People v. Houston

• Decision Date: 17 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 102225.,102225.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Aaron Jamar HOUSTON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

890 N.E.2d 424

229 Ill.2d 1

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Aaron Jamar HOUSTON, Appellant.

No. 102225.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 17, 2008.

Rehearing Denied May 27, 2008.

Robert Agostinelli, Ottawa, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defenders, Sherry R. Silvern,

Assistant Defender, Elgin, all of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Kevin Lyons, State's Attorney, Peoria (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Peoria County, defendant, Aaron Houston, was convicted of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000)). The circuit court sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment. A divided appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence (People v. Houston, 363 Ill.App.3d 567, 300 Ill.Dec. 207, 843 N.E.2d 465 (2006)), and we granted leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315). The case is now before us a second time following our limited remand in People v. Houston, 226 Ill.2d 135, 314 Ill.Dec. 113, 874 N.E.2d 23 (2007) (Houston I). In that opinion, we retained jurisdiction and remanded the cause to the circuit court for reconstruction of the voir dire record. Houston I, 226 Ill.2d at 154, 314 Ill.Dec. 113, 874 N.E.2d 23.

BACKGROUND

As noted in our opinion in Houston I, defendant's conviction arose from his participation in a robbery at a Peoria pizzeria. At the beginning of defendant's trial, defense counsel waived the presence of the court reporter for voir dire. Before both this court and the appellate court, defendant argued that this waiver constituted ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. Having received the reconstruction of the voir dire record from the circuit court, we proceed with our review of defendant's claims regarding the impropriety of the voir dire and selection of the jury. The facts relevant to defendant's voir dire claims and their procedural background were presented in Houston I, 226 Ill.2d at 137-40, 314 Ill.Dec. 113, 874 N.E.2d 23, and we need not repeat them here. We also consider defendant's separate claim concerning trial counsel's failure to submit a jury instruction. Additional facts are set forth below as needed.

ANALYSIS

Voir Dire Proceedings

In Houston I, this court determined that defense counsel's waiver of the court reporter for voir dire constituted deficient performance, and defendant therefore satisfied the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance. Houston I, 226 Ill.2d at 148, 314 Ill.Dec. 113, 874 N.E.2d 23. We now turn to whether the second prong of the Strickland test has been met.

This second prong requires a showing that counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice. A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Peeples, 205 Ill.2d 480, 513, 275 Ill.Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641 (2002). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Peeples, 205 Ill.2d at 513, 275 Ill. Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must satisfy both the performance and the prejudice prongs of Strickland. People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 220, 283 Ill.Dec. 651, 808 N.E.2d 939 (2004).

In the case at bar, defendant's pro se motion for a new trial included a complaint about the composition of his jury. In this motion, defendant stated that he "felt a predjudice [sic] and discriminating [sic] patter[n] going on with the jury," which he noted consisted of "eleven white people and one black person."¹ We determined in Houston I that this complaint amounted to a claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

In Batson, the Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the equal protection clause for the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror solely on the basis of race. Under Batson, a three-step process is employed to evaluate claims of discrimination in jury selection. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that relevant circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove panel members based on their race. People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 70-71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding each of the venirepersons in question. Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 70, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638; People v. Williams, 209 Ill.2d 227, 244, 282 Ill.Dec. 824, 807 N.E.2d 448 (2004). Finally, the trial court considers those explanations and determines whether the defendant has met his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. Williams, 209 Ill.2d at 244, 282 Ill.Dec. 824, 807 N.E.2d 448; Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 70-71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638.

In the case at bar, the circuit court of Peoria County submitted to this court a reconstruction of the voir dire record consisting of two items: (1) transcripts of the proceedings that resulted in the creation of a "Bystander's Report Re: Voir Dire Reconstruction," and (2) the bystander's report itself, "certified per Supreme Court Rule 323," dated November 21, 2007, and signed by counsel for defendant and the State. This second item, the bystander's report, includes a summary of the jury-selection proceedings at defendant's trial, along with seven exhibits containing documents that apparently were used in assembling the report. Exhibit 1 is a list of the names of the 29 members of the jury panel. Exhibits 2 through 5 consist of juror profile questionnaires — with photos — for the 29 panel members.² Three of these 29 appear to be African-American. Included in exhibit 2 are juror profile questionnaires for the 12 members of the final jury, which included one African-American. Also included in exhibit 2 is the questionnaire for the alternate juror. Exhibit 3 consists of juror profile questionnaires for the seven venire members who were excused by the defense, and exhibit 4 includes questionnaires for the six members excused by the State. Exhibit 5 includes questionnaires for the three panel members excused by the court. Exhibit 6, which is a jury seating diagram, lists the names of the panel members who were called for each seat, including those who were excused and those finally seated. Exhibit 7 is the court clerk's thumbnail summary of the trial, a three-page document that includes, among other items, the names of the final jurors; the names of the panel members excused by the court, the State, and the defense; and the names of the witnesses testifying at trial, along with the dates and times of their testimony.

Our review of the reconstruction proceedings and the resulting bystander's report reveals the following pertinent information. The reconstruction proceedings were conducted by a judge other than the judge who presided at defendant's trial. David Gast, the prosecutor at defendant's trial, appeared for the State in the voir dire reconstruction proceedings. A public defender was appointed to represent defendant, whose trial counsel had since retired from the practice of law. No information was available from defendant's trial counsel.

According to the bystander's report, the judge at defendant's trial questioned potential jurors in groups of four, and counsel for the State and the defense asked supplemental questions. "The questions posed by the Court were standard questions regarding availability, bias, prejudice, prior service, burden of proof, presumed innocence of the Defendant, duties as jurors, among other things, as well as any personal questions gleaned from the Juror Questionna[i]res." No notes were taken or memoranda created regarding the supplemental questioning by the attorneys.

Attached to the juror profile questionnaires of each of the six panel members challenged by the State are photocopies of the panel members' drivers' license photographs. Of those six panel members, one — Tracy Mosley — appears to be African-American, and the remainder appear to be Caucasian. Gast, the prosecutor at trial, recalled the particular reasons for four of the challenges. These panel members "either had a criminal conviction or a close family member with a criminal conviction." Included in these four was Mosley, who checked the blank marked "Yes" on her juror profile questionnaire in answer to the question of whether she or a family member had ever been convicted of a criminal offense other than a traffic ticket. Gast did not recall the reasons for challenging the other two panel members, each of whom was born in 1928. As noted, neither of them appears to be African-American.

Of the three venire members excused by the court, one appears to be African-American. Gast recalled that this panel member was excused because his spouse was employed by the county sheriff as a courthouse security officer.

The bystander's report concludes by stating:

"After investigating all sources for this report, the reasons given, if any, for the particular challenges made by the State or the Defense, or * * * by the Court in removing three potential jurors for cause, further information is otherwise unknown and cannot be ascertained by any other means."

Having reviewed the bystander's report and the transcripts of the reconstruction proceedings, we see no prima facie case of racial discrimination. First, we do not find an impermissible pattern of strikes against...