People v. Hopkins

Decision Date04 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93SA263,93SA263
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie HOPKINS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Robert S. Grant, Dist. Atty., Michael J. Milne, Sr. Deputy Dist. Atty., Gary Pirosko, Deputy Dist. Atty., Brighton, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Joni E. Speirs, Deputy State Public Defender, Brighton, for defendant-appellee.

Chief Justice ROVIRA delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order suppressing evidence obtained from a warrantless search of Willie Hopkins' (defendant) fanny pack. The People argue that the trial court erred in suppressing statements made by defendant and evidence seized by applying the wrong legal standard for determining when a law enforcement official may conduct a search based upon the consent of a third party who does not have actual authority over that property. Because we conclude that the trial court erred and that the record before us is sufficient to determine that the search was reasonable, we reverse the trial court's order.

I

In July 1992, Sergeant Sederberg of the Aurora Police Department summoned officers Valko and Junnila to Joliet Street in Aurora to investigate a fireworks complaint. After knocking on an apartment door where the parties thought to be involved were believed to have gone, and receiving no response, the officers returned to their vehicles. As they returned, defendant and two friends, Stephen Green and Carla Morton, approached the officers. Defendant asked why the officers had gone to the apartment and they informed him of the fireworks complaint.

The officers requested identification from defendant and he replied that it was in his apartment. Officer Junnila accompanied defendant to his apartment to retrieve his identification. The officers who remained with Green and Morton asked for their identification and both replied that they had none. Officer Valko, believing that the closed, black leather fanny pack which Green was carrying might contain identification, asked Green if he could look into the pack. Green said, "Sure, if you want to," and handed the pack to Valko.

Inside the pack, Valko discovered a clear vial of white rocks believed, and later confirmed to be crack cocaine, marijuana, and identification belonging to defendant and a woman. 1

Green told Valko that the drugs were not his and that he was not going to "take the fall for anyone." He then said that the pack belonged to defendant who had handed it to him and asked him to carry it as they approached the officers. Morton corroborated Green's account.

When defendant returned, Valko asked if the pack was his and he replied that it was. Defendant was then told that he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance and advised of his Miranda rights. Valko then informed defendant that drugs and his identification were found in the pack. 2

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a schedule II controlled substance. § 18-18-204, 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.). He filed a motion to suppress statements and evidence obtained by the police officers which was granted.

II

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution establish the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.Amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. These guarantees generally proscribe the warrantless search of a person's home or property whether to make an arrest or search for specific objects. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); People v. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d 467, 470 (Colo.1993). Among the exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless searches are situations in which voluntary consent to a search has been obtained. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. at 2797; United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); McKinstrey, 852 P.2d at 470. Valid consent may be obtained either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the property. Rodriguez, supra; McKinstrey, supra.

In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court addressed the question of "[w]hether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179, 110 S.Ct. at 2796. In Rodriguez, Gail Fischer reported to the police that Rodriguez had assaulted her in an apartment. Fischer told the police that Rodriguez was then asleep in the apartment and agreed to go there with them in order to unlock the door with her key so that the officers could arrest him. Fischer referred to the apartment several times as "our" apartment and said she had clothes and furniture there.

After entering the apartment with the aid and permission of Fischer, the officers observed in plain view cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The officers arrested Rodriguez and seized the contraband. The officers did not obtain an arrest warrant for Rodriguez or a search warrant for the apartment.

After determining that Fischer did not possess common authority to validly consent to a search of the apartment, id. at 181-82, 110 S.Ct. at 2797, the Court addressed the prosecution's argument that the search was nevertheless valid because the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had the authority to consent to the search. Id. at 183-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2798-2801. Rodriguez held:

As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determinations of consent to enter must "be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' " that the consenting party had authority over the premises? If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid.

Id. at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2801 (citations omitted). In reaching the conclusion that apparent authority to consent to a search, when reasonably relied on by law enforcement officials to be actual authority, 3 renders a search based on that consent constitutional, the Court explained,

that in order to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government--whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement--is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.

....

We see no reason to depart from this general rule with respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a search. Whether the basis for such authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably.

Id. at 185-86, 110 S.Ct. at 2799-2800. See also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-88, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1017-1018, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (holding that reasonableness does not require factual correctness); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-05, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1110-11, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971) (same); People v. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d at 471 (same).

"Thus, under Rodriguez, a warrantless search is not invalid merely because of a reasonable good-faith mistake of fact by the officers concerning the authority of the party consenting to the search." McKinstrey, 852 P.2d at 472 (footnote omitted).

We applied the holding of Rodriguez in People v. McKinstrey. In McKinstrey, a police officer noticed a car parked at an unoccupied cabin in Grand County. The officer, who had previously investigated a break-in at the cabin, stopped to investigate. McKinstrey came out of the cabin, approached the officer, identified himself and said that he had permission to be there. McKinstrey stated that he had been dropped off by a friend who had left for a walk. The officer then contacted Frank Drumm, a neighbor who lived in a nearby cabin, who stated that McKinstrey had arrived alone and unloaded what appeared to be computer equipment from his car. The officer then ran an outstanding warrants check and learned that McKinstrey had several outstanding warrants. After a backup arrived, the two officers returned to the cabin and attempted to contact McKinstrey. After getting no response, the officers entered the cabin through the open front door, conducted a cursory search and left.

Drumm, who had accompanied the officers to the cabin, volunteered that he had a key to the cabin and was its partial owner. Drumm granted the officers permission to search the cabin. McKinstrey was later arrested after the officers executed a search and discovered drugs and stolen property. Id. at 468-69.

McKinstrey sought to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court agreed, concluding that Drumm did not have actual authority to consent to the search of the cabin.

Relying on Rodriguez, we held that a warrantless search is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment merely because of a reasonable, good-faith mistake of fact by the officers concerning the authority of the party consenting to the search. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d at 471 (citing Rodriguez ). We additionally concluded that in granting defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court failed to apply the proper test for determining whether the officers' reliance on Drumm's consent violated the Fourth Amendment, i.e., the test set forth in Rodriguez. Id. at 473. Thus, we reversed the trial court's...

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