People v. Hope

Decision Date30 May 1990
Docket NumberNo. 58037,58037
Citation148 Ill.Dec. 252,137 Ill.2d 430,560 N.E.2d 849
Parties, 148 Ill.Dec. 252 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Edgar HOPE, Jr., Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Gary S. Rapaport, Asst. Defender, Springfield, and Steven Clark, Asst. Defender, Chicago, Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago (Mark L. Rotert and Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, and Joan S. Cherry, Timothy J. Frenzer, Inge Fryklund and David A. Cuomo, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Justice STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Edgar Hope, Jr., was tried by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and convicted of murder, attempted murder, and armed violence. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, pars. 8-4, 9-1(a)(1), 33A-2.) The jury had no black members; defendant is black; and the two victims of his most serious crimes were white, both of them police officers. After a sentencing proceeding before the same jury, which determined that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court sentenced defendant to death on the murder conviction. No sentences were imposed for the other convictions. Defendant took a direct appeal to this court. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(i); 107 Ill.2d Rules 603, 606.

By an order of May 1, 1987, while this cause was pending, we directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the State had unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race when it peremptorily challenged venire members. The order was entered pursuant to our supervisory authority and on our own motion, the hearing was to be conducted in accordance with the teachings of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, the trial court was to make and file appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and we retained jurisdiction. See People v. Hooper (1987), 118 Ill.2d 244, 107 Ill.Dec. 250, 506 N.E.2d 1305 (similar order); see also People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 461-62, 139 Ill.Dec. 469, 548 N.E.2d 1025 (citing similar cases).

The scope of our review now includes the Batson proceedings. A transcript of those proceedings, but no specific written findings of fact or conclusions of law, was filed by the trial court with the clerk of this court. The central Batson issue is whether the trial court erred in holding that defendant failed to make a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection and that no such discrimination occurred.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm on the Batson issue and affirm defendant's convictions but vacate his sentence and remand the cause.

I. FACTS
A. THE CRIMES

At about 10 p.m. on February 5, 1982, defendant was boarding a Chicago Transit Authority bus at 79th Street and the Dan Ryan Expressway in Chicago when he was seen by Charles Harris, who had filed a robbery complaint against him several months earlier. There was an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. Harris told two nearby police officers, James Doyle and Robert Mantia, that defendant was on the bus. The officers and Harris drove the short distance to where the bus was then stopped, near the intersection of 79th Street and Lafayette Avenue. Harris identified defendant and pointed out where he was sitting, at the back. The two officers boarded the bus; defendant was searched briefly. As Officer Doyle was following defendant toward the front to remove him, defendant suddenly turned and fired a handgun. He shot and killed Doyle and then fired at Mantia, who was at the back of the bus searching another person. Two passengers, Kevin Paige and Cynthia Houston, were injured by defendant's gunfire. Mantia pursued defendant and, after more shots were fired, captured him outside the bus.

At trial, defendant admitted firing the shots that killed the officer and wounded the passengers. He raised as a defense his drugged condition, and the only contested issue at trial was his mental state at the time in question. Defendant testified that he had been drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and ingesting cocaine in the hours preceding the occurrence. Dr. Edward Senay, a physician, testified in defendant's behalf as an expert witness. Based on what defendant had told him regarding his use of drugs and intoxicants, Dr. Senay was of the opinion that defendant had been moderately to severely intoxicated at the time in question and that his judgment had been mildly impaired. Dr. Senay also testified that, despite the intoxication, defendant had known what he was doing and had acted intentionally. Other witnesses testified variously that defendant did or did not appear to be intoxicated on the bus or after the shooting.

B. THE 1982 JURY SELECTION

In the 1982 selection of defendant's jury, the State exercised 11 peremptory challenges, five of which were used to exclude all those venire members called for voir dire who were black and not otherwise excluded. (A sixth black member was excused for cause.)

While hearing defendant's first motion for a mistrial based on allegedly systematic exclusion of black venire members, the trial judge permitted the State to offer explanations in camera for its earlier peremptory challenges of such members, stating that he was doing so "just for the sake of the record" and adding his observation that "[a] couple of them were out and out bums, to say the least." In explaining his latter comment, the trial judge stated that one was "unemployed and never really worked anywhere," that he did not believe "anybody in his right mind would have taken that juror," but that the State could "give the reasons for what it's worth." The State thereupon offered explanations for the peremptory challenges at issue, and the trial judge implicitly denied the mistrial motion.

1. The First Four Disputed Challenges

At this point in the trial, four black venire members had already been peremptorily challenged by the State.

a. The challenged venire members

Gay. The first such member was Gayle Gay, who was a 24-year-old telephone operator with 2 1/2 years' tenure and was married to a Navy airman with six years' service. She had lived in the same neighborhood for more than six years, had no children, was well dressed, belonged to the Brethren faith, and did not attend church regularly. She had been the victim of a burglary for which no arrest had been made. With regard to the burglary, the following exchange occurred during her voir dire :

"Q. Is there anything about that that you feel would affect your ability to give both sides a fair trial?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. Is there any reason why I-- Q. The fact you have been burglarized, would that affect your ability to give both sides a fair trial?

A. Oh, no."

Franklin. The second such venire member was Kenneth Franklin, who was 21 years old, had lived at his current address for 20 years, was single and unemployed, and was living with his unemployed mother. He had once worked at a restaurant for nine months.

Buckley. The third such venire member was Roger Buckley, who had never been married, was living with his parents, and was employed as a supervisor at a State medical center where he had worked for 5 1/2 years. He had custody of his eight-year-old daughter, whose mother lived separately and was receiving public assistance. Before his current employment, he had worked for two years as a clerk. Buckley's brother was a drug abuse counselor and a former police officer. Buckley had once witnessed a burglary to his father's car, had testified in court, and was satisfied with the results of the case. He was a Baptist and did not attend church regularly.

Bartlett. The fourth such venire member was Louise Bartlett, who was separated from her husband and had lived at her current address for 36 years. She had been employed for three years as a wrapper in a factory. Her husband had worked in a paint factory when they lived together. She had six adult children, who ranged in age from 19 to 36 years and included a single housewife, a single car-wash worker, a teacher in a public school, a married firefighter, a single city government office clerk, and a business administration student. The car of one of her sons had once been burglarized, for which no one had been arrested. When first asked whether she belonged to any clubs or organizations, she replied, "The Defenders," but when later asked again, she replied, "No." She was a Baptist and attended church regularly. The transcript suggests that her interrogator had some difficulty in hearing her responses to questions and that on one occasion she had to be asked a question twice before giving a responsive answer.

b. The State's 1982 explanations

Gay. In attempting to explain the peremptory challenge of Gayle Gay that had occurred earlier in the day, a prosecutor said, "I'm trying to think who she was, Judge," and the other prosecutor said, "I don't recall that individual in particular, Judge. We have excused at least ten and I don't recall everybody we have excused." The trial judge then said, "The reason why I would not choose that juror, as far as I'm concerned, is, she's a young black lady about the same age as the defendant. That's why I would have excused her."

Franklin. In regard to Kenneth Franklin, to whose former restaurant employment defense counsel had referred, a prosecutor remarked, "Obviously, he was chasing cockroaches for a couple of months," and the other prosecutor added, "That's the only job he ever had. He could hardly talk to you."

Buckley. Before giving the State an opportunity to explain the peremptory challenge of Roger Buckley, the trial judge remarked, "Buckley, there's no question." Later, when actually explaining their...

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