People v. Houston, Docket No. 126025. Calendar No. 3.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 126025. Calendar No. 3. |
| Citation | 473 Mich. 399,702 N.W.2d 530 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duane HOUSTON Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David S. Leyton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, Flint, MI, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Gail Rodwan), Detroit, MI, for the defendant.
Stuart J. Dunnings, III, David G. Gorcyca, Joyce F. Todd, and Danielle Walton, Pontiac, MI, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, amicus curiae.
This appeal concerns the proper method of scoring offense variable 3 (OV 3), which addresses "physical injury to a victim." M.C.L.§ 777.33. The defendant in this case was convicted of second-degree murder on the basis of the shooting death of John Strong. Offense variable 3 requires the sentencing judge to select one from among the several listed scoring elements and assign points that range from a high of one hundred for a death to zero when no injury occurred. The sentencing guidelines require that the sentencing judge assess the highest number of points applicable. Generally speaking, the higher the number of points assessed, the longer the resulting sentence.
In determining defendant's sentence under the legislative guidelines, the trial court assessed twenty-five points for OV 3 because the victim suffered an injury-a gunshot wound. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, in part on the basis of this scoring determination.
On appeal, defendant argues that he should not have been assessed any points for OV 3. This variable provides that the sentencing court must score one hundred points when a victim dies unless homicide is the sentencing offense. Defendant would have been appropriately assessed one hundred points but for the fact that second-degree murder, a form of homicide, was the sentencing offense. Defendant argues that none of the other variable elements requiring the assessment of points was applicable and, therefore, the trial court's only option was to assess zero points.
We disagree. The defendant not only killed the victim, but in the process also caused a physical injury-a gunshot wound to the head.1 Consequently, although the court did not have the option of assessing one hundred points for OV 3, it properly assessed twenty-five points on the basis of the next applicable variable element: "Life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury." This conclusion is mandated by the fact that the statute governing OV 3 requires that trial courts assess the highest number of points possible.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In December 2001, John Strong was the victim of an attempted robbery in Flint, Michigan. During the course of the robbery, Mr. Strong's assailant shot him in the head, killing him. Defendant Duane Houston was charged with Mr. Strong's death. Although he maintained his innocence throughout his trial, defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder2 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,3 and was acquitted of assault with intent to rob while armed.4 The court sentenced defendant as a second felony offender to a term of life, plus a term of two years.
Defendant appealed by right to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court had misscored OV 3 and offense variable 14 (OV 14)5 and had erred by sentencing him to life imprisonment as an habitual offender.6 In affirming defendant's convictions, the panel assumed arguendo that the offense variables were scored erroneously, but held that any error was harmless because defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment as a repeat offender.7
In November 2004, we granted defendant's application for leave to appeal, limiting the parties to the following issues: "(1) whether Offense Variable 3, M.C.L. § 777.33, was properly scored and (2) whether a sentence of life imprisonment falls within the statutory sentencing guidelines for second-degree murder for a defendant who is an habitual offender."8
Statutory construction is a question of law subject to review de novo.9 Our paramount task is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent as manifest in the plain, unambiguous language of its statutes.10
We must begin, as always, with the language of the governing statutes. At the time defendant was sentenced,11 M.C.L. § 777.33 (OV 3) provided:
Defendant argues that, because the statute governing OV 3 prohibits the trial court from scoring one hundred points on the basis of the death of the victim when homicide is the sentencing offense, the court in this case was required to assess zero points. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that only the "ultimate result" of a defendant's criminal act-here, the death rather than the injury that preceded the death-may be considered in scoring OV 3. The prosecution argues, on the other hand, that the court correctly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3. Because the court was precluded from considering the victim's death under M.C.L. § 777.33(2)(b), it could, in the prosecution's view, consider and score the next applicable factor on the basis of the physical injury that preceded the victim's death.
Faithful application of the plain language of M.C.L. § 777.33 demonstrates that the prosecution is correct and that defendant was properly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3 in this case.
The Legislature expressly prohibited the assessment of one hundred points when, as here, the underlying offense is homicide.12 Consequently, one hundred points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(a) must be excluded as a possible assessment for OV 3.13
It is equally clear, according to the plain language of M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(f), that zero points must be excluded as an option because zero points may be assessed under that subsection only when "[n]o physical injury occurred to a victim."14 The gunshot wound to the victim's head in this case unquestionably constitutes a physical injury. Therefore, the trial court did not have the option of scoring zero points for OV 3.15
The only options left for the trial court, therefore, were to assess either twenty-five points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(c) or ten points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(d) on the basis of the life-threatening bodily injury requiring medical treatment sustained by the victim-viz., the gunshot wound to the victim's head. Because the statute directs the trial court to award the highest number of points possible under OV 3, the trial court was required to assess twenty-five points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(c).16
Therefore, the trial court correctly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3. When defendant's offense variables are properly scored, his recommended sentence under the legislative guidelines is 180 to 300 months or life. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to life for second-degree murder, and its sentence must be affirmed.
Our conclusion in part I follows from the plain language of the statute and the undisputed facts in this case.
Defendant offers three arguments to counter this reading of the statute governing OV 3. First, he asserts that only the ultimate outcome of the criminal act-the victim's death, in this case-may be considered in scoring OV 3. The statute obviously contains no "ultimate outcome" requirement.17 Rather, it instructs courts to "[s]core offense variable 3 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points."18 This language indicates that the Legislature believed that multiple scoring factors may apply to a single offense. The statute simply indicates that the one scoring factor ultimately selected should (a) be applicable and (b) yield the highest number of points possible. Where more than one factor might apply (e.g., when a life-threatening injury requires medical treatment), the one generating the highest points is the correct one. The defendant's assumption that only the ultimate outcome of the defendant's act may be considered in scoring OV 3 is therefore undermined by the statutory language.
Defendant's second argument is a variation on the first. Defendant argues...
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