People v. Hood
| Decision Date | 24 November 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 42491,42491 |
| Citation | 49 Ill.2d 526,276 N.E.2d 310 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Mansfield HOOD, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Caplan, Turner & Golding, Edward M. Genson and Sam Adam, Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle and Arthur Belkind, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
In a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Mansfield Hood, was found guilty of the offense of unlawful use of weapons (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 38, par. 24--1(a)(7).) Specifically, the indictment charged knowing possession of a shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches in length.
Sergeant Olmos of the Evanston Police Department testified that at approximately 10:20 P.M. on May 2, 1967, while entering a service station office, he observed defendant alight from the driver's side of an automobile standing in the driveway of the station. At the same time he saw Robert Brantley alight from the vehicle through the door on the passenger's side. Brantley went into the station office and defendant walked around the front of the automobile to the passenger's side. Olmos observed that the rear license plate on the car was wired on. He approached defendant and while they discussed the license plate he observed that a safety sticker on the windshield of the automobile had expired. As he and defendant talked Olmos looked inside the car and saw the barrel of a gun protruding from under the rear of the front seat, on the driver's side. He drew his revolver, told defendant he 'believed he had a gun in the car' and ordered him 'to slowly remove the object from his car.' Upon seeing Olmos draw his revolver, his partner, Officer Clyde Graham, rushed over to the car. Defendant opened the door on the passenger's side and removed an unloaded 20-gauge shotgun with a barrel which measured 11 3/4 inches.
Upon cross-examination, Sergeant Olmos testified that defendant denied knowing there was a firearm in the car and that from the driver's seat it would not be possible to see the shotgun.
As grounds for reversal defendant contends that in finding him guilty the trial court erroneously relied upon section 24--1(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965), ch. 38, par. 24--1(c), which provides 'The presence in an automobile other than a public omnibus of any weapon, instrument or substance referred to in Subsection (a)(7) is prima facie evidence that it is in the possession of, and is being carried by, all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, instrument or substance is found, except under the following circumstances: (i) if such weapon, instrument or instrumentality is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein; or (ii) if such weapon, instrument or substance is found in an automobile operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the driver.'
Citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57; United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S.Ct. 279, 15 L.Ed. 210; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658; and Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 124, 87 L.Ed. 1519, defendant argues that the statute presumes guilt without evidence of knowledge, is therefore unconstitutional and his conviction based thereon is void.
The People contend that within constitutional limits the General Assembly 'has complete control over the rules of evidence and may enact laws declaring that upon proof of one fact another fact may be inferred * * *,' that the statute destroys no constitutional right of the defendant and is therefore valid.
(1) The test of the validity of a criminal statutory presumption as enunciated in Leary is that 'it can at least be...
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People v. King
...so long as the inferred fact was more likely than not to flow from the established facts. See: Leary v. United States; People v. Hood (1971), 49 Ill.2d 526, 276 N.E.2d 310; People v. Harris (3d Dist. 1971), 131 Ill.App.2d 824, 268 N.E.2d The central issue thus presented on this appeal is on......
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People v. Davis
...(People v. McKnight, 39 Ill.2d 577, 237 N.E.2d 488), it is incumbent upon the State to present such evidence. In People v. Hood, 49 Ill.2d 526, 276 N.E.2d 310, our Supreme Court considered the statutory presumption valid both as to the constitutional errors urged, as well as to the effect o......
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People v. Koba, 76-1529
...occupying such automobile * * *. " Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 24-1(a)(7) and 24-1(c). (Emphasis added). In People v. Hood (1971), 49 Ill.2d 526, 276 N.E.2d 310, our supreme court reviewed section 24-1(c) and stated it need not decide whether that section was constitutional insofar as ......
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People v. Chandler
...when it applied the statutory presumption and found defendant guilty after the close of the evidence. See People v. Hood (1971), 49 Ill.2d 526, 529-30, 276 N.E.2d 310, 312-13; People v. Davis (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 163, 167-68, 8 Ill.Dec. 749, 753-54, 365 N.E.2d 1135, 1138-39. Defendant ther......