People v. Howard, 1-04-2865.

• Citation: 844 N.E.2d 980
• Decision Date: 21 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-2865.,1-04-2865.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley HOWARD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

844 N.E.2d 980

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley HOWARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-04-2865.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

February 21, 2006.

Schiff Hardin, LLP, Chicago (Paul E. Dengel, David C. Blickenstaff and Jeffrey L. Enright, of counsel), for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Marie Quinlivan Czech, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1986, defendant Stanley Howard was convicted of armed robbery, rape and home invasion. He was sentenced to 50 years, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence of 28 years for another armed robbery. In 1987, defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Defendant served 16 years on Death Row before he was pardoned on January 10, 2003, by then-Governor Ryan on the grounds of actual innocence. On December 24, 2003, less than a year after being pardoned, defendant filed a postconviction petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), seeking a reduction in his sentence for armed robbery, rape and home invasion. In his petition, defendant asserted that he was entitled to a reduction because he served 16 years of his sentence under harsh Death Row conditions and endured extreme mental anguish from facing execution for a crime he did not commit. The circuit court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to modify defendant's sentence and dismissed the petition with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant contends that his petition invokes the broad equitable powers of the circuit court to prevent enforcement of a judgment when enforcement would be unjust. The State, on the other hand, takes a much more restrictive view and argues that the circuit court can only grant relief where the petitioner brings to its attention evidence which was in existence at the time of judgment and which, if then known, would have precluded its entry. The sole issue on appeal is whether section 2-1401 grants a circuit court equitable powers to reduce a previously imposed sentence, where the petition is based on a postjudgment change in the circumstances of the defendant's confinement. We review this question of law de novo. See City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill.2d 191, 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998).

Section 2-1401, formerly section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 72), provides a comprehensive statutory procedure by which final orders, judgments, and decrees may be vacated after 30 days from their entry. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill.2d 209, 220, 102 Ill. Dec. 368, 499 N.E.2d 1381, 1386 (1986). Subsection (a) of section 2-1401 states:

"Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in Section 6 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, there shall be no distinction between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to availability of relief, grounds for relief or the relief obtainable." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2002).

Although section 2-1401 is characterized as a civil remedy, its powers extend to criminal cases. People v. Haynes, 192 Ill.2d 437, 460-61, 249 Ill.Dec. 779, 737 N.E.2d 169, 182 (2000).

The State contends that our supreme court never wavered in its requirement that newly discovered evidence forming the basis of a section 2-1401 petition has to have been in existence at the time of the judgment. In support, the State relies on language in Haynes, 192 Ill.2d at 463, 249 Ill.Dec. 779, 737 N.E.2d 169, quoting Russell v. Klein, 58 Ill.2d 220, 225, 317 N.E.2d 556, 559 (1974) ("section 2-1401 is available `for relief based on matters which antedate the rendition of the judgment and not those which arise subsequent to its rendition'"), People ex rel. Carey v. Rosin, 75 Ill.2d 151, 158, 25 Ill.Dec. 816, 387 N.E.2d 692, 695 (1979) ("Section 72 is not available to attack a judgment on the grounds that evidence which did not even exist at the time of that judgment (i.e., defendant's postconviction behavior) should have been presented"), and People v. Berland, 74 Ill.2d 286, 313-14, 24 Ill.Dec. 508, 385 N.E.2d 649, 661-62 (1978), quoting Ephraim v. People, 13 Ill.2d 456, 458, 150 N.E.2d 152, 153 (1958) ("A section 72 proceeding is the forum in which `to correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and the court at the time of trial, which, if then known, would have prevented the judgment'"). The State further points out that in Haynes, the supreme court rejected the defendant's section 2-1401 petition challenging a finding of fitness to stand trial, where the defendant relied on evidence that he was diagnosed with and treated for mental illness after he was convicted and sentenced. Haynes, 192 Ill.2d at 463, 249 Ill.Dec. 779, 737 N.E.2d 169. The supreme court explained that such post-judgment evidence does not provide a proper basis for relief because it "did not exist at the time of defendant's fitness hearing * * * and therefore could not have been presented to the trial court for its consideration during those proceedings." Haynes, 192 Ill.2d at 463, 249 Ill. Dec. 779, 737 N.E.2d 169. Thus, the State would contend that new evidence which was not in existence at the time of the judgment cannot be used as the basis of a section 2-1401 petition — even where such evidence sheds new light upon relevant prejudgment facts or conditions and thus, in hindsight, calls into question the propriety of the judgment. Obviously, if the State is correct in its contention that the supreme court's decisions unequivocally require newly discovered evidence to have been in existence at the time of trial, we would have to conclude that the circuit court here cannot grant defendant relief because defendant relies on the conditions of his Death Row confinement — evidence which was not in existence when the trial court imposed the sentence for armed robbery, rape and home invasion.

Defendant, however, disputes that the supreme court categorically foreclosed consideration of evidence which arose after the judgment. Defendant initially cites to broad language in People v. Lawton, 212 Ill.2d 285, 297, 288 Ill.Dec. 638, 818 N.E.2d 326, 334 (2004), wherein the supreme court stated that "[o]ne of the guiding principles in the administration of section 2-1401 relief is that the petition invokes the equitable powers of the circuit court to prevent enforcement of a judgment when doing so would be unfair, unjust, or unconscionable." In Lawton, our supreme court also noted that in defining the relief available, the General Assembly used the broadest possible terms. See Lawton, 212 Ill.2d at 297, 288 Ill.Dec. 638, 818 N.E.2d 326. Because "[r]elief should be granted under section 2-1401 when necessary to achieve justice," and because the statute is to be construed liberally, the supreme court expressed that it is improper to impose restrictions that "the language of the statute does not include and that the purposes of the statute cannot accommodate." Lawton, 212 Ill.2d at 298-99, 288 Ill.Dec. 638, 818 N.E.2d 326. Defendant points out that section 2-1401, on its face, contains no language limiting the circuit court to considering only petitions predicated on events that occurred prior to the judgment.

Further, defendant characterizes the language relied upon by the State as out-of-context dicta. With respect to Haynes, defendant asserts that the supreme court disallowed the use of postjudgment evidence because it was not probative of the defendant's mental state at the time of the fitness hearing and, therefore, could not cast doubt upon the trial court's finding of fitness. Defendant posits that Haynes did not suggest that evidence that comes into being after the judgment and is probative of the judgment's propriety can never be considered. In this regard, we note that in its earlier decision in People v. Hinton, 52 Ill.2d 239, 245, 287 N.E.2d 657, 660 (1972), a case similar to Haynes, the supreme court did indeed qualify that it "[did not] intend to suggest that subsequent occurrences can never be considered in determining merits of a section 72 petition."

Defendant next points to the decision of this court in Saeed v. Bank of Ravenswood, 101 Ill.App.3d 20, 26, 56 Ill.Dec. 526, 427 N.E.2d 858 (1981), wherein we held that a circuit court may consider facts occurring subsequent to the judgment "as part of the total circumstances surrounding the * * * judgment" and stated the following regarding the language from Russell relied upon by the State:

"[R]eliance on this quotation demonstrates the danger inherent in taking a statement out of context and applying it in a strictly literal sense to a different situation. The main issue in Russell was whether section 72 should be construed as the exclusive remedy for all types of postjudgment relief, such that the two-year [period of] limitation would likewise apply.

* * *

* * * We believe a fair reading of this statement, in context, is that the writ of audita querela is encompassed by section 72 to the extent that the relief sought pertains to matters in existence before the judgment. Where the judgment debtor seeks relief based on matters arising subsequent to judgment, however, the two-year limit of ...