People v. Holman

• Decision Date: 03 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 5–10–0587.,5–10–0587.
• Citation: 405 Ill.Dec. 371,58 N.E.3d 632
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Richard HOLMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

58 N.E.3d 632

405 Ill.Dec. 371

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Richard HOLMAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 5–10–0587.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

March 3, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy Defender, Robert S. Burke, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Mt. Vernon, IL, for Appellant.

Thomas D. Gibbons, State's Attorney, Edwardsville, IL, Patrick Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Whitney E. Atkins, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, IL, for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice CHAPMAN

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal requires us to consider whether a natural-life sentence without the possibility of parole may be imposed on a defendant who was a minor at the time of the offense when the sentencing court had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence. The defendant, Richard Holman, was 17 years old when he committed the murder at issue in this case. In April 1981, a court sentenced him to natural life in prison. Since that time, courts have grappled with the question of the extent to which the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII

) limits the sentences that may be imposed for crimes committed by juveniles. In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison without the possibility of parole runs afoul of the eighth amendment when imposed for a crime committed when the defendant was a juvenile. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)

. In this case, the defendant filed a petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging that his natural-life sentence is unconstitutional. He appeals an order denying that petition, arguing that (1) the sentencing court did not take into account mitigating factors associated with his youth, as required by the Court in Miller; and (2) the holding of Miller should be expanded to encompass any natural-life sentence imposed for a crime committed while the defendant was a juvenile. We affirm.

¶ 2 On July 13, 1979, 83–year–old Esther Sepmeyer was found dead in her rural farmhouse. Mrs. Sepmeyer had been shot in the side of the head with her own rifle. Her home had been ransacked. The defendant's fingerprints were found on the cabinet where Mrs. Sepmeyer stored her rifle. The defendant and a codefendant, Girvies Davis, were arrested for the murder. Both gave statements to police. Girvies admitted that he loaded the rifle, but indicated that the defendant was the shooter. The defendant indicated that Girvies was the shooter. Although the defendant's fingerprints were the only prints found on the cabinet, the State acknowledged that it could not establish beyond a reasonable doubt which of the two defendants was the shooter. It should be noted that the defendant turned 18 on August 20, 1979, just five weeks after the murder.

¶ 3 A jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder in March 1981, and the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing on April 24, 1981. The multiple-murder sentencing statute in effect at the time provided that the court “may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment” if the defendant has been convicted of murdering more than one person. (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, ¶ 1005–8–1(a)(1)

; see also Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, ¶¶ 1003–3–3(d), 1005–8–1(d) (providing that parole is not available to prisoners serving sentences of natural life). (We note that the statute was subsequently amended to make natural-life sentences mandatory for defendants convicted of more than one murder. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, ¶ 1005–8–1. All of the Illinois cases we will discuss later in this opinion arose under the latter version of the statute.)

¶ 4 A presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that the defendant had been convicted in two unrelated cases of two additional murders and one attempted murder. One of those cases involved the August 30, 1979, robbery of an auto parts store. The defendant and Girvies, his codefendant in this case, were both convicted of one count of murder and one count of attempted murder. The other case involved the May 11, 1979, murder of John Oertel, during a home invasion. In addition, the PSI indicated that the defendant had three delinquency adjudications between 1975 and 1978. Two delinquency adjudications were for burglaries; the third involved three counts of criminal damage to property.

¶ 5 The PSI included psychological evaluations of the defendant. Psychiatrist Dr. Syed Raza evaluated the defendant and diagnosed him with borderline or dull normal intelligence, anxiety, and depression. He stated, however, that these diagnoses were tentative because he believed that neurological testing was necessary to exclude neurological issues resulting from a head injury

.

¶ 6 Psychologist Cheryl Prost then performed a psychological evaluation. In her evaluation, Prost noted that there were indications of neurological impairment. She found that the defendant had a verbal IQ of 73 and a performance IQ of 64. These scores both fell within the borderline retarded range. Prost also pointed out that the defendant was admitted to the Warren G. Murray Children's Home for a period of six weeks in 1976 when he was 15 years old. Prost noted that, during that time, staff observed that the defendant tended to be a follower and that his low IQ made him susceptible to bad influences from more intelligent peers.

¶ 7 After reviewing Prost's evaluation, Dr. Raza provided an addendum to his evaluation. Dr. Raza noted that although the defendant's overall IQ was towards the lower end of the borderline mentally retarded range, his verbal IQ was high enough to give the defendant the ability to exercise judgment as to the difference between right and wrong. Dr. Raza concluded that the defendant was not “severely handicapped” in terms of his ability to differentiate right from wrong.

¶ 8 The PSI also contained a brief family history as well as the observations of the probation officer who prepared the report, Linda Schulze. In the family history section, Schulze noted that the defendant's father and stepfather both died while he was young. She further noted that the defendant reported to her that he had a close and loving relationship with his mother and siblings. Finally, Schulze noted that the defendant showed no remorse for Mrs. Sepmeyer or for the victims of any of his prior crimes. Schulze thus concluded that the defendant had “no predilection for rehabilitation.”

¶ 9 At the sentencing hearing, the State's Attorney highlighted the defendant's criminal history and emphasized the fact that the victim was 83 years old and posed no threat to the defendant. He argued that, given the defendant's history, a sentence of natural life in prison was necessary to protect the public from the defendant. In addition, he argued that such a sentence was necessary to deter others from “going out on similar killing sprees.” Defense counsel argued that the question before the court was whether the court “should assess natural life to this very young man.” Counsel asked the court to consider rehabilitation as a goal and argued that isolation in the prison system mitigates against that goal.

¶ 10 The court offered the defendant an opportunity to make a statement. The defendant expressed no remorse for his role in the death of Esther Sepmeyer. Instead, he took issue with the prosecutor's argument that he had been convicted of previous murders. He told the court, “I have been convicted as what they say as accessory of the murder, of knowing that this murder [may] have taken place. I was never convicted of no murder.”

¶ 11 Before pronouncing sentence, the court stated that it had considered the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court found no statutory factors in mitigation and stated that there were “many factors in aggravation.” The court then stated that it had considered the evidence presented at trial, the PSI, and the evidence and arguments presented at the sentencing hearing. The court concluded, stating, “And the court believes that this Defendant cannot be rehabilitated and that it is important that society be protected from this Defendant.” The court therefore sentenced the defendant to natural life in prison.

¶ 12 The defendant appealed his conviction, but did not challenge his sentence. This court affirmed the defendant's conviction on direct appeal. People v. Holman, 115 Ill.App.3d 60, 66, 70 Ill.Dec. 959, 450 N.E.2d 432 (1983)

. Between 2001 and 2009, the defendant filed three petitions for leave to file postconviction petitions. He raised various challenges to his sentence, including claims based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)

, and our supreme court's holding in People v. Miller, 202 Ill.2d 328, 269 Ill.Dec. 503, 781 N.E.2d 300 (2002) (Leon Miller ) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life in prison violates the eighth amendment if imposed for a murder committed by a juvenile convicted under a theory of accountability). Each petition was dismissed, and this court upheld those rulings on appeal.

¶ 13 On October 7, 2010, the defendant filed the petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition that is at issue in this appeal. In his pro se petition, he argued that his sentence of natural life in prison violated the constitution. He did not cite the eighth amendment, and he could not cite Miller v. Alabama, which had not yet been decided. On November 10, 2010, the circuit court entered an order denying the defendant's petition for leave to file the postconviction petition. The court found that the defendant failed to allege facts to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. See...