa Barbara County indicted fifteen persons for various felony and misdemeanor offenses arising out of these events.

Defendants William Hoiland, Robert Langfelder and Chris Sherman were among those persons indicted. Hoiland and Sherman were subsequently convicted by a jury of violating Penal Code section 405 (participating in a riot). The same jury also convicted Langfelder of participating in the riot and in a second count of inciting to riot (Penal Code section 404.6). The three named defendants appeal from those convictions.

We have been presented with only a partial transcript for the reason that they defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

The record does disclose, however, that both Langfelder and Hoiland were identified as part of the group which pushed the 'dumpster' into the bank.

Thus, defendants lay no claim to innocence, their contentions on appeal attack certain aspects of the procedure which led to their conviction.

The main thrust of this appeal is that the grand jury which indicted them was selected by a process which systematically excluded 'young people under the age of 30' and that as to Sherman, who was 19 years of age, persons between 18 and 20 were improperly excluded from the trial jury.

The success of defendants' attack admittedly rests initially upon establishing that 'young people' are a distinct and identifiable group which because of the common factor of age would share a distinctive 'decisional outlook.'

Defendants suggest that young people, 'sympathetic to lawful student demonstrations,' would experience 'different emotional responses' than those of their elders.

To suggest that the violence and depradation in which these defendants participated here was in any way a 'lawful student demonstration' is pure fantasy. To infer that responsible 'young people' would, because of their distinctive 'decisional outlook,' react to this violence with less revulsion than persons a few years their senior is to defame the majority of the nation's youth of whatever age.

Defendants claim that they were denied constitutionally guaranteed rights must rest upon a more solid basis than the contention that a sub-group of society based upon some factor common to the defendants and which might be sympathetic to them was unrepresented on either the grand jury or the trial jury.

The number of such sub-groupings which any criminal defendant might be able to describe is limited only by the number of factors which can be enumerated in describing the personal profile of the individual.

The quality of Distinctness which the defendants seek to attribute to the class of 'youth' was discussed in one of the landmark cases in this area of the law.

'Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of courts in securing equal treatment under the law. But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a question of fact. When the existence of a distinct Against this background we examine defendants' contention concerning the grand and petit jurors in inverse order of their presentation.

class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.' (Emphasis added.) (Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, at p. 478, 74 S.Ct. 667, at p. 670, 98 L.Ed. 866.)

THE EXCLUSION FROM THE TRIAL JURY OF PERSONS UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE

Defendant Sherman alone makes the assertion that such exclusion was unfair, the other two defendants were themselves over 21 years of age.

That such exclusion was systematic and deliberate cannot be denied. It was mandated by the Legislature in Code of Civil Procedure section 198 ¹ which provides that a person, to be competent to act as a juror, must be of the age of 21 years.

Defendant Sherman contends that such provision is unconstitutional with respect to the exclusion of those age 18--20 years. This contention in light of an admission which he makes in his brief before this court is interesting indeed. That admission is that 'eighteen years is the only Logical or reasonable minimum age for jury service.' (Emphasis added.)

Defendant seeks to buttress this assertion by reference to a number of statutes which grant privileges and impose responsibilities on persons over 18 years of age. ²

The 'logic and reasonableness' of the arbitrary selection of the age of 18 is not self-evident. Why not 17 or 19? Nothing in the way of a magical change in an individual occurs the moment the clock strikes the advent of any given birthday.

Historically, legislative bodies have adopted, admittedly arbitrarily, certain chronological ages as the basis for a number of significant determinations.

Interestingly enough, the Constitution of the United States limits those eligible to serve as a representative to persons over 25 years of age (Art. I, § 2) those eligible to serve as a Senator to persons over 30 years of age (Art. I, § 3) and those eligible to serve as President to persons over 35 years of age (Art. II, § I).

Once it is conceded, as defendant has here, that any classification may properly be based on chronological age, then the selection of the particular age is a matter of legislative and not judicial concern.

The same legislative body that enacted many of the statutes relied upon by defendant as establishing the 'logic and reasonableness' of the age of 18 also enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 198, which adopts 21 as the minimum age for jury service. We cannot say that such determination was any less 'reasonable or logical.'

Ample case and text law also support the view that such classification is not a violation of constitutional rights. (George v. United States, 9 Cir., 196 F.2d 445, at 453, cert. den. 344 U.S. 843, 73 S.Ct. 58, 97 L.Ed. 656; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645; Hampton v. Ewert, 8 Cir., 22 F.2d 81; Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684, 214 P. 42; People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal.App.Supp. 771, 300 P. 801; United States v. Tantash, 9 Cir., 409 F.2d 227.)

The Constitution not forbidding the states to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors. (Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549) the respective legislature may make reasonable requirements. While the California Legislature has recently decided to lower the qualifying age to serve on petit juries to eighteen years, it had not chosen to do so at time of trial. The trial court need not have anticipated such a change. (See People v. Pearce, 8 Cal.App.3d 984, 87 Cal.Rptr. 814; Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal.App.2d 613, 343 P.2d 977; People v. Shipman, 62 Cal.2d 226, 42 Cal.Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480.)

Suffice to say, such a change was not constitutionally mandated.

Whether such a change would in any event achieve the special understanding which the defendant seeks is conjectural to say the least.

In a recent Federal case involving omission from jury panels of persons below age 25 and over age 70, it was observed: 'We regard it as highly speculative whether the decisional outlook of such excluded persons would be different than that of persons a mere few years older, or a few years younger. The mere fact that there might be fewer young persons on the jury, and fewer of the oldest, than the exact proportion of such persons existing in the community does no of itself make a jury nonrepresentative.' (King v. United States, 1 Cir., 346 F.2d 123, at 124; cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118.)

Since defendant Sherman's claim of error is addressed to the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 198, and not to any irregularity in...