People v. Holmes

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSON
• Citation: People v. Holmes, 347 N.E.2d 407, 38 Ill.App.3d 122 (Ill. App. 1976)
• Decision Date: 28 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 61022,61022
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 407

347 N.E.2d 407

38 Ill.App.3d 122

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 61022.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

April 28, 1976.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin, Dale W. Broeder, William P. Murphy, Lawrence J. Suffredin, Jr., Asst. Public Defenders, Chicago, of counsel) for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Linda Ann Miller, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

JOHNSON, Presiding Justice.

Anthony Holmes was arrested on May 28, 1973 and charged with murder. On September 27, 1973, a preliminary hearing was held before The Honorable Maurice Pompey and a finding of no probable cause was entered. Nevertheless, the defendant alone was later indicted for murder and conspiracy and, after a bench trial, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to 20 to 75 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

The State's evidence consisted of a confession by the accused in which he related the events leading up to and culminating with the murder which occurred on May 19, 1972. According to Holmes, he and six individuals had a meeting in early April 1972, and they discussed Joe Murphy, a prospective witness in a murder case pending against Luther Coburn, defendant's brother-in-law. The men at the meeting informed Holmes that they would put a 'hit' on Murphy since he intended to testify against Coburn.

Then, on May 18, 1972, the defendant received a call from Roger Collins, one of the men at the meeting, and was told, 'We're fixing to make a run.' Holmes defined 'run' as going to see some woman or going to stick somebody up. So, after receiving the call, he drove to Mayo Turner's apartment where he picked up Joe Lee Brown, Roger Collins, Maurice Powell and Lawrence Poree. The group left the apartment and Holmes proceeded to the Crystal Lounge on 73rd Street; then he drove them to the Bus Stop Lounge on 79th Street. When they arrived at the business establishment, he parked his car around the corner from the lounge and remained therein while his companions left the car. Five to fifteen minutes later, Holmes heard gunshots and saw people running away from the lounge. Shortly thereafter, his companions returned to the car and said, 'It's done.' It was at this time that Holmes noticed that two of them had guns. He started his car and left the area and drove to the 35th Street 'L' where he discharged his passengers. A year later, Holmes was arrested and on May 29, 1973, he gave a written statement.

The State called two other witnesses, Charles Norris and Minnie Murphy. Norris, a bartender at the Bus Stop Lounge on the night of the murder, testified that he heard the shots but did not see who fired them. Mrs. Murphy, wife of the deceased, testified not about the occurrences on May 19, 1972, but about the Coburn case. Finally, the State introduced into evidence People's exhibit 2, Indictment 72--1458, which listed Luther Coburn as the defendant, and People's exhibit 3, the State's answer to defendant's motion for discovery in the Coburn case which listed Joe Murphy as a witness, and rested its case.

The only issue presented for review is whether the State proved the corpus delicti of the crime Aliunde the confession.

In the United States, analytic proof of a crime can be divided into three elements: 1) the basic injury, such as the death in murder, the burning in arson, the missing property in larceny, or the intercourse in rape; 2) the fact that the basic injury was the result of a criminal rather than a natural or accidental cause; and 3) the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime (7 Wigmore Evidence § 2072 (3d ed. 1940)). The first two elements constitute the corpus delicti or body of the crime. See 103 Univ. of Penn. 638 (1955). Most jurisdictions in the United States hold that defendant's naked extrajudicial confession uncorroborated by other evidence is not sufficient proof of corpus delicti and, therefore, there must be independent proof that the crime was committed to warrant or sustain a conviction. (45 A.L.R.2d 1320.) The reason an extrajudicial confession must be corroborated by proof Aliunde the confession is because courts have a general distrust of confessions (Commonwealth v. Chuing (1942), 150 Pa.Super. 445, 452, 28 A.2d 710), coupled with the extreme difficulty the defendant would have disproving the confession once it had been admitted into evidence (State v. Saltzman (1950), 241 Iowa 1373, 1379, 44 N.W.2d 24). Another reason for a court's distrust of confessions is the fact that the defendant may be mistaken about what he confesses to either as to the facts or the law. (Gardner v. People (1883), 106 Ill. 76; 20 Am.Jur. Evidence § 1233.) Finally, courts feel this rule is necessary to prevent errors in convictions based exclusively on untrue and unsubstantiated confessions, and because of their belief that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused.

The rule requiring that an accused be convicted on evidence Aliunde the confession has also been recognized by the federal courts. See Opper v. United States (1954), 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101; Warszower v. United States (1941), 312 U.S. 342, 61 S.Ct. 603, 85 L.Ed. 876. In support of the above stated rule, the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192, said:

'The general rule that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession has previously been recognized by this Court, (citations), and has been consistently applied in the lower federal courts * * *. Its purpose is to prevent 'errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone', (citation); * * *.' (348 U.S. at 152--53, 75 S.Ct. at 197.)

In Illinois the corpus delicti rule has had a very interesting metamorphosis. At one time, Illinois cases only required corroboration of any number of a great variety of facts which usually attend or are inadvertently connected with the commission of every crime. (Bergen v. People (1856), 17 Ill. 426.) However, later cases seem to indicate that the corpus delicti must also be proved by corroborative evidence. See People v. Gavurnik (1954), 2 Ill.2d 190, 117 N.E.2d 782; People v. Harrison (1914), 261 Ill. 517, 104 N.E. 259. In People v. Lueder (1954), 3 Ill.2d 487, 121 N.E.2d 743, our own Supreme Court quotes from People v. Nachowicz (1930), 340 Ill. 480, 172 N.E. 812, which summarizes the law in this area:

'While it has been held that a defendant's confession, when the Corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, is insufficient for a conviction, this does not mean that the Corpus delicti must be proved by the evidence, aside from the confession, beyond a reasonable doubt. On the contrary, it was early held that it is the mere naked confession, uncorroborated by any circumstance inspiring belief in its truth arising out of the conduct of the accused or otherwise, which is held insufficient to convict, and the corroborating fact or facts in proof need not necessarily, independent of the confession, tend to prove the Corpus delicti. (Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426.) Direct and positive evidence is unnecessary to prove the Corpus delicti (Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9, 42 N.E. 123) and it is not essential that it should be established by evidence independent of that which tends to connect the accused with its perpetration. The same evidence which tends to prove one may also tend to prove the other, so that the existence of the crime and the guilt of the defendant may stand together inseparable on one foundation of circumstantial evidence. (Carroll v. People, 136 Ill. 456, 27 N.E. 18.) The crime being clearly shown, independently of admissions or confessions, to have been committed by some person, the admissions or confessions freely or voluntarily made may be considered in connection with the other evidence to establish the Corpus delicti, and it is sufficient if evidence of other facts and circumstances so fully corroborates the confession as to show the commission of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gore v. People, 162 Ill. 259, 44 N.E. 500; People v. Hein, 315 Ill. 76, 145 N.E. 654.'

In the instant case the defendant was convicted of murder, although a count in the indictment also charged him with conspiracy. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, § 8--5. In order to convict the defendant of murder, the State had to establish by evidence Aliunde the confession that the accused conspired with...