People v. Howell

• Decision Date: 30 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 46625,46625
• Citation: 60 Ill.2d 117,324 N.E.2d 403
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Johnny HOWELL, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 403

324 N.E.2d 403

60 Ill.2d 117

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Johnny HOWELL, Appellant.

No. 46625.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 30, 1975.

Rehearing Denied March 24, 1975.

Robert E. Farrell and Richard E. Cunningham, Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for the people.

RYAN, Justice:

Defendant was arrested on September 13, 1971, in connection with an attempted armed robbery and shooting in a tavern in East St. Louis. He was confined in jail until he was indicted 65 days later. No preliminary hearing was held, and no issue was raised in the trial court concerning the failure to hold a prompt preliminary hearing. While finding that the 65-day delay violated the defendant's constitutional right to a prompt preliminary hearing, the appellate court held that the error did not require a reversal of the conviction. (16 Ill.App.3d 989, 307 N.E.2d 172.) We granted leave to appeal.

Section 7 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:

'No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either the initial charge has been brought by an indictment of a grand jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.'

The above provision of the Constitution was submitted to the convention by the Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission. The committee had made a change in the wording of the proposed draft and explained the change as follows:

'This change makes it clear that a person must either be charged initially by grand jury indictment or given a prompt preliminary hearing before being held to answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary.' 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2600.

Thus under this constitutional provision the defendant held on a criminal charge punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary must be afforded a prompt probable-cause determination of the validity of the charge either at a preliminary hearing or by an indictment by a grand jury. People v. Kent, 54 Ill.2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710; People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill.2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724.

Without question, holding the defendant in this case under a criminal charge for 65 days without giving him a prompt preliminary hearing or presenting his case to a grand jury violated the letter and intent of section 7 of article I of the 1970 Constitution. The appellate court so held, and in this court the State does not contest that holding. What consequences then flow from such a violation? The legislature has not fashioned a remedy of discharge for a violation of this section as it has for the violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial. (Ill.Const. (1970), art. I, sec. 8; see Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 103--5.) We acknowledged this absence of a remedy in People v. Hendrix and stated:

'The second paragraph of section 7 does not provide a grant of immunity from prosecution as a sanction for its violation. Nor would an interpretatiion make sense which required the dismissal of the present indictment and the discharge of the defendant, to be followed by his reindictment and rearrest upon a new indictment.' 54 Ill.2d 165, 169, 295 N.E.2d 724, 727.

The nature of the remedy available to a defendant for a violation of section 7 is of little concern in the disposition of the present case. We find the defendant precluded from raising the question of the violation of this section by his failure to present the issue to the trial court. At no time before, during or after trial was complaint made to the trial court that the defendant had not been given a prompt preliminary hearing. The issue was raised for the first time in the appellate court. That court considered this violation to be plain error affecting substantial rights and thus reviewable under the provisions of our Rule 615(a) (50 Ill.2d R. 615(a)).

In People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280, 282, 296 N.E.2d 856, this court summarized the question of waiver and the consideration of plain error under Rule 615(a). We there held that, generally, failure to raise an issue in the trial court constitutes a waiver and that this general waiver rule also applies to constitutional issues. We there held that Rule 615(a) does not mandate that a reviewing court consider all errors involving substantial rights whether or not they had been raised in the trial court. Rather the rule is intended as a means of meliorating the harshness of the strict application of the waiver rule. It permits the court on review to take notice of errors appearing upon the record which deprive the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial and in criminal cases in which the evidence is closely balanced to consider errors that have not been properly preserved.

Thus, the fact that substantial rights are involved does not mandate a consideration of the violation of section 7 when the same has not been properly preserved for review. Under the facts of this case we do not feel that the denial of this right deprived the accused of a substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial. Nor do we consider that the evidence is closely balanced. The defendant and another man attempted to rob a tavern in East St. Louis. Three persons in the tavern definitely identified the defendant. They had an opportunity to clearly view him in the tavern. He was identified from pictures, and he was identified in...