People v. Holleman

Citation37 Ill.Dec. 782,402 N.E.2d 784,82 Ill.App.3d 409
Decision Date18 March 1980
Docket NumberNo. 79-216,79-216
Parties, 37 Ill.Dec. 782 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee HOLLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes and Armand L. Andry, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

HARTMAN, Justice:

Defendant Robert Lee Holleman, indicted on three counts of murder and one count of armed robbery of Scott Moore, was convicted of murder in a bench trial during which he stipulated to the State's evidence and presented none of his own. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment to run concurrently with his sentence then being served on a separate conviction in Indiana involving a separate crime, and other impending sentences which may be imposed upon him by federal jurisdictions. He appeals from the trial court's denial of his preliminary motions to dismiss, based upon provisions of the Uniform Code of Corrections encompassing the Uniform Agreement on Detainers Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 1003-8-9) (hereinafter "Uniform Agreement") and section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5), the "speedy trial" requirement, respectively. For the reasons given below, we affirm.

The indictments were returned on the stipulated date of July 26, 1977, based upon incidents which allegedly took place in Cook County, Illinois on October 5, 1976. An arrest warrant for defendant was issued on August 10, 1977, and on March 28, 1978, he was returned to Illinois from imprisonment in Indiana pursuant to the provisions of Article IV of the Uniform Agreement. Defendant's trial counsel entered his appearance on April 12, 1978, and thereafter filed, inter alia, the two motions to dismiss the indictment previously identified. He alleged that the State had attempted to avoid the dictates of Article IV of the Uniform Agreement by deliberately delaying the indictment until ten months after the alleged crime occurred to gain tactical advantage and failing to return defendant to Illinois from Indiana until nine months after the indictment was returned, thus denying him his statutory right to a speedy trial under the Uniform Agreement. 1 The motion based upon section 103-5 alleged a total accumulated pre-trial delay of 142 days not occasioned by defendant during which he was in custody; that it was the intent of the legislature that subparagraph (f) of the statute, under which such delays would be regarded cumulatively to determine whether a violation had occurred, apply to cases in which the defendant's arrest was "close in time" to the date of the alleged crime; and, consequently, that the terms of the statute had been violated by the State. Defendant also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he represented that he had been transferred from Indiana to Illinois without his consent and without benefit of a hearing.

The aforesaid motions and petition were heard by the trial judge immediately prior to defendant's trial on November 6, 1978. A group exhibit tendered to the court, comprised of documents bearing upon defendant's return from Indiana for trial, was stipulated to by the State and defendant as to truth of dates and contents. Though not themselves part of the record on appeal, these documents were presented to the trial court and described as:

(a) the arrest warrant of August 10, 1977;

(b) a request for temporary Cook County custody dated September 13, 1977;

(c) the Indiana document acknowledgment of the arrest warrant dated October 21, 1977;

(d) an Indiana certificate of inmate status;

(e) a Notice of Untried Indictment and of Right to Request Disposition dated October 24, 1977;

(f) approval of defendant's temporary custody in Cook County under the Uniform Agreement signed by the governor of Indiana and dated November 14, 1977;

(g) an offer to deliver temporary custody dated November 25, 1977;

(h) an undated request unsigned by defendant asking Indiana for an extradition hearing and appointment of counsel to see if he should be brought to Illinois.

Though apparently not part of the same group exhibit, also tendered was a document indicating defendant was not brought to Illinois until March 28, 1978.

Following argument on defendant's motion and petition, all were denied. As to defendant's argument based on section 103-5, the court's ruling was grounded on the statutory language used. With respect to the motion to dismiss based upon the Uniform Agreement, the court found that: the delay from October, 1976, the time of the alleged occurrences, to July of 1977, the return of the indictment worked no hardship on defendant, since Illinois would not have been able to obtain his custody during the pendency of criminal proceedings in Indiana; the "red tape" delay from July to December 2, 1977 was connected with the necessity of obtaining the Indiana governor's concurrence; and the delay from December of 1977 to March of 1978, while not representative of good practice, was not sufficient to require application of "the one hundred twenty day rule." The court extended to defendant an opportunity to raise before it the same matters that could have been raised by him at an Indiana extradition hearing had one been provided, which opportunity was refused by defendant. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was therefore denied.

The cause then proceeded to trial, defendant stipulating to the State's case, the relevant evidence of which follows. Scott Moore was alive on October 5, 1976 and living at 5142 S. Blackstone; subsequently he was killed on that date. His body was discovered in his apartment by Chicago Police officers on October 11, 1976. The pathologist's autopsy report and protocol suggested that Moore had been dead five to seven days when found. On or about October 17, 1976 the body of a woman was discovered in Indiana which was identified as Moore's missing common law wife, Robbin Opfer. When later arrested in Indiana, defendant had in his possession various identification cards belonging to Scott Moore. A fingerprint matching defendant's was lifted from a plastic drinking glass on Moore's bedroom nightstand.

During questioning by Indiana authorities, defendant gave several statements, at first admitting his presence in Scott Moore's home but denying complicity in his death and then admitting he contracted with two men in Indiana to "rip off" Scott Moore. Defendant facilitated their entry into Moore's apartment, and during the course of the ensuing robbery Moore was fatally shot. After his companion Robbin Opfer returned to the apartment she was wounded, then taken to Indiana by defendant and the two other men and shot six additional times. Defendant was located by Indiana police through his efforts to sell the stolen automobile that had belonged to Moore and Opfer. In support of this evidence the State presented to the court documents in the form of Indiana and Chicago police reports, statements of defendant and other witnesses, a certified copy of title to the vehicle sold in Indiana and traced to defendant and three photographs of the auto depicting its identification markings.

Defendant presented no evidence and was found guilty of murder by the trial court. After denial of his motion for a new trial, with a sentence credit back to October 17, 1976 and good time credit provided, sentence was imposed as described above.

The first issue defendant raises on appeal is grounded in the following provisions of section 103-5(a), (f) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a), (f)):

"(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, * * *.

"(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subparagraphs (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended. * * * This subparagraph (f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977."

Discharge from custody is the pertinent remedy provided for anyone not tried in accordance with the requirement articulated in subsection (d) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5(d)).

Defendant urges that the final sentence of subsection (f) be construed as applicable only where both the alleged crime and the indictment occurred prior to March 1, 1977, endeavoring to secure for himself the substantive provision of (f), that delays not occasioned by him will be cumulatively determined for the entire period from custody to trial, but rejecting the prescribed time limitation of March 1, 1977 for application to offenses committed after March 1, 1977, the murder in the present case having been committed on October 5, 1976. Defendant maintains in this regard and the State does not contest that: after he was delivered into the custody of Illinois authorities on March 28, 1978, delays were occasioned by him from April 12 to April 21; continuances by agreement were granted from May 15 to July 27; the time that elapsed between the last agreed continuance and the trial on November 6, 1978 was 102 days; and the total accumulated time of delays not caused by defendant was 128 days. The pivotal question of whether or not the substantive provision of subsection (f) should apply where the offense occurred prior to March 1, 1977, but indictment and prosecution therefor occurred after the March 1, 1977 cutoff date, has...

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8 cases
  • United States ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • December 30, 1986
    ...for the writ of habeas corpus.) The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court conviction, People v. Holleman, 82 Ill.App.3d 409, 37 Ill.Dec. 782, 402 N.E.2d 784 (1st Dist. 1980), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Holleman's petition for leave to If a state prisoner fails to rais......
  • US ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • July 31, 1984
    ...from custody only insofar as his custody is pursuant to the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in No. 77-3900, People v. Holleman. The writ shall not impair Holleman's incarceration pursuant to his Indiana conviction or his federal It is so ordered. APPENDIX A Analysis ......
  • Stopka v. Lesser
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 18, 1980
  • Holleman v. Duckworth, 95-3152
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • September 15, 1998
    ... ... According to the autopsy, Opfer was killed by a gunshot wound to the chest and lungs that caused extensive bleeding. On October 11, 1976, Chicago police officers found Moore's body in the apartment. See United States ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 770 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.1985); People v. Holleman, 82 Ill.App.3d 409, 37 Ill.Dec. 782, 402 N.E.2d 784 (1980). At a South Bend, Indiana motel on October 17, police from Michigan and Indiana arrested Holleman for armed robbery, pursuant to a Michigan warrant. Holleman was brought to the St. Joseph County, Indiana jail on the Michigan ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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