People v. Holmes
| Decision Date | 11 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–13–2357.,1–13–2357. |
| Citation | 400 Ill.Dec. 236,48 N.E.3d 185,2016 IL App (1st) 132357 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Andre HOLMES, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Amy P. Campanelli, Public Defender, Chicago (Eileen T. Pahl, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 In 2010, the State filed a petition to determine whether defendant, Andre Holmes, was a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 205/1.01 et seq. (West 2010)). Following a 2013 bench trial, defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person and committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant asserts that: (1) he was deprived of due process when the State vindictively and belatedly sought his commitment as a sexually dangerous person; (2) the petition should have been dismissed because it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations; (3) the petition was barred by collateral estoppel; (4) he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial; (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a diagnosis that should have been subject to a Frye hearing ( Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) ); (6) the expert witnesses improperly testified outside the scope of their written reports; (7) the court improperly admitted an expert's prior consistent statement; (8) the court improperly restricted cross-examination about a complaining witness's false allegations of rape; (9) the court failed to make the requisite finding that defendant had serious difficulty controlling his criminal sexual behavior; and (10) the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had a mental disorder distinct from a typical recidivist rapist. We affirm.
¶ 3 This matter concerns two proceedings: a criminal proceeding initiated in 2003 and the sexually dangerous person proceeding initiated in 2010. Throughout both matters, defendant's history of committing sexual offenses was at issue, and we briefly summarize that history here, beginning with the most recent. The State's versions of the incidents were as follows. On December 28, 2002, defendant struck and choked the victim, J.B., forced her into a car, and sexually assaulted her at knifepoint. In 1996, defendant was convicted of attempted forcible rape in Louisiana after he forced himself on the 17–year–old victim who he had been dating, and sexually assaulted her against her will. In that incident, defendant bent the victim's hands back to stop her from resisting, covered her mouth, and threatened to kill her if she said anything. In 1994, defendant was convicted of sexual battery in Louisiana. In that incident, defendant told the victim, who he had been dating, that he was armed with a gun, and then punched her in the stomach and forced her into a car. Once defendant and the victim arrived at his home, defendant showed the victim a kitchen knife and vaginally raped her. In 1989, defendant was convicted of sexual battery in Florida. There, defendant and the victim were married but legally separated at the time of the offense. Defendant went to the victim's home and offered to take her to church. As the victim got ready, defendant grabbed her from behind, choked her until she lost consciousness, removed her clothing, and sexually assaulted her.
¶ 5 Defendant was indicted for the incident with J.B. in January 2003, and was charged with 12 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault. On August 19, 2003, the State filed a motion to allow other crimes evidence pursuant to section 115–7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) ( 725 ILCS 5/115–7.3 (West 2002) ). In this motion, the State asserted that it should be permitted to present evidence at trial of defendant's 1994 and 1996 convictions in Louisiana. The State conceded that the 1989 sexual battery conviction in Florida was too remote, but contended that the 1994 and 1996 incidents were relevant to show defendant's propensity to try to force girlfriends and acquaintances to have sex with him and to rape and beat them when they refuse. According to the State, all three crimes happened during an approximately six-year period, excluding time defendant spent in custody, and there were factual similarities among the three crimes. The State further asserted that the other crimes evidence would rebut the defense of consent and ensure that a jury would not be misled to believe that the latest assault was an isolated incident. The State also contended that apart from showing defendant's propensity, the evidence was relevant to show identity, intent, motive, and modus operandi. According to the State, violent rapes committed by otherwise "normal" men are crimes that are inherently difficult for juries to understand. The State asserted that defendant was, "to say the least, a man who reacts violently to rejection and rapes women who will not agree to submit to his demands for sexual relations." In response, defendant asserted in part that the other crimes evidence would unfairly prejudice his case and that any probative value of the other crimes would be significantly outweighed by their prejudicial effect.
¶ 6 On June 10, 2004, at the hearing on the State's motion, defendant asserted that if evidence of the other crimes was permitted, "we're going to be having three different trials going on at once." Defendant further contended that the potential prejudice was "just inexplicable" and he would not receive a fair trial if the other two convictions were permitted. Defendant also noted that the current victim, J.B., had "prior false allegations" of rape against a football player, from whom she currently collected child support. The State responded that it did not yet have discovery from the defense.
¶ 7 Ultimately, the court barred the use of the 1994 and 1996 crimes. The court stated that the 1994 case occurred too long ago and there was no similarity between the 1996 case and the current case.
¶ 8 On September 7, 2004, defendant filed a motion for specific additional discovery, seeking the location and dates of any previous reports of assault, sexual assault, battery, or rape made by J.B. On October 21, 2004, the State disclosed that J.B. stated in an interview that she had been a victim in only one previous incident of assault, sexual assault, battery, or rape. J.B. reported that the incident occurred between 1989 and 1992 in Ohio and involved her boyfriend, who punched her in the face during an argument.
¶ 9 On May 30, 2006, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling about the other crimes evidence. The State asserted that two years after it filed its original motion, new discovery was tendered by defendant that indicated that J.B. reported a crime of rape in 1995 from which a child was born. The State further stated that J.B. currently collected child support from the man she had accused. According to the State, defendant planned to introduce this evidence when cross-examining J.B. at trial. The State contended that in light of this new discovery, the State should be allowed to present evidence of the 1994 and 1996 incidents. The State asserted that it would be "outrageously prejudicial" to deny evidence of defendant's prior incidents, but allow the evidence about J.B.
¶ 10 At a subsequent hearing, defense counsel confirmed that he intended to cross-examine J.B. about the 1995 rape allegation because she had previously denied any other reports except for the domestic battery claim against her boyfriend in 1989. The State contended that it would be unfair if the trier of fact believed that J.B. may have possibly consented to have intercourse with defendant, but did not know that three other women had not consented.
¶ 11 Ultimately, the court denied the State's motion to reconsider, stating that "when the layperson hears propensity, it begins to snowball * * * to almost proof of the crime," which the court believed to be against the presumption of innocence. The State then requested that the other crimes evidence be allowed to show defendant's motive or intent, or to show lack of consent. The State asserted that if it could not present evidence of the other crimes, but J.B.'s 1995 allegation was permitted, the State "would be substantially impaired in proving our case beyond a reasonable doubt," and defendant "probably will be acquitted by the trier of fact because we will not be able to prove our case beyond a reasonable doubt." Nonetheless, the court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶ 12 On June 2, 2006, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and appealed the court's ruling pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. Dec. 13, 2005). The appellate court issued its decision on June 18, 2008. People v. Holmes, 383 Ill.App.3d 506, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045 (2008). The court stated that although the State normally has 30 days to appeal or seek reconsideration of a trial court's order, if the facts changed materially from the time the order was entered, and " ‘the new evidence [is not] of a nature that with due diligence could have been presented’ at the time of filing the earlier motion, then the court may correct its ruling in light of those newly presented facts." Id. at 513, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045 (quoting People v. Williams, 138 Ill.2d 377, 394, 150 Ill.Dec. 498, 563 N.E.2d 385 (1990) ). The State had argued that the "new discovery" that J.B. had falsely accused a man of rape before agreeing to accept child support payments for the child who was subsequently born was a new and material change...
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