People v. Holland

Decision Date21 December 1987
Docket NumberNo. 64182,64182
Citation520 N.E.2d 270,121 Ill.2d 136
Parties, 117 Ill.Dec. 109, 56 USLW 2383 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Daniel HOLLAND, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago, for appellee; Donald S. Honchell, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for appellant; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kenneth T. McCurry, Rosanne T. Ossey, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel.

Justice THOMAS J. MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Daniel Holland, was charged by indictment with two counts of aggravated kidnapping (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, pars. 10-2(a)(3), (a)(5)); two counts of rape (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 11-1); two counts of deviate sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 11-3); one count of armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 18-2); and one count of aggravated battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(1)). These charges stemmed from the sexual assault of a female suburban Cook County teenager. The indictment also charged the defendant with two counts of aggravated battery as a result of a confrontation with two police officers after his arrest (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(6)) and one count of unlawful use of weapons within five years of release from a penitentiary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, pars. 24-1(a)(9), (b)). On defendant's motion, the court severed the counts charging aggravated battery of a police officer and the count charging unlawful use of weapons. Trial proceeded before a jury in the circuit court of Cook County on the remaining counts of the indictment.

Defendant was found not guilty of aggravated battery but was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping, rape, deviate sexual assault, and armed robbery. The court entered judgment on the verdicts and held a sentencing hearing to consider factors in aggravation and mitigation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found "that the offenses of rape, deviate sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping were 'accompanied by exceptionally brutal [or] heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.' " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2).) The court then sentenced the defendant to extended terms of 60 years' imprisonment for rape and deviate sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2(a)(2)) and an extended term of 30 years' imprisonment for aggravated kidnapping (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2(a)(3)). These sentences were to run concurrently. As to the conviction for armed robbery, the court made a "separate and distinct" finding that the defendant's objectives changed during the course of the kidnapping from sexual gratification to armed robbery and that the sexual assault was completed before the armed robbery occurred. The court further found that this conviction was the defendant's fifth conviction for armed robbery and that society required protection from the defendant. On the basis of these findings, the court imposed a term of 25 years' imprisonment for armed robbery and ordered that it be served consecutively to the extended-term sentences already imposed. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, pars. 1005-8-4(a), (b).) The court further ordered that "[a]ll of these sentences shall be served consecutive to any parole violations."

Defendant appealed, raising numerous errors but principally contending that an inculpatory statement made during his post-arrest interrogation by an assistant State's Attorney violated his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) and should have been suppressed. A divided appellate court agreed, concluding that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid because he was not informed, prior to receiving his rights and giving an inculpatory statement, that an attorney was attempting to see him. The majority of the court also held that defendant's statement was inadmissible because it was the product of a police "subterfuge." (147 Ill.App.3d 323, 337-38, 100 Ill.Dec. 868, 497 N.E.2d 1230.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (103 Ill.2d R. 604(a)).

The central issue presented is the validity of defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights. We also consider the following issues raised by the defendant: (1) that the State used its peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective; (3) that his conviction for armed robbery was improper because the State failed to prove that he took the complainant's property by force or threat of force; (4) that imposition of extended-term sentence for aggravated kidnapping was improper; and (5) that imposition of consecutive sentences was improper. We first summarize the facts pertinent to these issues.

Testimony presented at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress various post-arrest incriminating statements established that the defendant was the object of a traffic stop at approximately 8 a.m. on May 4, 1980, by a Schiller Park police officer because the vehicle he was driving did not have a rear license plate. The officer ordered a check of defendant's driver's license and found that it had been revoked. While awaiting the results of the driver's license check, the officer noticed that defendant's vehicle--a dark blue Chevrolet Camaro, his clothing--blue jeans, a jean jacket, a white T-shirt bearing the word "Superscrew," and his physical appearance matched information contained in a reported abduction which occurred in Des Plaines, Illinois, at approximately 6 a.m. on May 4, 1980.

Defendant was arrested for improper vehicle registration, driving on a revoked license, and illegal transportation of alcohol. At the time of his arrest, a straight blade hunting knife was removed from his back pocket. Defendant was transported to the Schiller Park police station and, in a subsequent search, the complainant's high school identification card was found in a pocket of defendant's jacket. Also found in this search was $58.80 in currency and coins.

Schiller Park police then contacted Detective John Meese of the Des Plaines police regarding the arrest of the defendant. Detective Meese asked that the defendant be photographed and held pending further investigation. Detective Meese obtained the defendant's photograph from the Schiller Park police and presented it along with six others to the complainant. After she identified the defendant's picture as representing her assailant, Meese made arrangements to transport the defendant to the Des Plaines station. Prior to moving the defendant, Meese spoke by telephone to Anthony Rocco, who represented himself as defendant's attorney. According to Meese, Rocco asked to be notified if the defendant was to be placed in a lineup. Meese testified that he telephoned Rocco later that afternoon and left a message that the defendant would be in a lineup.

Meese transported the defendant to the Des Plaines station. Upon arriving, Meese advised him of his Miranda rights and was present during an interview conducted by Assistant State's Attorney Ira Raphaelson, accompanied by Assistant State's Attorney Howard Freedman. The interview began at approximately 2:05 p.m. on the afternoon of May 4.

Meese heard Raphaelson give the defendant his Miranda rights. About 20 minutes later, Raphaelson left the interview room, leaving the defendant and Detective Meese alone together. At this time, Meese told the defendant:

"that we had received a report from the City of Chicago in reference to a female being raped in an alley. At that time his license plate was given as to the offending vehicle, and his vehicle was described as the same type vehicle.

At that time I told him that the woman could not make a positive identification of him; however, he would have to explain why his vehicle was at that particular location."

Meese also testified that, in fact, he had not received such a report. However, Meese stated that the defendant responded by saying "he now wished to tell the truth."

Meese summoned Raphaelson and remained in the room during this second interview. He testified that he again heard Raphaelson advise defendant of his Miranda rights. During this interview, the defendant gave an oral inculpatory statement in which he admitted that he had picked up the complainant and her companion on Irving Park Road in Des Plaines; that he forced the companion from his car; that he forced the complainant to accompany him; that he forced her to perform two acts of fellatio and also raped her on two separate occasions. In addition, he admitted taking the complainant's money and her high school identification.

Meese stated that the defendant did not complain of any injuries when he arrived at the Des Plaines police station. He stated that he observed no physical or mental coercion of the defendant during the two interviews conducted by Raphaelson. Meese also indicated that the defendant acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights and at no time requested an attorney.

Assistant State's Attorney Ira Raphaelson testified at the suppression hearing that he interviewed the defendant twice on May 4--once at approximately 2:05 p.m. and a second time at approximately 2:30 p.m.. Raphaelson stated that he began the first interview by introducing himself and telling the defendant that he represented the State and not the defendant. He then advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. According to Raphaelson, defendant indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to talk. Defendant proceeded to give a false exculpatory statement in which he said that he had picked up a teenage girl and her boyfriend who were hitchhiking and that an...

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