People v. Holcomb
| Decision Date | 25 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,3 |
| Citation | 395 Mich. 326,235 N.W.2d 343 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas HOLCOMB, Defendant-Appellant. 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William F. Delhey, Pros. Atty., Washtenaw County by John L. Thompson, Asst. Pros. Atty., Ann Arbor, for plaintiff-appellee.
State Appellate Defender Office by Roger L. Wotila, Asst. Defender, Detroit, Sharon Sloan, John Minock, Researchers, for defendant-appellant.
Thomas Holly Holcomb was convicted of armed robbery. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for resentencing. 1
Before trial, Holcomb requested that he be allowed to represent himself. The trial court, relying on the Forensic Center psychiatric report that Holcomb was competent to stand trial, denied the motion.
We reverse on the authority of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed. 562 (1975), 2 where the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to refuse to be represented by a lawyer and to conduct his own defense.
Because we remand this case, we also address a question raised by Holcomb likely to recur on retrial. 3
Holcomb was charged with stealing a portable radio from Chris Holzapfel, a student at Eastern Michigan University.
Holcomb, accompanied by Michael Jerome Harper and Arthur Michenor, visited a friend on campus and then went to Holzapfel's dormitory.
Holzapfel testified that when, in response to a knock on the door of his room, he opened the door Holcomb 'pulled out a gun and shoved (him) back into the corner of the room and the other two just kind of rummaged around through the room'. Holzapfel said he attempted to 'shove the gun away', then 'got in a little argument' with Holcomb, and eventually sccumbed when struck on the head with the gun. Holcomb tied Holzapfel up and left. A stereo tape deck, and radio were missing.
Harper testified that, believing Holcomb was going to another friend's room, he followed him to Holzapfel's hallway. Harper stopped for a drink of water 'about three or four minutes maybe' and as he approached Holzapfel's open door he saw Holcomb 'sitting on (Holzapfel), he was beating, he was beating on him.' Harper said that Holcomb directed Michenor to take 'the tape or something'. As Harper left, Michenor handed him some of the stolen equipment. Harper and Michenor were then apprehended.
Holcomb testified that Holzapfel had sold him some 'bull drugs' which made his 'head hurt.' When Holcomb confronted Holzapfel with this charge, Holzapfel 'swung' at him and told him he was in the wrong building. Holcomb denied entering Holzapfel's room with a gun, striking Holzapfel with the gun, or taking anything from the room. He made no demand on Holzapfel, but only 'asked for (his money).' (Emphasis supplied.)
Holcomb said he tied Holzapfel up 'because he wouldn't give me to money back and (Holcomb) got mad.'
Holcomb reiterated that he went to Holzapfel to get his money back, not to rob him:
In his short summation, Holcomb's lawyer argued that Holcomb lacked the requisite felonious intent:
'The defendant has denied the armed robbery, he has admitted to an assault to recover some money.
'(H)e has admitted the assault * * * for the purpose of recovering payment of money for defective drugs.'
In instructing the jury, the judge defined the crime of armed robbery as a taking with 'a felonious intent and without any claim or color of right.'
However, in elaborating on the requisite intent, he further instructed the jury that '(w)rongful acts, knowingly or intentionally committed can neither be justified nor excused on the grounds of innocent intent.' 4 Felonious intent is a requisite element of armed robbery. This Court, in reversing a conviction in People v. Henry, 202 Mich. 450, 455, 168 N.W. 534, 536 (1918), said:
Holcomb testified that he went to Holzapfel's room 'to Ask for (his) money back,' he did not intent to rob Holzapfel. (Emphasis supplied.)
If a jury believes Holcomb, it may not properly convict him of armed robbery. A jury instructed that '(w)rongful acts' are not 'excused on the ground of innocent intent,' might feel compelled to return a verdict of guilty of armed robbery despite its belief that Holcomb's intent was 'innocent,' not felonious.
The instruction given tended to negate the intent element of armed robbery 5 and to vitiate Holcomb's defense. On retrial, that portion of the instruction on intent should not be given and a correct instruction on this essential element of the offense charged should be given. 6
On the morning of trial, before a jury was impaneled, Holcomb moved to substitute counsel ('I would like to have a new lawyer') or alternatively to proceed as his own counsel ('I would like to defense this my own self').
The judge, after reading from Holcomb's psychiatric report prepared by the Forensic Center in evaluating his competency to stand trial, denied his motion because 'it would not be in the best interest of the defendant, would not afford him a proper defense, would not satisfactorily protect his constitutional rights if he were permitted to represent himself and not have the benefit of a trained experienced and skilled counsel, that if he were to attempt to defend himself his demeanor before the jury would probably result in irreparable prejudice against him.'
Subsequently, near the completion of the people's case, the judge elaborated 'for the benefit of the Appellate Court' his reasons for denying Holcomb's request.
First, he noted that the defendant's right to proceed In propria persona is not, according to ABA standards, an 'absolute right.' Then he read portions of Holcomb's competency report into the record and concluded:
'(T)hat this man is not qualified mentally, properly to represent himself and secondly, that to attempt--for him to attempt to do so would clearly and without question result in disruption of trial proceedings and the probability of a mistrial.'
In Faretta v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to refuse to be represented by a lawyer and to conduct his own defense. In so holding, the Court declared that in order to represent himself the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forego the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. The Court said: 'He should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."
The record in that case affirmatively showed that Faretta was 'literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.'
In this case, the record does not affirmatively show that Holcomb was literate, competent, understanding and voluntarily exercising his informed free will. But neither did the trial judge--no doubt because he could not anticipate Faretta v. California--seek to establish on the record that Holcomb did not know what he was doing or that he was not literate, competent, understanding and voluntarily exercising his informed free will.
We have considered remanding this case for determination whether Holcomb was at the time 'literate, competent, and understanding,' and 'voluntarily exercising his informed free will.'
We are of the view, however, that it is most improbable at this late date that it could satisfactorily be demonstrated that Holcomb could not have been adequately apprised of the nature of the right to proceed Pro se and of the consequences of the exercise of that right and, therefore, the court was justified in depriving him of the right to represent himself. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 7
If Holcomb again requests to proceed Pro se, the trial judge shall inform him of the 'dangers and disadvantages of self-representation' and seek affirmaitvely to establish on the record that Holcomb 'knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' The record should show whether the defendant is 'literate, competent and understanding' of the choice which confronts him and 'voluntarily exercising his informed free will' in declining to be represented by counsel and in seeking to represent himself.
Neither the quality of a defendant's advocacy skills nor his technical legal knowledge are 'relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.' Faretta v. California, supra. 8
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
LINDEMER, J., not participating.
Leave to appeal was granted to explore the right of a defendant to represent himself under the circumstances at bar.
After all persons necessary to the trial, including defendant's attorney, were present and prepared to go forward, defendant asked the court first for another attorney and next asked to represent himself.
The circuit judge, who had previously observed defendant's behavior, had in hand a relevant psychiatric report and had spoken with defendant on the trial date, followed prevailing law and American Bar Association standards in reaching his conclusion that defendant could not voluntarily and knowingly waive his...
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