People v. Holsey

• Decision Date: 03 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 59971,59971
• Citation: 30 Ill.App.3d 716,332 N.E.2d 699
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward HOLSEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 699

332 N.E.2d 699

30 Ill.App.3d 716

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward HOLSEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 59971.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

July 3, 1975.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Richard D. Kharas, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County, Laurence J. Bolon and James S. Veldman, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

McGLOON, Presiding Justice:

Defendant, Edward Holsey, was charged in an indictment with the commission of the offenses of Deviate Sexual Assault, Indecent Liberties with a Child, and Contributing to the Sexual Delinquency of a Child (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, pars. 11--3 through 11--5.) Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant guilty of Indecent Liberties with a Child, and not guilty of the two other offenses. Subsequently, defendant was sentenced to the minimum term of four years to four years and one day. On appeal, defendant argues that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that his cross-examination of the complaining witness was improperly restricted.

We affirm.

The testimony at trial adduced the following pertinent facts. The complaining witness testified that on April 27, 1972, he was fifteen years old, five feet seven inches tall, and weighed 125 pounds. On that date, he was in downtown Chicago delivering packages for his father when he was approached by the defendant, who said 'he loved me and wanted to be my friend.' Defendant grabbed onto the boy's arm and the boy tried to break away as the two walked for about a block and a half. As the boy reached his destination, he told the defendant to go away. The boy entered the office building and boarded an elevator to go to the eighteenth floor where he was to deliver a package. Defendant followed him onto the elevator. The boy made his delivery, and as he was walking back to the elevator, defendant pushed him into a washroom. In the washroom, defendant sexually attacked the fifteen year old boy, threatening the use of force. The boy yelled for help, and someone responded to the cries to observe the scene. Defendant was subsequently arrested and taken into custody by the police.

The man who entered the washroom testified that he heard screams for help and then dashed into the washroom to see defendant grabbing and pulling down on the boy's pants.

Defendant testified in his own behalf that the complaining witness made the initial sexual advances, and when the other person entered the washroom, defendant was fending off the youth's attack and the boy began screaming. At the time of the offense, the defendant was thirty-nine years old, six feet tall and weighed 215 pounds.

Defendant's initial allegation of error is that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the boy's testimony was so incredible as to be unworthy of belief. It is well established that the credibility of witnesses is for the trier of facts to determine, and if a case is heard at a bench trial, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's determination is palpably erroneous. The testimony of one witness, if clear and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Stephenson (1973) 12 Ill.App.3d 201, 204, 298 N.E.2d 218.) In the instant case, the complainant's testimony is substantially corroborated by the testimony of a completely disinterested party who happened upon the scene to rescue the child from the defendant's grasp. We do not feel the evidence is incredible or creates a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.

Defendant further argues that there was a reasonable doubt of his guilt because he raised an affirmative defense to the offense but that the State failed to present any evidence on the point so as to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial defendant testified that he thought the boy was about seventeen or eighteen years old. It is an affirmative defense to the offense of indecent liberties with a child that 'the accused reasonably believed the child was of the age of 16 or upwards at the time of the act giving rise to the charge.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 11--4(b)(1).) An affirmative defense is raised by a defendant by presenting 'some evidence thereon.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 3--2(a).) Evidence sufficient to raise a 'reasonable possibility' that a defendant comes within an exception to the offense of indecent liberties with a child is sufficient to raise the issue. (People v. Brown (1971) 132 Ill.App.2d 875, 271 N.E.2d 395.) If the issue is raised, 'the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 3--2(b).) By testifying that he thought the complainant was about seventeen or eighteen years old, defendant raised the issue of the affirmative defense. The State had already introduced evidence of the victim's height and weight at the time of the offense, which was relevant to the issue of whether the defendant's belief was reasonable. The matter then went to the trier of fact, who expressly stated that he disbelieved defendant's testimony in this respect. Based upon the evidence, we feel that defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant's final allegation on appeal is that the trial court erred by improperly restricting his cross-examination of the complaining witness. During corss-examination, the complaining witness, a minor, admitted that he was currently a resident of the Valley View Boy's School, a facility of the Illinois Youth Commission. The following exchange then occurred:

'DEFENSE COUNSEL: Are you there based on two findings on delinquency for robbery?

STATE'S ATTORNEY: Objection.

THE COURT: The basis.

STATE'S ATTORNEY: The basis is only adult convictions, if they are felonies, can be used in regards to a witness.

THE COURT: Sustain the objection.'

Certified copies of the complaining witness' adjudication of delinquency were offered into evidence but refused by the trial court. defendant contends that the trial court erred in both rulings. In support of the trial court rulings, the State argues that the Juvenile Court Act bars the use of the complaining witness' juvenile record.

Section 2--9(1) of the ...